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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, and especially since 1983, a controversial
national debate has been taking place relative to the question whether
banks' should be allowed to sell and underwrite all types of insur-
ance.2 This is but a segment of the debate concerning the limits of
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "bank(s)" includes commercial banks, and
where the context permits, bank holding companies, but excludes savings banks,
savings and loan institutions, investment banks and other depository or nonde-
pository institutions.
2. At present banks are permitted very limited insurance activities. What type of
activities are permissible depends on the regulatory entity exercising control over
the particular bank.
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financial services and products that banks and bank holding compa-
nies should be allowed to offer. This matter has been brought to a
head by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA).3 The
purpose of this study is to focus on the question of whether the con-
sumer 4 of bank and insurance services or products would retain the
protections envisioned by the regulatory schemes imposed since the
1930s if bank services and products were expanded to include the un-
derwriting and selling of insurance of all kinds.
One of the main goals of the federal and state banking and insur-
ance regulatory schemes5 is the maintenance of bank and insurer sol-
vency6 to the end that consumers of their services and products be
protected from failure of the institutions to which their money was
entrusted.7 Each financial institution carries its own particular type of
3. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
It is the intent of the Congress, through the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives, to con-
duct a comprehensive review of our banking and financial laws and to
make decisions on the need for financial restructuring legislation in the
light of today's changing financial environment both domestic and inter-
national before the expiration of such moratorium.
Id. § 203(a), 101 Stat. at 584.
4. The term "consumer" refers to the bank depositor, insurance policyholder, or
beneficiary of the policy.
5. "[Blanking has historically been one of the most heavily regulated industries."
LASH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS 22 (1987) [hereinafter LASH].
6. Id. at 23; WiLLIAM H. LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 121-25 [hereinafter LOVETT]. Between 1920 and 1933, when there was
little regulation, 16,000 banks were closed. Between 1934 and 1982, after the 1933
regulations came into existence, only 765 banks failed. Id. at 125. However, bank
failures have started rising in recent years, due to, according to some commenta-
tors, deregulation of interest limitations on commercial banks. Geoffrey P.
Miller, Banking Regulation, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1987). During the entire decade of the 1970s there were only 76 bank
failures, but in 1985 alone 118 failed outright or received FDIC assistance. Id.
"The assurance of the safety of deposits, therefore, is a basic objective that bank
regulation is designed to achieve." Richard H. Whiting, A Perspective on Finan-
cial Services Restructuring, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 347, 357-58 (1988)(emphasis ad-
ded)[hereinafter Whiting]; "Since the primary regulatory goals of the members of
the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] are maintaining in-
surer solvency and consumer protection .. " Bruce W. Foundree, Statement on
Behalfof the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, submitted to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on the Integration of
Financial Services, 2 NAIC PROCEEDINGS 91 (1983)[hereinafter Foundree];
"Wrapped in the wonders of the new and exciting, there is a danger that even the
most seasoned public policy-makers can lose sight of their basic insurance regula-
tory goal-solvency." John R. Dunne, Risk, Reality, and Reason in Financial Serv-
ices Deregulation: A State Legislative Perspective, 2 JOURNAL OF INSURANCE
REGULATION 342, 348 (1983)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Dunne].
7. Other goals of banking regulation are: (1) providing competition to prevent con-
centration of economic power, (2) lending for social purposes, (3) protecting the
consumer (e.g. Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Consumer
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risk.8 Would consolidating or concentrating several risks into a con-
glomerate financial entity increase those risks? When the iron curtain
of institutional separation and segregation is removed, would the
forces of competition exert their muscle with the potential result that
efficient entities will thrive and grow, but the less efficient ones shall
fail and the consumers' savings get the knockout blow?9
Credit Protection Act), and (4) providing an environment for monetary policy.
Whiting, supra note 6, at 357-59 and LAsH, supra note 5, at 22-25. Other goals of
insurance regulation are: (1) product dependability, (2) strong insurance mar-
kets with adequate capacity and availability of coverage, (3) competition for busi-
ness with fair pricing, buying opportunities and claim settlement, and (4)
deconcentration of power and risks. See Dunne, supra note 6, at 348; see also,
Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services: Blueprint for Re-
form (Part 1), Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, 99th Congress, 1st Sess. 307 (1985) [hereinafter Bush Task
Force Report].
8. One of the primary concerns of insurance regulators is the concentration
of risks which appears to be contemplated or occurring in the financial
services sector. Individually, operations of insurers, securities broker-
dealers, banks, savings and loans, and real estate companies involve
enough hazards and difficulties in today's environment. A growing in-
terest in offering insurance, banking and lending, securities, and real es-
tate services under one roof carries with it the potential combination of
insurance, credit, investment, and property risks not previously known
or foreseen. It is this concentration, to the extent it occurs, which insur-
ance regulators look upon with considerable apprehension. Problems of
regulation are compounded by such combinations; the ability of regula-
tors to protect consumers is affected.
Foundree, supra note 6, at 92.
In the course of their lending activities, banks take credit risks with a
duration of years in many cases. Whether the borrower is an individual,
a corporation or even a government entity, the bank must make a judg-
ment whether future conditions will be such that the borrower will be
able to repay the loan, and this judgment is subject to all the unforeseen
events that may shape domestic or foreign economies. Regulatory con-
trols such as lending limits, capital ratios and bad debt reserves are
designed to insure that credit risks are diversified, and that the bank has
adequate resources to absorb losses that may occur. Nevertheless, so
long as banks lend funds to borrowers the banking business necessarily
involves substantial risks that are generally greater than found in most
other financial activities. Because of the degree of credit risk necessarily
involved, for example, corporate lending by banks is inherently more
risky than any type of strictly brokerage activity, whether involving real
estate, insurance or securities, so long as the broker is not acting as a
principal.
Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 330-31.
9. Several commentators have raised concern about competitive forces:
As the number of conglomerates and holding companies has grown to be
the predominant form of business, the pressure for positive financial re-
sults has increased. The recent recession, high but uncertain interest
rates, and the on-again-off-again financial deregulation proposals of the
federal and state governments have intensified the pressure for in-
creased positive results.
Managers have responded with some of the most inventive, creative
and aggressive financial tactics. But some of those methods, involving
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Divergent views are being expressed, sometimes with great vehe-
mence, and numerous proposals suggesting various deregulatory mod-
ifications to present law are being submitted. To understand the
nature of these proposals it is necessary to analyze the nature and
structure of our dual banking system, its evolution, the jurisdictional
framework of the regulating bodies, and the present statutory um-
brella, all as related to the protection of the consumer. Similarly, the
regulatory system of the insurance industry, as related to the protec-
tion of the policyowner and the beneficiary, needs to be reviewed. Re-
gardless of action by Congress, it is almost certain that:
the distinctions between different types of depository institutions, and be-
tween depository and other financial services institutions, will continue to
fade. The Garn-St Germain Act greatly expanded the bank-like powers of
thrift institutions, while retaining the legal distinction of these institutions as
a separate industry. This Act built upon the expansion of powers initiated by
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
the use and abuse of holding company systems and the transactions that
occur within them, have raised serious fundamental questions regarding
corporate and regulatory laws insofar as adequate protection of the pub-
lic interest is concerned.
John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding Compa-
nies, 20 FORUM 445 (Spring 1985) [hereinafter Dunne, FORUM].
We have concluded that the holding company device, when it involves
affiliation with non-insurance enterprises, jeopardizes the interest of
both the public and the policyholder, and especially will do so if its devel-
opment is indiscriminant and without benefit of close regulatory
supervision.
Id. at 446, citing Insurance Department, State of New York, Report of the Special
Committee on Insurance Holding Companies (Feb. 15, 1968) p.7 .
Other observers believe that competitive forces rather than government
agencies or laws should be allowed to structure the marketplace. In this
view unrestrained entry into financial services markets will produce effi-
cient markets, free of the distortions and inefficiencies that are usually
created by government attempts to organize market activity. Many of
these observers believe that the appropriate focus of government should
be to promote efficient, competitive markets by prohibiting negative
practices (such as monopolization, fraud, inadequate disclosure or capi-
talization, etc.).... These observers believe that institutions should have
the maximum possible degree of flexibility to determine their own busi-
ness activities in light of market conditions and competition, with gov-
ernment rules restricted to those necessary to prevent unfair
competition and to encourage, but not require, favored types of activities.
Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 319-20.
In theory, product diversification would make it possible for banks to
reduce the volatility of their earnings, thereby reducing their likelihood
of failure .... The freedom to diversify, however, could increase instabil-
ity in the banking system because of the danger that funds raised from
insured depositors will be used to support unduly risky investments.
This danger arises not only from the fact that managers and sharehold-
ers of some banks may be risk-seeking, but also from the "moral hazard"
created by fixed-rate deposit insurance.
Robert E. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product De-
regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1985).
[Vol. 71:726
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Many new state laws in recent years have also significantly expanded the per-
missible activities of state-chartered credit unions, thrift institutions and
banks. Accordingly, many of the purely legal distinctions between the tradi-
tional categories of depository institutions have disappeared, although many
individual institutions will almost certainly continue to specialize in particular
products or services. In addition, depositories will increasingly enter activities
traditionally limited to investment banking, brokerage and insurance firms,
and vice-versa.
To the extent they occur the foregoing changes will tend to intensify the
difficulties of the existing regulatory system in providing equitable and consis-
tent regulatory treatment of financial institutions. They will also cause in-
creasingly severe problems of conflicting regulatory policies and duplication,
as more and more institutions become subject to multiple regulatory agencies.
Without modification the current system is probably incapable of resolving
the conflicts and inequities that have already occurred among financial insti-
tutions, and such problems can only be expected to worsen over time.10
II. EVOLUTION OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Banking Prior to the Civil War
1. From the Revolutionary War to 1836
The Revolutionary War was financed in a haphazard manner; both
the Continental Congress and the states issued paper money which
depreciated rapidly.11 If the new republic was to survive, a more for-
mal method of conducting financial transactions had to be developed.
At the urging of Alexander Hamilton, the Bank of North America was
created and chartered by the Continental Congress in 1782. Its notes' 2
were redeemable in specie and its business was conducted profitably.
Unfortunately, its very success brought about its demise as a "na-
tional" or "central" bank.13 The general agrarian attitude that such a
"central" bank was business oriented to the detriment of agricultural
interests caused the Continental Congress to repeal its perpetual char-
ter and issue a short term charter.14
10. Bush Task Force Report, supra note 7, at 320-21.
11. The notes issued were not freely convertible into specie. In fact the Continental
notes were eventually redeemed at one cent on the dollar. See LASH, supra note
5, at 2.
12. During this period, extension of credit was by means of notes, not deposits. Bor-
rowers from banks were given bank notes which became "money" since they
were transferable from person to person.
13. Its function, aside from accepting deposits and making short term loans, was to
assist in government financing. LAsH, supra note 5, at 1. However, it was by no
means a central bank.
14. This occurred a mere four years after the original charter was issued. In 1787 it
obtained a charter from Pennsylvania and continued its activities as a state bank.
The hostility against concentrated banking power, both private and public, has
continued throughout the history of the United States and has lead to an ex-
tremely complicated dual banking system. The dual system is also at least partly
responsible for the haphazard regulatory system that has evolved. Instead of cre-
1992]
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Notwithstanding the opposition of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, was able to con-
vince Congress to charter the First United States Bank in 1791 for a
period of twenty years. It had broader powers than the Bank of North
America, but it still could not be considered a central bank since it was
not a clearinghouse, a depository of banks, a creator of reserves nor
the lender of last resort. The bank's charter prohibited it from owning
real estate other than its place of business and from buying or selling
goods and real estate.' 5
Meanwhile, many state chartered banksi6 issued notes in huge
quantities.' 7 The ability of these state banks to redeem the notes was
rather questionable. The regulatory schemes of the states' s were not
adequate to control the volume and quality of the notes issued.19 As a
result, the First Bank of the United States, whenever it received state
bank notes, would immediately present them to the issuing banks for
redemption in "real" money, gold or silver coins issued by the First
Bank of the United States. To a degree, this restrained state bank
note issues, but it did not endear the Bank to the state banks, who
added their voices to the anti Bank forces.2 0 Because of the com-
plaints of state banks, among other reasons, Congress 2 ' allowed the
Bank's charter to expire and the Bank to cease operations in 1811.
Consequently state banks proliferated,22 issuing notes without limita-
tion.2 3 The War of 1812 proved the need for a strong national bank
ating a well planned regulatory system, Congress and state legislatures enacted
laws in knee-jerk fashion, responding to financial crises as they arose. See gener-
ally, Daviel R. Fischel, et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301 (1987). The discussion and analysis in this paper will
reflect the development of the banking system in the United States in light of this
antibank phobia. It is for this reason that a certain portion of this paper is being
devoted to the historic aspects of banking. It may be observed that when Penn-
sylvania issued its 1787 charter to the Bank of North America it expressly prohib-
ited the bank from owning more real estate than needed for its place of business.
Under present law national banks are similarly limited. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
15. To make sure that the Federal Government would not usurp economic power
through the Bank, its stock ownership was limited to 20%, the other 80% to be
owned by private stockholders.
16. By 1811 there were 88 state chartered banks.
17. In 1811 state bank notes outstanding amounted to $22.7 million, an immense sum
for that time.
18. Until 1863, bank regulation was almost entirely a state matter.
19. Paradoxically, the states themselves were prohibited by the Constitution from
issuing notes.
20. Jefferson, Madison and Randolph believed that the Bank was unconstitutional.
However, the Supreme Court held the Second Bank of the United States to be
constitutional in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21. In spite of the fact that the Bank had operated successfully, was well managed,
and had accomplished the objectives sought when it was chartered.
22. By 1816 there were 246.
23. By 1816 $68 million was outstanding.
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because the overissued notes of the state banks24 depreciated quickly,
giving rise to rampant inflation.
Viewing the chaotic monetary situation, Jefferson and Madison, in
a complete turn-about, proposed and fervently supported the creation
of the Second Bank of the United States. In 1816 Congress issued a
twenty year charter to the Second Bank. Although it began its trans-
actions during a financial crisis, the Bank worked well,25 bringing dis-
cipline to the economy.2 6 However, between 1829 and 1837 Andrew
Jackson and his agrarian party campaigned to destroy the Bank. The
classical fear, suspicion and resentment against concentrated power,
foreign domination 27 and mercantile interests and the desire for more
latitude for state banks impelled the Jacksonians to bring about the
end of the Bank.28 The response of the economy was the Panic of 1837
which started a depression that lasted until 1842.
2. The State Free Banking System, 1837 to 1864
After the rise and fall of the first and second national banks, it
should have been apparent that without the discipline of a strong cen-
tral bank, the unrestrained and unfettered practices of state banks
could result only in economic chaos. Nevertheless, the anti-national
bank sentiment was so strong that not only was there no new national
bank charter issued by Congress, but the states made entry into the
banking field easier. Until 1837 bank charters were issued only by
special legislative acts, a practice which amounted to a grant of monop-
olistic power.29 This did not comport with democratic ideals and lais-
24. Notes were, for the most part, the only currency available to finance the war.
25. It did not do well in its first three years under its first president, William Jones.
Under his lax leadership, issuance of state bank notes were not properly re-
strained. The proliferation of state bank notes lead to speculation in land which
culminated in the panic of 1819. Jones was then replaced.
26. Under the next two presidents, Chives and Biddle, note issues were curtailed
through prompt presentation for redemption in specie. Lending practices were
also tightened, and Bank notes were issued through all branches, making the cur-
rency more uniform throughout the country.
27. A large portion of the stock of the Bank was held by foreigners.
28. Jackson transferred all United States deposits from the Bank to state banks and
vetoed the bill extending its charter. The Bank ceased as a national bank in 1836.
It continued its existence for a short while as a Pennsylvania state bank but even-
tually went bankrupt in 1841.
29. The economic advantage of a bank charter was well appreciated by bath the ap-
plicants and the politicians granting it. Chicanery and bribery were not excluded
as a means of obtaining the license to such a fruitful tree. All parties concerned
benefitted from the transaction: the legislators received meaningful gifts, the
state had access to a source of low interest loans and the banker obtained the
right to issue notes. See Thomas F. Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institu-
tions: A Historical Perspective on Current Issues, in FINANCiAL SERviCES: THE
CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENT PoLicY, 9 (George J. Benston ed.,
1983).
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sez-faire principles and thus the "free banking" method of chartering
was introduced.30
The State of New York passed the Free Banking Act in 18383'
which allowed anyone to obtain a charter so long as the applicant com-
plied with minimum capital requirements and submitted to supervi-
sion and control.32 By 1860 eighteen states adopted free banking. With
the vast proliferation of bank notes which followed, the nation fell
into financial chaos.
B. The National Free Banking System, 1864 to 1933
1. Prior to 1913
To finance the Civil War, Congress in 1863, and with substantial
revision in 1864, passed the National Bank Act of 1864.33 The Act's
immediate goal was to bring about a system of national banks with a
single uniform currency.34 The Act established the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) to screen applicants for charters, is-
sue charters, supervise the national banks and regulate the currency.
The chartering was modeled on the New York free banking system.
The dual banking system has thus been brought into existence, even
though not so intended. In fact the intention was to displace the state
banking system. To "encourage" state banks to switch to national
charters and to cease issuing bank notes, a two percent tax on state
bank notes was imposed. The response was less than spectacular; few
state banks made the switch and state bank notes continued to prolif-
erate. By hiking the tax to ten percent3 5 Congress persuaded the ma-
jority of state banks to change to national charters.36 State bank notes
30. From 1837 to 1863 banking became entirely a state matter.
31. Michigan was the first state to pass a free banking law in 1837.
32. Interestingly enough, a concomitant of free banking was the introduction of bank
regulation. New York and other states, concerned about the safety of bank notes,
required the posting of collateral, mainly bonds, and participation in safety funds,
a precursor of today's FDIC. In case of bank failure, the sale of the collateral and
monies from the safety fund would provide for the redemption of the notes.
However, lax implementation of collateral requirements, the rise of "wildcat"
banks and the rapid spread of free banking resulted in many failures. Many note-
holders and depositors lost their money. In the early 1840s, the Treasury with-
drew all its deposits from the state banks (see supra note 28) and established the
Independent Treasury System, with "subtreasuries" throughout the country
designed to transact business with the public.
33. National Bank Act of 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Act squeaked through the Senate by two votes. Had
the Southern states still been represented in Congress, the Act would have failed
because the fear of federal centralization of power and the antibank feeling could
not have been overcome.
34. It was hoped that state banks would recharter themselves as national banks.
35. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 484.
36. By 1870, the ratio of national banks to state banks was five to one.
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soon went out of existence. The goal of uniform currency had been
achieved, but the dual bank system endured. The inclination for de-
centralization and the fact that checking accounts or demand deposits
replaced bank notes as money motivated banks to obtain state char-
ters.3 7 By the turn of the twentieth century more than seventy per-
cent of the nation's banks were state banks, a ratio that is still true
today. Unfortunately there were many deficiencies in the structure of
the national banking system3s which resulted fairly regularly in bank
runs, panics and depressions.39 Free, decentralized banking had not
proven itself; a better system was needed. It came in 1913.
2. After 1913
The most pressing need facing reformers was the need for the es-
tablishment of a banking system with a strong centralized supervisory
power to provide safety and stability and an elastic currency to provide
liquidity. All this was to be accomplished in the now traditional envi-
ronment of decentralized banking.40 The result was compromise leg-
islation which gave birth to the Federal Reserve System4 ' in 1913. All
national banks were required to join, but state banks could elect to
join.42 The Act retained the three tier reserve requirements of the
national banking system,43 empowered the District Banks44 to become
lenders of last resort by rediscounting commercial paper of member
banks,45 thereby alleviating the liquidity crises that plagued the prior
system, and authorized what is now known as "open market opera-
tions"46 by permitting district banks to buy and sell government
securities.
37. The more stringent regulatory aspects of national banks were also a weighty fac-
tor in the resumption and growth of state banking.
38. Typical structural deficiencies included the inelasticity of the currency, weakness
in the reserve requirements and pyramiding of reserves.
39. The panics of 1873, 1893 and 1907.
40. There was general agreement as to the desirability of these goals, but little agree-
ment on how to implement them. The bankers proposed a National Reserve As-
sociation of Banks, to be controlled by the bankers themselves. The populists
wanted strong government supervision with government issue of currency, and
no private control. How attitudes have changed!
41. The Federal Reserve Act, Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) [hereinafter "the
Act"](codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
42. This attempt to bring the state banks under Federal regulation was not success-
ful. In 1930, about 15,000 banks out of a total of 24,000 were not member banks; in
1985, about 10,000 out of a total of 15,000 banks were not member banks.
43. As provided in the National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as a
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
44. The United States was divided into 12 districts, each with its own District Federal
Reserve Bank.
45. The so called "discount window".
46. At present, the most powerful tool to control the money supply.
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As has been indicated,47 a compelling motivation for passage of the
National Bank Act was the need for a stable bank system to finance
the Civil War. Similarly, during World War I the Federal Govern-
ment sought the aid of the banking system to participate in the financ-
ing of the war by underwriting government bonds. Thus, the
commercial banks (both state chartered and national) became accus-
tomed to intermingling commercial and investment banking. State
chartered banks had no impediment to actively engaging in securities
activities since state charters did not prohibit them from so doing.
However, even though the National Banking Act of 1864 did not pro-
hibit investment banking activities, judicial48 and administrative49
barriers prevented national banks from participating in this lucrative
post World War I business.50 To reduce the exodus of national banks
into the state chartered camps 5' and to legitimize the status of securi-
ties affiliates,52 the McFadden Act53 was passed in 1927, to permit,
among other things,54 the underwriting activities which the national
47. See supra text accompanying note 33.
48. In Logan County National Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67 (1891), the Supreme
Court held that a national bank is prohibited from performing investment bank-
ing services (in this case purchasing municipal bonds) because the National Bank-
ing Act of 1864 did not expressly confer such power. In California National Bank
v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362 (1897), the Court held, based on the same grounds, that a
national bank may not purchase or deal in the stock of another corporation.
49. In 1902, the Comptroller of the Currency issued regulations severely restricting
investment activities of national banks. See Robert J. Rogowski, Commercial
Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J. 155, 157 (1978). To over-
come these impediments (see supra note 48) many national banks pursued one of
two courses; they converted to state charters or established "securities affiliates"
by purchasing state chartered banks or establishing new entities. The legality of
these affiliates was strongly denounced in 1911 and 1912. See Comment, Securi-
ties Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 31
N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV. 215, 222-23 (1986). However, due to the need of bank assist-
ance in financing World War I, neither the Justice Department nor the Federal
Reserve attempted to halt the securities activities of the commercial banks.
50. After World War I, corporations began to rely on internal financing, from their
own profits or from new security issues, thus reducing their dependence on or
need for bank short term loans. This put banks under pressure to find other
sources of income. As a result, more and more commercial banks engaged heav-
ily in investment bank functions, the national banks using the securities affiliate
system.
51. Robert J. Rogowski, Commercial Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANK-
ING L.J. 155, 157 (1978).
52. Id.
53. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)
54. The National Banking Act prohibited national banks from establishing branches.
This reduced their ability to compete against state chartered banks which had no
such impediment. The McFadden Act made provision to permit national banks
to branch. See infra note 142. Several other provisions liberalized other limita-
tions on national banks in order to make them more competitive with state
chartered banks.
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banks had been practicing all along. Meanwhile, in order to offset the
competition of the commercial bank affiliates, investment banks en-
tered the commercial banking field by accepting deposits and making
commercial loans. By 1929 there was little left to distinguish these
two classes of institutions; the separation of banking functions had
practically disappeared.55 Then came the stock market crash of 1929,
followed by thousands of bank failures in the early 1930s. 56 The accus-
ing finger (for the causes of the crash and failures) pointed at the in-
vestment activities of commercial banks. The hearings57 Congress
held to investigate the causes of the crash brought forth a long cata-
logue of perceived ill-deeds by the commercial banking fraternity.
The stage was thus set for the Glass-Steagall Act.58
III. REGULATION OF BANKING
A. The Glass-Steagall Act and the FDIC
In view of the catastrophic results59 of the 1929 stock market crash
and the views expressed in the Congressional hearings60 thereon,
policymakers were compelled to reevaluate the system 61 and pass leg-
islation to bring about the recovery and reform of banking. The im-
mediate goals to be accomplished were:
(1) to restore public confidence in banking following the 1929 stock market
crash and the accompanying widespread bank failures; (2) to insure and main-
tain general economic stability by prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank
investments; and (3) to forestall potential conflicts of interest between com-
mercial and investment banking operations. 6 2
To achieve these goals Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933,63
four sections6 4 of which are referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act or
the Glass-Steagall wall. The "wall" alluded to is the wall between
55. See Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L. J. 483, 495-96 (1971).
56. By 1933 almost 9000 banks failed, ostensibly due to losses on speculative invest-
ments. See Matthew Clark & Anthony Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of
Glass-Steagalk The Need for Legislative Action, 97 BANING L. J. 721, 723 (1980).
57. See Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. No. 71 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Session (1931).
58. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)).
59. See Clark and Saunders, supra note 56, at 723.
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
62. See Clark and Saunders, supra note 56, at 725.
63. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)).
64. Id
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commercial and investment banking.65 The most notable activity pro-
hibited to commercial banks is the underwriting6 6 of securities. To
help restore public confidence in banking, the Banking Act of 1933
established the FDIC67 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) to in-
sure deposits up to a specified amount,68 guaranteed by the full faith
and credit of the United States. The expectation was the restoration
of public faith in the banks and prevention of future waves of panic
induced bank runs. The results have been gratifying. The period fol-
lowing 1933 has been stable and marked by relatively few bank
failures.69
Changes in the legislative and regulatory scheme during 1933-1986
were relatively minor70 and largely represented a fleshing out of the
themes established in and prior to 1933. The major exceptions were
the Bank Holding Company Act of 19567, and its amendment in 197072
and the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.73
B. Policy Goals of Federal Regulation
This section delves into the broad goals of bank regulation, the pol-
65. Glass-Steagall:
a) Prohibits national banks from buying or selling securities for their own
account. Ch. 89 § 16, 48 Stat. 184 (1937).
b) Restricts national banks from investing in debt securities. Ch. 89 § 20, 48
Stat. 188 (1933).
c) Bans national banks from underwriting or issuing securities, with excep-
tions. Ch. 89 § 21, 48 Stat. 189 (1933).
d) Prohibits national banks from affiliating with investment banking firms.
Ch. 89 § 32, 48 Stat. 194 (1933). 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) imposes these prohibitions
on state member banks, i.e. state banks which are members of the Federal Re-
serve System.
66. Underwriting securities is a practice whereby a financial intermediary, in effect,
buys the debt or equity of its client and in turn sells it to investors. The under-
writer has the potential exposure that the market will not buy the securities at or
above the price paid to its client. This risk creates a potential for particular li-
quidity problems or abuses by banks. A bank, faced with undesirable securities,
may either hold them or abuse its trust and fiduciary capacity and unload them
on unsuspecting dependent customers.
67. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1988).
68. At present the amount is $100,000 in any insured bank.
69. During the boom years of the 1920s, an average of about 600 banks annually sus-
pended operations. Then in the four years between 1930 and 1933, approximately
9000 commercial banks were closed. From 1934 to 1985 (52 years) there were 875
FDIC insured bank failures and 136 non insured bank failures, a total of 1011.
This averages to about 20 per year. CARTER H. GOLEMBE AND DAvID S. HOLLAND,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1986-87, 115-16 (1986).
70. But see sources cited supra note 3.
71. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)).
72. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
1760 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
73. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
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icy tools created to pursue these goals and the constraints that limit
the government in their pursuit.
1. The Broad Goals
Because of its tremendously profound role in the national econ-
omy, the Federal Government has a vital interest in regulating bank-
ing. The specific goals of federal banking policy fall into three
identifiable but overlapping categories: depositor or consumer protec-
tion; credit distribution/macroeconomic goals; and monetary/cyclical
economic policy.
Consumer protection includes all of those policies aimed at protect-
ing depositors' funds, insuring competitive pricing, and insuring that
banks act as relatively impartial fiduciaries for the public. Thus, the
safety of deposits is a primary objective pervading banking public pol-
icy and is considered the salient point in this study.
Credit distribution entails the government's concern for suitable
capital apportionment. Any distortion in the flows74 would have the
potential for powerful macroeconomic effects. Any geographic con-
centration of banking power or significant affiliation with a particular
economic segment would have such implications. Such distortions
could profoundly misshape economic growth and development.
The banking system plays a key role in the monetary system, the
manipulation of which has been used as a policy tool to direct or cor-
rect economic cycles. The Federal Reserve Board ("The Fed") at-
tempts to reach the desired results by affecting the supply of bank
liquidity through open-market operations, reserve requirements and
the discount rate.75
2. General Constraints on Federal Banking Policy
Federal banking policy is constrained by concerns .for economic ef-
ficiency, the balancing of federal authority and states' rights,76 and the
fungible and global nature of capital and capital markets.
In pursuing any of the three aforementioned areas of banking pol-
icy, policy makers must be aware of the costs of their actions.77 Bank-
74. Proper credit allocation involves the furthering of general economic growth
through capital flow to its most productive use free of any systematic, geographic,
industrial or other biases that would work against a healthy free market
economy.
75. The Board is required under 12 U.S.C. § 225a (1982) to "maintain long run growth
of the monetary and credit aggregates.., so as to promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates."
76. See supra text accompanying notes 34-48.
77. As with any public policy, the makers must balance the costs and benefits associ-
ated with particular actions. For banking policy, this implies a balancing of finan-
cial safety and economic efficiency.
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ing policy makers must constantly maintain the right balance of risk
and efficiency. A particular policy may be to ensure deposit safety,
but come only at a prohibitive cost. For example, Congress could fully
guarantee the stability of deposit institutions by requiring all deposito-
ries to hold U.S. Treasury bonds exclusively. This however would not
be an appropriate mix of risk and efficiency. In this case the decrease
in risk does not offset the high opportunity costs of channeling money
into relatively low yield and low productivity areas.
The balancing of federal and state authority over banking is a con-
cern where such regulation affects local matters and also has national
implications. Banking represents an important part of intrastate ac-
tivity with interstate implications. Consequently much of the federal
banking legislation reflects this concern.78
The business of banking is money. This creates specific concerns
for the public policy maker. Money and its derivatives, debt and eq-
uity, are highly fungible and fluid and are relatively inexpensive to
transfer and change form.79 As a result banking is a regulated indus-
try that lends itself to avoidance and evasions. A bank, by slightly
modifying a particular practice, may be able to achieve substantially
the same result as that which is prohibited by law or regulation.8 0
78. Under our dual banking system, the states and the federal government may char-
ter banks. The National Bank Act of 1864, Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), regulates federally chartered banks
but not state banks, nor affiliates of national banks. Thus a national bank,
through a holding company, could engage in activities that would have been for-
bidden to the national bank itself. This loophole became apparent in the two
decades prior to the 1930s. See supra note 49. Congress attempted to remedy the
situation through the Glass-Steagall provisions. However, the means attempted
by those measures proved ineffective. To cure the problem Congress passed the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)). Congress was careful in its provisions not to encroach
on the power of the states to regulate their state chartered banks or their bank
holding companies. The present issue of the "South Dakota Loophole" is one of
the manifestations of this deference to state sovereignty. See infra text accompa-
nying note 295.
79. Money is simply a medium of exchange and a store of value. Debt and equity
instruments all have values in present terms and are readily exchangeable.
80. An example is the sale of loans. A bank originating a loan is free to sell the loan
as it would a bond or other asset. Quite often a loan is sold off in pieces corre-
sponding to different maturity periods in the future. For example, a bank
originating a five year loan may sell off the first two years to one party, the sec-
ond two years to another party and keep the last year for itself. This practice is
confined to very large scale loans and the periods sold are typically 30-90 days.
Phillip L. Zweig, Major New York Banks Initiate Tactic of Selling Short Term
'Strips' of Loans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1986, at 10. This practice is, from a regula-
tory perspective, similar to underwriting commercial paper or very short term
marketable credit which is prohibited by Glass-Steagall. But see infra note 219
for a decision (June 13, 1988) permitting limited underwriting activity in commer-
cial paper.
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These effects are further aggravated by the existence of integrated
and global financial markets8 ' which make it more difficult for regula-
tors to contain banking within the desired limits.
C. The Policy Implementing Tools (Regulatory Mechanisms)
The foregoing concerns have produced a broad arsenal of policy
regulating tools which are administered by several regulatory entities.
Unfortunately these entities overlap,8 2 as do the laws creating the reg-
ulatory scheme. The regulatory limitations will be examined in a
functional sense rather than chronologically or by statutory classifica-
tion. A caveat is necessary at this point: It is not the objective of this
portion of this study to set forth a thorough analysis of the regulatory
scheme but merely to present a simple and broad summary which fo-
cuses on the concept of safety and soundness with a view to examining
the underlying question raised in the introductory portion of this pa-
per. Thus the following generalizations do not include all the relevant
substance and detail.
1. Entry Restrictions
Except during the short periods when the Bank of the United
StatesS3 exerted some restraining influence, entry into banking was
practically unregulated.84 The threshold requirement for the promo-
tion of safety, soundness and diminishment of risk (the first of the
aforementioned policy goals) would logically impose a standard on the
qualifications of persons to be permitted to enter the field and place
restrictions on the environmental structure in which a bank is to be
81. The computer technology has enabled instantaneous communication of financial
information on a global scale facilitating bank activity in underwriting, distribut-
ing and dealing in debt and equity securities in foreign markets such as the
Euromarket. See Hearing on Globalization of Capital Markets and the Securi-
tization of Credit, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For legal authorization of such
activities see 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13)(1992).
82. National banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), and because they are required to be members of the Federal Reserve and
the FDIC, they also are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board (12 U.S.C.
§ 248(a) and (j)(1988)), as well as the FDIC (12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 and 1814 (1988)).
State member banks (state banks may elect to join the "Fed" or the FDIC; but
joining the "Fed" requires also joining the FDIC) are regulated by the Federal
Reserve Board (12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988)) and the FDIC (12 U.S.C. § 1814 (1988)) and
the appropriate state regulatory agency. State nonmember banks which elect to
be insured by FDIC are regulated by the FDIC (12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1988)) and the
appropriate state regulatory agency.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 24.
84. See supra text following note 31.
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opened. The National Bank Act of 186485 did just that. It established
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency6 charging that Office
with the responsibility of determining8 7 which applicants shall be per-
mitted to "commence business."8 8 The several states have similar re-
quirements which are more or less stringent. State banks applying for
Federal Reserve membership8 9 are to be approved or rejected by the
Federal Reserve Board9O under criteria similar to those used by the
OCC.91 State banks, member or nonmember, applying for FDIC cov-
erage are to be evaluated by the Board of Directors of the FDIC by a
similar yardstick.92 It appears that application of these standards has
85. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
87. Id. § 26.
88. Applicants for a bank charter must file a formal "application" with ex-
tensive supporting data. The organizers must outline their plan of oper-
ations, describe earning prospects, provide details on management
capabilities (involving bank executives with appropriate experience,
under contract or part of the organizing group), show adequate capitali-
zation and soundness, and offer reasonable service to their community.
In addition, the Comptroller's Office (OCC) and State Bank Depart-
ments require information on market circumstances, i.e., size and
growth potential, and competition from existing banks and related finan-
cial institutions. Notice of the application must be published, which al-
lows other interested parties (normally competing institutions already in
the market) to file protests and relevant data. This provides ample basis
for determining whether a particular charter might meet the conven-
ience and needs of its community, taking into account competitive cir-
cumstances.
In other words, new entrants often have to demonstrate not only fi-
nancial resources and managerial competence but show also that the
market in question (a city or rural area) could accommodate another
banking institution. This means, in practice, that a substantial limitation
on the flow of new entry may be asserted by the existing banks in an
area as protestants against additional rivals. Whether or not this resist-
ance will be effective depends on how these factors are evaluated, in the
discretion of federal and state chartering authorities.
Lovxrr, supra note 6, at 103 and 104.
89. Under 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988).
90. Under 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1988).
91. See Lov=zr supra note 6, at 103 and 104.
92. § 1816.
The factors to be enumerated in the certificate required under section
1814 of this title and to be considered by the Board of Directors under
section 1815 of this title shall be the following: The financial history and
condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future
earnings prospects, the general character of its management, the conven-
ience and needs of the community to be served by the bank, and whether
or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this
chapter.
12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988). The court in City National Bank v. Smith, 513 F.2d 479,
480-1, (D.C. Cir. 1975)(citing 12 C.F.R. § 4.2(b)(1974)), explained that:
The dual purpose of the chartering process is to regulate entry into the
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worked well in the chartering process of banks.
2. Capitalization Requirements
Safety and soundness of any business entity, especially a banking
business, requires a minimum infusion of initial capital by the or-
ganizers of the business. The National Bank Act so provides for the
minimum initial capital.93 Although present federal minimums range
between $50,000 and $200,000,94 depending on the location of the bank,
as a practical matter the minimum is $1,000,000 by OCC require-
ments.9 5 Capital adequacy requirements are measured as a percentage
of total assets. The "Fed" and the OCC recently issued a single set of
guidelines for capital adequacy of national banks, state member banks
and bank holding companies. 96
An adjunct to the capital adequacy requirement is the reserve re-
quirement. The Fed is mandated97 to prescribe by regulation the rate
of reserves to be maintained by member banks against their transac-
tion or deposit accounts. The function of the reserve is to force banks
to hold enough cash as a buttress against potential bank runs. More
importantly, by having the power to change reserve requirements, the
Fed can, to some degree, also implement monetary policy.98 The Fed
banking industry on the basis of economic considerations and to assure
that national banks are competently and honestly operated. These
objectives are reflected in the topics subject to investigation prior to ap-
proval of applications for charters:
(1) The adequacy of the proposed bank's structure.
(2) The earning prospects of the proposed bank.
(3) The convenience and needs of the community to be served by the
proposed bank.
(4) The character and general standing in the community of the appli-
cants, prospective directors, proposed officers, and other employees, and
other persons connected with the application or to be connected with the
proposed bank.
(5) The banking ability and experience of those officers and other
employees.
93. 12 U.S.C. § 51 (1988). State laws have similar requirements.
94. Id.
95. LOvErrr, supra note 6, at 106.
96. Acceptable ratios are: above 6.5% for multinational and regional banks, above 7%
for community banks. The FDIC has a 2% total capital to total asset ratio, 12
C.F.R. § 325.4 (1992). What these ratios mean is that for every $1 of assets, $.02
(the FDIC ratio) must come from bank capital. The bank regulatory agencies
have the discretion to raise these minimums for individual banks based on their
financial histories or present financial conditions such as loans of questionable
quality, earnings capacity and other considerations.
97. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
98. The Federal Reserve System has two additional means to manipulate the money
supply. Each Federal Reserve bank (see supra note 44) has the power to buy and
sell U.S. securities in the open market, 12 U.S.C. § 355 (1988). For every dollar of
such securities sold, the money supply decreases by one dollar. The more the
money supply decreases, the higher interest rates go. This is a supply and de-
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can raise reserve requirements to contract lending and lower reserve
requirements to expand lending. In summary, minimum capital re-
quirements and reserve requirements are a safeguard against declines
in bank asset value99 or, in case of excessive depositor withdrawals,
they provide a cushion against insolvency. Thus, these capital and re-
serve requirements are designed to promote liquidity and further the
goal of deposit safety.
3. Limitation of and Prohibition Against Specific Activities
The most direct and powerful mechanism of implementing the pol-
icy goals which have been outlined00 is the legislative and regulatory
manifestation of permitted and prohibited activities of banks.101 A
mand reaction to the increase in the scarcity of money. The second means is
control over the discount rate. 12 U.S.C. § 357 (1988) empowers each Federal Re-
serve bank to establish discount rates. These banks lend money to commercial
banks. By changing the rate of interest charged, the Fed influences the amount
of money borrowed by banks, which in turn affects the money supply and interest
rates. The manipulation of money supply and interest rates is in effect a control
of the credit available to the national economy which in turn can be used to con-
tain cyclical inflation and recession.
99. As witnessed by loans to third world countries and certain domestic economic
sectors such as energy and agriculture, bank loans can go bad. The net present
value of a bank's asset portfolio, which includes loans, is, therefore, subject to
variation. A bank's capital has a subordinate claim to the assets of the bank rela-
tive to deposits. An unexpected fall in the value of a bank's loans will cause de-
positors to lose money only after all the bank capital has been lost.
100. See supra Part III.A.1.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990) provides in part:
A national banking association... shall have power... to exercise..., all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking;, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying
and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal
security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the
provisions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes. The business of dealing in
securities and stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and
selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order,
and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and
the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock; Pro-
vided, That the association may purchase for its own account investment
securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of
the Currency may by regulation prescribe. In no event shall the total
amount of the investment securities of any one obligor or maker, held by
the association for its own account, exceed at any time 10 per centum of
its capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired and 10 per centum of its
unimpaired surplus fund, except that this limitation shall not require
any association to dispose of any securities lawfully held by it on August
23, 1935. As used in this section the term "investment securities" shall
mean marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of any person, co-
partnership, association, or corporation in the form of bonds, notes and/
or debentures commonly known as investment securities under such fur-
ther definition of the term "investment securities" as may by regulation
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careful examination of the statute quoted supra note 101 shows that,
in general, national banks are allowed to do the business of banking
and the activities incidental and necessary to carry on such busi-
ness.
10 2 These activities clearly include deposit taking, making loans,
and discounting and negotiating debt.103
State banks derive their powers from the laws of the state of incor-
poration. Becoming a member of the Federal Reserve does not dero-
gate these powers,1 04 even though such banks become subject to the
jurisdiction of the Fed.105 However, the Fed may, in evaluating a state
bank's application, consider "whether its corporate powers are consis-
tent with the purposes of the Federal Reserve Act"106 and may subject
the applicant "to such conditions as it may prescribe pursuant [to the
provisions of this chapter]" in order to "permit the applying bank to
become a stockholder of such Federal Reserve bank."1o 7 However,
the Glass-Steagall provisions (the bane of banking activity restrictions
from the banker's point of view) do apply to state member banks.10s
Member banks are prohibited from "acting as agent for [any] non-
banking borrower in making loans on securities to [securities] dealers
[or brokers]."109 Insured nonmember state banks are subject to the
be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Except as hereinafter
provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall
authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any
shares of stock of any corporation. The limitations and restrictions
herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and purchasing for its
own account, investment securities shall not apply to [enumerated gov-
ernment, state and local securities].
Section 108 of CEBA, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987) (codified at scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.), added subsection "tenth" which expanded the power of
national banks "[tio invest in tangible personal property, including, without limi-
tation, vehicles, manufactured homes, machinery, equipment, or furniture, for
lease financing transactions on a net lease basis, but such investment may not
exceed 10 percent of the assets of the association."
102. Because the statute does not define "banking business" nor "incidental" thereto,
a great deal of litigation has resulted. Judicial and administrative rulings have
identified forty-two specific activities that are considered to be within the param-
eters of these phrases. For the list and sources of authority of the forty-two activ-
ities see 1 HARvEY L. PriT, THE LAW OF FINANCLAL SERvIcEs 16-21 (Supp. 1990-
92).
103. See infra Part llI.C.5.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 330 (1988) provides that "any bank becoming a member of the Federal
reserve system shall retain its full charter and statutory rights as a State bank or
trust company, and may continue to exercise all corporate powers granted it by
the State in which it was created."
105. See supra note 82.
106. 12 C.F.R. § 208.5(a)(4)(1992).
107. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1988).
108. 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1988) are made applicable by the terms of these sections; § 24
is applied through § 335 and § 378 is applicable to all organizations that accept
deposits subject to check, thus including state member banks.
109. 1d § 374a.
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jurisdiction of the FDIC;110 it also imposes some prohibitions on activi-
ties it considers inconsistent with the purposes of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.111
Aside from the Glass-Steagall oriented regulatory mechanism,
there are other tools in the arsenal of policy implementation. To pre-
vent funneling of money into highly nonliquid assets, national banks
are limited to those real estate activities necessary for the accommoda-
tion and transaction of its business. 112 This includes real estate ac-
quired in collecting previously contracted debts.l13 Real estate
acquired in this manner may only be held for five years. The purpose
of the real estate restrictions are to "keep bank capital flowing into
daily channels of commerce, to deter banks from embarking on haz-
ardous real estate speculation and to prevent accumulation of large
masses of such property."114
Permissible insurance activities of banks are extremely limited.
Interestingly, neither the National Bank Actl15 nor Glass-Steagal116
specifically prohibit such activities. It was merely an accepted view
that national banks do not have the power to sell or underwrite insur-
ance. The "incidental powers"117 clause was not considered broad
110. See supra note 82.
111. 12 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1992) Inconsistent powers.
A State nonmember insured bank (except a District bank) which does
not have any of the powers hereinafter enumerated, or which, although
it has any such power, does not exercise the same, shall not hereafter
exercise, take, or assume the power- (a) To do a surety business; (b) to
insure the fidelity of others; (c) to engage in insuring, guaranteeing nor
certifying titles to real estate; or (d) to guarantee or become surety upon
the obligations of others, except as provided in § 347.3(c)(1).
The limitations prescribed in § 332.1(d) do not include acceptances, endorse-
ments, or letters of credit made or issued in the usual course of the banking busi-
ness. 12 C.F.R. § 332.1 (1992).
§ 332.2 Exercise prohibited. After the effective date of this part, any
State nonmember bank (except a District bank) becoming an insured
bank shall not thereafter exercise any of the powers enumerated in
§ 332.1.
Id. § 332.2.
Additionally, in 12 C.F.R. Part 337, entitled "Unsafe and Unsound Banking
Practices", the FDIC has imposed restrictions on the following activities: (1) issu-
ance of standby letters of credit, Id § 337.2 (1988); (2) extension of credit to exec-
utive officers, directors and principal shareholders, Id. § 337.3; and (3) securities
activities through subsidiaries or with affiliated securities companies, Id. § 337.4.
Finally, under 12 C.F.R. § 333.2 (1992) no change in the general character of the
business is permitted without prior written approval by the FDIC.
112. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1988).
113. 1I
114. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 681 (5th
Cir. 1983).
115. See supra note 33.
116. See supra note 63.
117. See supra note 101.
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enough to include insurance activities."18 Apparently Congress agreed
with this view. In 1916, when Congress decided that it would be in the
public interest to allow national banks in towns with populations less
than 5,000 to sell but not underwrite insurance, it added a new sec-
tion119 to the national banking laws to enable such activity.12 0 How-
ever, almost fifty years later, James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the
Currency decided to be contrary.12 ' He ruled that:
Incidental to the powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. Sections 24, 84 and
371, National Banks have the authority to act as agent in the issuance of insur-
ance which is incident to banking transactions. Commissions received there-
from or service charges imposed therefor may be retained by the bank.12 2
(Emphasis added.)
This ruling was not limited in scope to cities of less than 5,000 popula-
tion and purported to authorize every national bank, regardless of its
location, to enter the insurance agency field and to compete with in-
surance agents.
This ruling did not go unchallenged. An association of insurance
agents brought an action for declaratory judgment to declare the
comptrollers ruling unlawful and to enjoin a national bank from act-
ing as an insurance agency in places of more than 5,000 population.
The agents' association was granted summary judgment on both
118. The Federal Reserve Board declared that "writing insurance on commission is in
no sense incidental to any of the enumerated powers of a national bank." PrIT,
supra note 102 at 573, citing 2 Fed. Res. Bull. 73, 74 (1916).
119. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (West 1945). Section 92 was omitted when Rev. Stat.
§ 5202 (to which it was added by the Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat.
753) was amended in 1918. See Act of Apr. 5, 1918, ch. 45, § 20, 40 Stat.
512. Revisers of the United States Code in 1952 accordingly omitted the
section. Nevertheless, the courts have continued to treat Section 92 as if
it exists, and Congress even purported to amend it as part of the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. See e.g. Pub. L. No. 97-320,
tit. IV, § 403(b), 96 Stat. 1469, 1511 [(1982)].
Prrr, supra note 102, at 574 n.14.
120. The apparent purpose of this legislation was expressed as follows:
It clearly appears, then, that 12 U.S.C. § 92 was enacted not out of a be-
lief that there was any significant connection between banking and the
sale of insurance in small communities, but merely because it was be-
lieved that banks needed an additional source of income to improve their
stability and profitability. Congress thus did not indicate that the sale of
insurance in small towns was part of "banking", but rather that it was an
unrelated business which would provide a source of income that would
then be available for use in the separate banking activities of small town
national banks.
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 224, 243 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 729 (5th
Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
121. Letter from James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to the Presidents of all
National Banks (Feb. 18, 1963).
122. O.C.C. Ruling No. 7110 (1963).
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counts.123 The OCC, however, was not overly impressed with its de-
feat. When the United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank), lo-
cated in Portland, Oregon, requested permission to establish an
operating subsidiary in Banks, Oregon, a town with a population
under 5,000, so that the Bank could sell a full range of insurance prod-
ucts through branches in Banks, Oregon, the OCC ruled that:
Based on our analysis of the relevant legal precedent, we have concluded that
[our attorney, in prior correspondence] correctly determined that a national
bank or its branch which is located in a place of 5,000 or under population may
sell insurance to existing and potential customers located anywhere. In other
words, while the bank or bank branch must be located in a small town, it can
sell insurance to persons and businesses located outside that town.
1 24
Naturally the insurance agents were less than enthusiastic about this
decision, foreseeing vigorous entry by national banks into insurance
on a national scale. The National Association of Life Underwriters
(NALU) and the Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.
(IIAA) brought declaratory and injunctive actions to challenge the
ruling.125 The Comptroller had more success with other aspects of in-
surance activities of national banks. In respect to credit life insurance,
he ruled that "national banks, wherever located, may [sell as agents]
individual or group credit life coverage and charge their loan custom-
ers accordingly."'126 He was upheld in Independent Bankers Associa-
tion of America v. Heimann127 where the court said that credit life
insurance is "a limited special type of coverage written to protect loans
... [and] is now commonplace and essential where ordinary loans on
personal security are involved,"128 that is, it is incidental to the busi-
123. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D.
Ga. 1967), affd 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). The court stated:
In interpreting the meaning of one provision of an act it is proper that all
other provisions in pani materia should also be considered. So, in con-
structing the general authority contained in Section 24(7) we must give
equal consideration to Section 92 as it specifically deals with the power of
national banks to act as insurance agents, and when the general language
in Section 24(7) dealing with "incidental" powers is construed in con-
junction with the specific grant in Section 92 it is clear that application of
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule requires the construction
that national banks have no power to act as insurance agents in cities of
over 5,000 population.
Id. at 1013.
124. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 366, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
125. The Court of Appeals held that section 92 had been repealed and the Comptrol-
ler's decision was, therefore, without statutory authority. Independent Ins.
Agents of America v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
126. COMPTROLLER'S DIGEST OF OPINIONS § 9420 (1960)(emphasis added) quoted in 41
Fed. Reg. 29,846, 29,847 (1976)(codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. Part 2).
127. 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
128. Id. at 1170. The court's characterization of the transaction as "loans on personal
security" intimates that the court was referring to the express wording of permis-
sible activities spelled out in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990), thus
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ness of banking. The expression "written to protect loans" was taken
by the Comptroller as a suggestion by the court that national banks
may enter into a variety of insurance activities. He ruled that a na-
tional bank or its operating subsidiary may se11129 or underwrite' 3 0 ti-
tle insurance in connection with mortgage loans made by them, since
such insurance is "incidental to banking within the meaning of 12
U.S.C. (Seventh)"131 because "It]here is a close connection between
mortgage lending (the express banking service) and title insurance on
the mortgage loan collateral (the incidental service)."132 Meanwhile,
the Comptroller also ruled that national banks may underwrite credit
life insurance.' 33
These prohibitions, especially the ones contained in the provisions
of Glass-Steagall incorporated into 12 U.S.C. § 24,134 have a double ob-
jective: first to achieve the policy goal of consumer protection by limit-
ing banks to safe transactions, and second to insure the policy goal of
free flow of capital. The perception was that bank involvement in
nonbanking activities would prejudice credit decisions in favor of affil-
iated businesses.13 5
4. Restrictions on Afiliations and Geographic Expansion
Although 12 U.S.C. § 24136 prohibits national banks and state mem-
ber banks (through § 335) from owning stock in any corporation, both
the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board have ruled within
their respective regulatory jurisdictions that banks may create subsidi-
aries13 7 but with an absolute limitation of activities to such as permit-
characterizing credit life insurance as incidental to lending money on personal
security.
129. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 368 [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,538 (July 11, 1986).
130. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 377, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,601 (Feb. 6, 1987).
131. Id at 77,901.
132. Id. at 77,902.
133. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 277, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,441, at 77, 959 (Dec. 31, 1983):
As explained below, the underwriting or reinsurance of credit life is a
logical complement to a national bank's power to sell credit life. This
activity is incidental to banking under even the more restrictive inter-
pretations of 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh) since it is "convenient or useful in
connection with the performance of one of the bank's express powers
under the National Bank Act," specifically the express power to lend
money. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat' Bank, 563 F.2d 1377,
1382 (9th Cir. 1977).
Limits on BHC insurance activities discussed infra note 283 and accompanying
text.
134. See supra note 101.
135. See supra note 74.
136. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)(1988 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
137. 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34 and 225.22(d)(1992) respectively.
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ted their parents.1 38 To prevent circumvention of the prohibited
securities activities of § 24,139 §§ 377, 378 and 78140 prohibit any affilia-
tion or interlocking personnel between entities considered to be banks
and entities which by nature are securities dealers or investment
bankers. The long and short of these sections is to keep the twain
apart, each to its own turf.141
The fear of concentration of economic power 142 which may lead to
political power impelled not only the above-mentioned product limita-
tions but also the imposition of geographic restrictions. Sections 36
and 81 generally prohibit national banks and state member banks
from establishing branches outside of the bank's home state, and per-
mit intrastate branch banking only to the extent that state law per-
mits the creation of branches to its own banks. Two policy goals are to
be implemented by these geographic restrictions: (1) safety and sound-
ness and (2) credit allocation. Because strong competition could cause
failure of smaller or weaker banks, limiting entry of competitors
would reduce such risks. As to the credit allocation aspects, the
Supreme Court said that geographic restrictions "preserve a close re-
lationship between those in the community who need credit and those
who provide credit."143 The perception existed that with free inter-
state banking, depositors' money would be channelled to the large
money centers and local businesses would not have sources of credit.
5. Lending and Borrowing Limitations
To further bolster the availability of credit to large numbers of bor-
rowers and maintain safety for depositors, the geographic restrictions
are supplemented by limitations on lending power. A national bank
may make unsecured loans of no more than fifteen percent of its
unimpaired capital stock and surplus to any one person,144 with an
additional ten percent if the loan is secured by readily marketable col-
lateral having a market value at least equal to the amount of funds
138. 1d at §§ 5.34(d)(2)(i) and 225.22(d)(2)(ii).
139. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Cum. Supp. II 1990).
140. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378, 78 (1988).
141. Indeed, this is the burning issue to which Congress is presently devoting a great
deal of attention. CEBA is but one example. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(1987).
142. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This draws attention to the fact that
the Jacksonian view of keeping banks decentralized is still alive as seen in 12
U.S.C. §§ 36 and 81. Section 36 is derived from the National Bank Act of 1865, ch.
78, § 7, 13 Stat. 484 and § 81 is derived from the National Bank Act of 1864, ch.
106, § 8, 13 Stat. 101, both as amended by the McFadden Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1224
(1927) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Also see Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 177 (1985) where the Court said
that "our country traditionally has favored widely dispersed control of banking."
143. Northeast Bancrop, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 178 (1985).
144. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1)(1988).
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outstanding.45 The Comptroller of the Currency explains that these
limitations are "intended to prevent one individual or a relatively
small group, from borrowing an unduly large amount of the bank's
funds. It is also intended to safeguard the bank's depositors by spread-
ing the loans among a relatively large number of persons engaged in
different lines of business."146
The Garn-St Germain Actl47 repealed14s 12 U.S.C. § 82 which lim-
ited the amount of money a national bank could borrow. Prior to the
repeal of § 82, the apparent assumption of the drafters was that bank
solvency would be strengthened if a bank could not be "indebted ... to
an amount exceeding the amount of its capital stock.., plus 50 per-
cent of the amount of its unimpaired surplus fund."-49 However the
present view is that borrowing should be limited by principles of
safety and soundness, which can be monitored by the regulatory
agencies.
IV. REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. The Nature of Regulation
In contradistinction to the dual system of bank regulation, insur-
ance is regulated almost exclusively by the states. 5 0 Regulation, how-
145. Id. at § 84(a)(2).
146. 12 C.F.R. § 32.1 (1992). The term "person" is defined at 12 U.S.C. § 84(b)(2)(1988)
and "capital" is defined at 12 C.F.R § 3.2 (1992).
147. Garn-St Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
148. Id. at 1510, title IV, § 402.
149. 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1976).
150. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) held that the business of insurance is not com-
merce and therefore not subject to Congressional jurisdiction under the Com-
merce Clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl. 3. Thus, regulation of insurance
companies was reserved to the states. However, in United States v. South-East-
ern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the Court overruled Paul v. Vir-
ginia. Congress quickly reacted to this decision and a year later passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 34 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-15 (1988)). Sections I and 2 state as follows:
Section 1:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest,
and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
Section 2:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the busi-
ness of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business,
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Pro-
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ever, came slowly. Prior to 1865 the number of insurance companies
and the assets they controlled were small. There was no pressure on
legislatures to remedy abuses of insurers. However, after the Civil
War, with the new American prosperity, the insurance industry began
growing rapidly.l15 But with this growth came many unsound insur-
ance practices. Unreasonably large amounts of money were being
spent-and misspent-by various insurance companies on salaries,
commissions, dividends, and lobbying activities. After paying premi-
ums for years, many insureds found their companies bankrupt, under-
capitalized, or non-existent. Something had to be done to regulate the
insurance business and to protect the insured policyholders from
many of these abuses.
The New York Armstrong Committee Investigation of 1906, under
the counsel of Charles Evans Hughes, dramatically, factually, and im-
partially exposed various unsavory practices among life insurance
companies. The investigation resulted in radical state legislation, both
in New York and elsewhere, designed to regulate the life insurance
industry. Today, the business of insurance is subject to regulation by
the various states and their administrative agencies, due in large part
to the findings of the Armstrong Committee. Since the goals of insur-
ance regulationlS2 are the same as the goals of bank regulation, sol-
vency and protection of the consumer, there are strong similarities
between insurance and bank regulatory measures.153 However, the
extensive variety of insurance policies compels additional regulation
relative to standard forms (e.g. fire policies) and rate making
procedures.
After World War II there was a tremendous surge in life insurance
vided, That after January 1, 1948, [the Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton
Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914] shall be
applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is
not regulated by State law.
151. Whereas in 1850 there were only 48 companies with assets of $4.7 million, by 1870
there were 129 companies with assets of $2.0 billion.
152. It is the continued financial ability of the insurer to fulfill its side of the
bargain that generates the value of insurance to the policyholder. Con-
tinued financial ability is ... neither self-regulating nor within the prac-
tical power of the individual policyholder to ascertain or enforce. Its
ascertainment and enforcement must be conducted by government to as-
sure the integrity of the insurance transaction itself.
State of New York, Insurance Department, Regulation of Financial Condition of
Insurance Companies, 3, (March 1974), quoted in Dunne, supra note 6 at 349.
[T]he fading of traditional lines between bank, insurance, securities, and
real estate activities may hold benefits for consumers. On the other
hand, they could have serious negative effects on consumers, including
insurance policyholders, and the efficacy of existing regulation.
Bruce Fondree, NAIC Wary on Financial Controls, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, May
20, 1983, at 39.
153. For example, both require minimum capital requirements, reserve requirements,
and licensing and both place limitations on investments.
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sales' 54 as well as in other insurance sales.155 Furthermore, inflation-
ary pressures 5 6 forced the creation of innovative and competitive in-
surance products, such as universal life policies, variable annuities,
single premium annuities and other variations. These events brought
about a radical change in the composition of insurance company port-
folios and also compounded the difficulties of insurance regulators in
the quality of their supervisory functions.
B. Items of Regulation 5 7
1. Entry and Capital Requirements
Insurance companies are creatures of the state. The state insur-
ance department issues charters subject to certain capital minimums
which are required to be recorded partly as capital stock and partly as
paid-in surplus.158
2. Reserves
a. Property and Liability Insurance
Property and liability insurance companies must maintain two
types of reserves: unearned premium reserves and loss reserves. The
former is the unearned portion of gross'5 9 premiums of all outstand-
154. By 1955 there were some 1100 life insurance companies with assets of 372 billion,
and by 1981 there were almost 2000 life insurance companies with assets in excess
of four trillion dollars! Compare these figures with those in supra note 151.
155. By 1982 there were almost 3000 property-liability insurance companies with as-
sets of $212 billion.
156. The classic life insurance policy no longer was an attractive investment.
157. This section discusses only those items which are relevant to and have an impact
upon the main focus of this study: the solvency of the institution and the safety
of the consumer's money. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
158. For example, assume that state X requires $3 million initial minimum capitaliza-
tion with $1 million assigned to capital stock account and $2 million to paid-in
surplus. Because mutual companies have no capital stock, the full minimum capi-
tal is credited to the paid-in surplus account.
159. For example, assume a $240 semi-annual premium on an auto liability policy.
The agent's commission would be $48 and other overhead expenses approxi-
mately $10. The unearned premium reserve at the inception of this policy would
be the full $240. The $58 deficiency would be "drawn" from the paid-in surplus
account, along with the loss reserves. The unearned premium reserve decreases
with the passage of each month. Thus, the cash flow of the insurer, at the incep-
tion of a new policy, is less than the reserve requirement. As a result:
[i]f new business increases quickly enough, it is conceivable that the in-
surer could become insolvent because of the exhaustion of surplus and
the resultant impairment of its capital or reserve account. Of course,
long before such impairment would be allowed, the insurer would stop
writing more business. This point was reached in the United States im-
mediately following World War II. Many insurers legally were "sold
out" of insurance; they had written as much new business as possible
without reducing their surplus accounts to dangerously low levels. Un-
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ing policies at the time of valuation. The latter is the insurer's esti-
mate of future claims and related expenses which is computed by
formula or loss ratio methods. Commentators indicate that these
methods are poor indicators of future liabilities. There is hardly a
mathematical way to predict disasters or unforseen events.
b. Life Insurance
In life insurance the predictability of future losses (i.e. deaths) does
not involve the same risk of variance from period to period. Therefore
loss reserves, like the premiums charged for the policies, are based on
mortality tables. Barring any external events such as large losses on
investment, fraud, or embezzlement, the normal flow of premiums
which are normally invested in income producing assets should pro-
vide the proper cushion for payment of claims. The premiums during
the earlier years of the policy are greater than the actuarial mortality
claim projection, and less in the later years.
3. Examination, Valuation of Assets and Liabilities and
Investments
If the fox could be appointed to guard the chicken coop, then insur-
ers could be relied upon to maintain adequate reserves without exter-
nal supervision. However, such is not the case. State insurance
departments conduct examinations to ascertain the solvency of insur-
ers doing business within the state. An insurer is solvent when its
admitted assets1 60 exceed its liabilities. This excess is the statutory
policyholders' surplus.161 Since the largest liability of an insurer is its
reserves, an examination and valuation of the assets amounts to a val-
uation of its reserves.
To further promote the solvency of insurance companies, the statu-
tory provisions for allowable admitted assets places both qualitative
less able to attract new capital (generally not a viable solution), they
were forced to discontinue writing new insurance or became overly se-
lective in underwriting. Only the most profitable business was accepted,
and the less profitable was left uninsured. This feature of the postwar
insurance scene, the "capacity problem," has been one of the most widely
discussed issues in property and liability insurance.
ROBERT J. MEHR AND EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE, 687 (1976).
160. The term "admitted assets" is sui generis to the insurance industry. State law
specifies which assets are admitted assets, the only assets counted in determining
the excess of assets over liabilities. In addition, to qualify as "admitted," the as-
sets must truly be under the control of the insurer. Thus, if an otherwise quali-
fied admitted asset were pledged as security for the debt of a parent company,
especially a non-insurer parent, the issue would arise as to whether this asset
could be counted as an admitted asset in determining the statutory solvency
requirements.
161. This surplus consists of the original capital (see supra note 158) and accumulated,
undistributed profits. In the world of finance it is referred to as equity.
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and quantitative restrictions on the kind of investments insurers may
make. There are, of course, variations from state to state, but gener-
ally the qualitative restrictions limit the portfolio to high grade bonds,
mortgages, preferred and common stock and a very limited amount of
real estate investment. The quantitative limitations refer to percent-
ages of admitted assets that may be invested in a single corporation
and the percentage of the corporation's stock that may be held by the
insurer. 62
4. Rate Making
An additional tool of indirectly promoting the solvency of insur-
ance companies is the supervision of rates charged on insurance poli-
cies. Cutthroat competition could undermine the stability and safety
of insurers (especially the smaller ones) and could lead to chaotic di-
sasters affecting numerous policyholders.6S On the other hand, "co-
operation" among insurers to set rates might lead to excessive rates
leading to bilking the public. To deal with both horns of this dilemma,
the New York legislature in 1911 and the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners (NAIC) in 1914 investigated the problem and
recommended supervised rate making. All states have now passed
some form of rate legislation, though such legislation is not uniform
throughout the United States. However, the goals of these statutes
are uniform: to achieve rates which are adequate,164 not excessive 65
and not discriminatory16 6
162. For example, the investment in the securities of a single issue may not exceed
five percent of the insurer's total admitted assets and may not exceed two percent
of the issuer's security. Generally there are no quantitative limitations as to in-
vestments in Government and state securities.
163. During the latter half of the 19th century large cyclical losses caused the collapse
of many insurers.
164. To yield a reasonable profit in light of past and future (projected) losses.
165. To prevent premiums which are too high.
166. Reasonable classification is permitted and, therefore, certain preferred risks
might be insured at lower rates than standard risks. The Virginia statute, VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-1900 (Michie 1990 Repl. Vol.), expresses the public policy be-
hind its rate making provisions as follows:
PURPOSES OF CHAPrER. [Ch. 191 A. This chapter shall be liberally con-
strued to achieve the purposes stated in subsection B of this section.
B. The purposes of this chapter are to:
1. Protect policyholders and the public against the adverse effects of
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory rates;
2. Encourage independent action by insurers and reasonable price com-
petition among insurers as the most effective way to produce rates that
conform to the standards of subdivision 1;
3. Provide formal regulatory controls for use if independent action and
price competition fail;
4. Authorize cooperative action among insurers in the rate making pro-
cess, and regulate such cooperation in order to prevent practices that
tend to create monopoly or to lessen or destroy competition;
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Rate making is an extremely complex and beyond the scope of this
paper.167 Suffice it to say that life insurance is not subject to rate
making since the reserve requirements necessarily set the premium
requirements.168 The rates of property and liability insurance and
workman's compensation, however, are frequently regulated.169
C. Insurance Holding Companies
The 1960s witnessed a sharp decline in the profits of insurance
companies creating an impetus to seek additional ways to employ large
pools of liquid funds. Life insurers experienced a drop in earnings be-
cause of long term inflation which became acute in 1963. Inflation
made investment in life insurance less attractive and quickened public
investment in higher yielding equity instruments. Furthermore, the
conservative investments of life insurers required by law produced a
lower return than portfolios of non-insurers. Property and liability
insurers faced a rapid rise of replacement costs and rising damage
judgments which could not be matched by increases in premium rates.
As a result, their loss ratios rose steadily.170
Finally, the emergence of "one stop" financial service entities171
5. Provide rates that are responsive to competitive market conditions
and improve the availability of insurance in this Commonwealth; and
6. Regulate the business of insurance in a manner that will preclude
application of federal antitrust laws.
167. Some states require property and liability insurers to belong to rating bureaus
and file rates based on the bureaus' published rates; other states, although per-
mitting bureaus, allow insurers to file independently of the bureaus. Some states
follow the "prior approval" method (the rates filed become effective after 15 days
of the filing date, unless disapproved within that period), other states follow the
"file and use" approach, wherein the filed rates become effective immediately,
subject to disapproval within a statutory period. Some states have "use and file"
statutes, permitting the use of new rates with filing later (within a statutory pe-
riod). Still other states have no filing requirements at all (pure laissez-faire),
whereas others prohibit rating bureaus. For a more complete discussion of rate
regulation, see 19 JOHN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 10491-96
(1982) and ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 557-567 (1971). See generally
JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIc REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 20-30
(1970) and Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insur-
ance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56
MICH. L. REV. 545 (1957).
168. See supra part IV.B.2b.
169. Regulation and licensing of insurance agents and brokers, financial reporting re-
quirements, requirements of standard contracts (or standard clauses in contracts)
or forms and classification regulations are not discussed herein.
170. To add to their woes they incurred heavy losses during the civil disturbances and
riots of the 1960s.
171. For example, Sears Roebuck owns Allstate Insurance, Dean Witter Securities,
Allstate Savings and Loan Association and Greenwood Trust and Bank which
handles the Discover credit card; American Express owned Firemans Fund In-
surance Company and Shearson-Lehman; Merrill Lynch created the CMA ac-
count, has a major interest in Insurance Systems Unlimited and owns the Family
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worsened the competitive status of insurers and impelled the search
for activities that would more fully and profitably utilize
"[the management expertise and specialized knowledge required for effective
insurer operation in such fields of investments, engineering, and electronic
data processing as are needed in related financial businesses .... It seems
apparent that the prospect of higher earnings through diversification would
secure better access to the capital markets by insurers and would help to insu-
late them against 'take overs,' while facilitating insurer acquisition of other
businesses.172
However, most states prohibit insurers from pursuing other busi-
ness activities and place strict limitations on their investment portfo-
lios.173 Additionally insurers may issue only a single class of common
stock and no senior securities. To overcome these regulatory handi-
caps, insurance company management looked to the holding company
structure to supplement underwriting and investment income by di-
versifying activities and gaining better access to capital markets.
Many insurers formed "upstream"' 74 holding companies transferring
surplus funds' 75 to the newly created parent. The parent then in-
vested these funds in a variety of businesses and avoided the regula-
tory prohibition against diversification. Since the holding company
was not an insurance company it, was beyond the jurisdiction of the
regulators. 76 Similarly, the limitations on an insurer's portfolio in-
Life Insurance Company, Bank America owned discount broker Charles Schwab
and Company, Prudential Insurance Company owns the Capital City Bank of
Hapeville, Georgia and Bache Securities. The list could continue.
172. Report of the Industry Advisory Committee to the (D1) Subcommittee of the
NAIC on Holding Company Legislation, 1 PROCEEDiNGS OF THE NAIC, 177 (1969),
(hereinafter 1969 Advisory Committee).
173. See supra part IV.B.3.
174. The normal procedure would be for the insurer to organize a subsidiary
holding company. The stock of the insurer is then exchanged for the
stock of the holding company and the holding company becomes the par-
ent of the insurer. It is then necessary for the insurer to declare a sub-
stantial dividend to the holding company to finance the expansion into
new fields.
Milton S. Wolke, Jr., Insurance Companies as Parents and Subsidiaries, SECTION
OF INsURANcE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAw, 167, 168 (1970).
175. Funds in excess of reserve requirements referred to as "surplus surplus." Many
large insurance companies accumulated assets, generally liquid assets, well in ex-
cess of minimum reserve requirements.
176. Since 1965 the movement toward formation of holding companies has
been an outstanding feature in insurance company history. Over half of
the major property and casualty companies as well as the bulk of the
larger life insurance companies have restructured their corporate form
of organization to place their operating companies under holding com-
pany ownership. In conjunction with these moves or shortly after the
formation of the holding companies, steps have been taken to bring in
other subsidiaries in the field of financial services related to or ancillary
to the insurance business. For example, both Life Insurance Company
of Virginia and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company brought
title insurance companies under their newly formed holding companies.
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vestment 177 were bypassed because the holding company could invest
in common stocks without restriction. Again, the non-insurer parent
could issue a variety of securities (different classes of common stock,
preferred stock, debt, convertible or nonconvertible, etc.) with distinct
advantages over the restricted types178 that the operating insurance
company was permitted to issue.
Other insurers formed "downstream" holding companies:
An alternative to the exchange approach is to have the insurance operations
of the insurer transferred to a subsidiary and to convert the insurer into a
general business corporation. This way, no dividend is necessary, and the
stockholders do not have to approve a plan of exchange with a newly organ-
ized (and usually thinly capitalized) holding company. However, it will be
necessary, of course, to obtain stockholder approval of the conversion. 1 7 9
The holding company movement was not restricted to these up-
stream and downstream devices. The large liquid asset holdings of the
insurance industry suddenly drew the attention of the conglomerate
fraternity. Rapid takeovers of insurers resulted.s0 One commentator
cites the following reasons for the rash of insurance company take-
overs by the conglomerates:
1. The subnormal underwriting results of the property and casualty insur-
ance companies as a group during recent years caused the stocks of most of
these companies to sink to record lows early this year. Prices were depressed
both in relation to earnings and in relation to estimated liquidating values.
Even such highly regarded companies as Hartford Fire Insurance Company,
Insurance Company of North America and United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty sank below the value of their capital and surplus, let alone their total
liquidating values which would attribute some extra amount for the value of
unearned premium reserves.
2. At the same time the stocks of many of the conglomerates had risen to
exceptionally high levels in relation to their earnings and book values.
3. With this set of valuations-extremely low for the insurance companies
and fantastically high for the conglomerates-it was possible for the latter to
try to acquire the sound investment values of the insurance companies, using
And it didn't take the CNA Financial Corporation long to add the Tsai
Management Corporation and General Finance Corporation to its princi-
pal subsidiaries which include Continental Casualty Company, Conti-
nental Assurance Company and National Fire Insurance Company of
Hartford.
William W. Amos, The Merger Movement in the Insurance Industry, FEDERATION
OF INS. COUNSEL Q., Winter 1968-69, 11, 12.
177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
178. Generally only common stock of one class.
179. Wolke, supra note 174, at 167-68. Additional advantages afforded by the holding
company structure include more liberal accounting methods, repurchase of capi-
tal stock in the open market and merchandising superiority. See Amos, supra
note 176.
180. Although conglomerate general take-over activity reached feverish heights by
the early 1960s, it was not till 1968 that take over bids were made to large insurer
groups, such as Reliance Insurance, Fund American Companies, Great American
Holding Corporation and Home Insurance. See Amos, supra note 176, at 14.
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the cheap money of the conglomerates' stock.1 8 1
The acquiring conglomerate could then sell off the portfolio of the
acquired insurer (which was carried on the books of the insurer at low
original acquisition cost) at current high market prices, realizing huge
profits. These profits would be included in the overall earnings of the
conglomerate which, when applied to the high price earnings multiple
of the conglomerate, would further increase the market price of the
conglomerate stock.82 Thus, insurance holding companies 83
emerged in large numbers placing great strain on the insurance regu-
latory system. State insurance laws were designed to control and reg-
ulate insurance companies, not holding companies whose members
could be-and often were-non-insurers. The regulators needed stat-
utory means to protect policyholders by supervising the financial con-
ditions of the insurance companies, despite the layers of ownership
and the diversification of activities. The National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC) reacted to these new conditions by estab-
lishing a committee 84 to "propose to the NAIC such legislation as the
states should enact and such regulatory procedures as the Insurance
Commissioners should adopt in order to assure adequate and proper
supervision of insurers in their relationships with holding compa-
nies."1 85 After many discussions, reports, drafts and debates, the
NAIC adopted the Model Insurance Holding Company Systems Regu-
latory Act of 1969 (the Model Act), the goals and policies of which are:
(1) to maintain the solvency of insurance companies by policing takeovers of
181. Amos, supra note 176, at 14.
182. For a humorous and instructive description of the "pooling" method of account-
ing for mergers and acquisitions, see JAMES D. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION,
ACCOUNTING AND THE LAw, 744-47 (1986).
183. An "insurance holding company" is defined as "consist[ing] of two (2) or more
affiliated persons, one or more of which is an insurer." NAIC, Insurance Holding
Company System Regulatory Act, in 2 NAIC MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULA-
TIONS AND GUIDELINES § iD (1992)[hereafter MODEL ACT].
184. See supra note 172.
185. 1969 Advisory Committee, supra note 172, at 175. The Committee, after lengthy
study, submitted the following conclusions and objectives:
1. Holding companies serve a beneficial, valid and legitimate function
in the insurance industry.
2. There should be an effective and comprehensive state supervision of
insurers in their relationship with holding companies in order to protect
their financial integrity.
3. The most effective regulatory system is one premised on disclosure
and regulation of significant intra-system transactions involving the in-
surer, and verification by examination when necessary.
4. To prevent shifting of assets from an insurer to other affiliates
(whether parent, subsidiary or other) disclosure of dividends and distri-
butions need be required.
5. The domiciliary state should bear the primary responsibility for reg-
ulation of the insurer in its relationship and transactions with insurance
holding company systems.
Id. at 181-83.
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insurers and extraordinary distributions by insurers to the holding company
parent or to noninsurance affiliates; (2) to protect policyholders by continuing
intensive supervision of the adequacy of insurance companies' surplus; (3) to
provide standards to assure that intrasystem transactions involving insurers
are fair and reasonable; (4) to encourage domiciliary states to continue their
established role as the primary regulators of the insurance industry by giving
them full responsibility for regulation of insurers within an insurance holding
company system; and (5) to predicate regulatory activities on the principles of
registration, disclosure, and prior approval of certain transactions (eg. ex-
traordinary dividends and distributions) and relationships impacting an
insurer.1 8 6
Underlying the provisions of the Act was the belief that although the
potential for "milking" of insurance company assets by affiliates (es-
pecially parent holding companies) was a valid concern, the problem
could be effectively regulated.18 7 Furthermore, to protect policyhold-
ers18 8 and maintain insurer solvency the NAIC placed its reliance on
the effectiveness of domiciliary states to adequately regulate its insur-
ers.1 8 9 A reading of the Model Act would seem to indicate that the
safety of the insurer and policyholder could be achieved through its
provisions.190 A comprehensive analysis of the Model Act is not
within the scope of this paper, however, a description of its structure is
necessary, along with the foregoing explanation of banking regulatory
law, in order to understand some of the problems inherent in the
questions posed by this study.191
186. Report of the Industry Advisory Committee on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation to the Insurance Holding Companies (Bl) Subcommittee, 1
NAIC PROCEEDINGS 213, 221 (1978).
187. Id. at 222.
188. Protection of insurance company stockholders was not a concern of the Model
Act.
189. See supra note 186, at 222.
190. The error of this conclusion surfaced years later when Baldwin-United collapsed.
See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
191. The act is divided into several sections, each of which focuses on a partic-
ular aspect of the relationship between the insurer and other members
of the insurance holding company system and specifies how that particu-
lar aspect will be regulated.
After defining key terms, such as "affiliate" and "insurance holding
company system," in Section 1, the act goes on in Section 2 to deal with
downstream diversification by insurers. Section 2(a) enumerates types
of businesses in which subsidiaries of insurers may engage, including in-
vestment management, data processing, and accounting. The ultimate
determination as to the scope of the activities in which an insurers' sub-
sidiaries may permissibly engage is left to each domiciliary state.
Section 2(b) allows a domestic insurer additional investment author-
ity beyond that permitted under the insurance code, so that it can, for
example, invest in the stock, debt obligations, and other securities of its
subsidiaries up to certain percentage limits. However, an individual
state can modify the liberalized investment approach so that insurers'
investment activity continues to confotm to that state's public policy....
Section 3 of the act provides protections against detrimental take-
overs of insurance companies by regulating mergers with, and acquisi-
[Vol. 71:726
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In response to the Model Act, the vast majority of states have
passed comparable legislation. Most have adopted crucial registration
requirements and prior approval requirements for certain transactions
such as dividend payments to affiliates and prior approval require-
ment of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. A few states imposed
only part of the regulation proposed by the Model Act. Portions of the
statutes did not go unchallenged, 192 but, in the main, the statutes were
tions of, domestic insurers. Persons who propose to acquire or merge
with a domestic insurer are required, under subsections (a), (b), and (c),
to file a statement with the commissioner, disclosing the principal ac-
quiring parties; giving certain financial and other information about
them; describing their plans, agreements, and activities concerning the
proposed takeover, and including any other information the commis-
sioner may request. Section 3(d) provides that all takeovers are subject
to prior approval by the commissioner, after a public hearing, which
hearing is optional with the commissioner. Section 3(d)(1) lists the sev-
eral grounds upon which any denial of such approval must be based, e.g.
a finding by the commissioner that the proposed takeover might lead to
the insurer's insolvency or undercut policyholders' interests....
Registration requirements for insurers are delineated in Section 4.
Under subsection (a), all authorized insurers that are members of insur-
ance holding company systems must register with the commissioner, un-
less they are foreign insurers that are subject to substantially similar
requirements in their domiciliary states. Section 1 of the act indicates,
through its definitions of "affiliate," "control," "person," and "insurance
holding company system," that 10% stock ownership of an insurer by
another person (or 10% stock ownership of another person by an in-
surer) creates a rebuttable presumption of the insurer's membership in
an insurance holding company system. Section 4(b) states that the regis-
tration statement shall contain current information about the financial
condition of the insurer, and about certain specified relationships and
transactions between the insurer and its affiliates....
Section 5 contains the provisions applicable to material transactions,
dividends and distributions. There are standards provided in Section
5(a) for evaluation of material transactions between insurers and their
affiliates and, in Section 5(b), for evaluation of adequacy of surplus. Sec-
tion 5(c) provides a prior approval procedure for extraordinary dividends
and other distributions....
Sections 6(a) and (b) confer upon the domestic commissioner the
power to conduct an examination of any insurer where it is necessary to
ascertain the financial condition or legality of conduct of that insurer in
order to protect the interests of policyholders.
Report of the Industry Advisory Committee on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation to the Insurance Holding Companies (B1) Subcommittees,
supra note 186, at 222-23.
192. Some courts held takeover provisions in violation of the Commerce Clause and
the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (e) & 78n(d)(t)(1982); e.g., Edgar v. Mite 457
U.S. 624 (1982), (examining the Illinois Business Take-Over Act); Terry v.
Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986), (examining the Hawaii Control
Share Acquisition statute). Other courts found violations of the Commerce
Clause: eg., Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.
1982)(examining the Michigan Take-Over Offers Act); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F.
Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(examining the Missouri Control Share Acquisition
Act); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983)(examining the
New Hampshire Security Takeover Disclosure Act). Other courts held the take-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
accepted by the industry. The statutes were made applicable to any
affiliate93 that was in control of or controlled by another insurer, a
corporation, a partnership, any other entity or an individual. How-
ever, the realization that changing events and conditions require ad-
justment and modification to current laws persuaded the NAIC to
undertake a thorough review of the Model Act.
The first review was prompted by the Equity Funding Corporation
of America fiasco.1 9 4 The frightening and dismaying aspect of this
scandal is that apparently a large financial organization was able to
over statute in violation of the Williams Act: e.g., Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F.
Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981)(examining the Florida Insurance Holding Company
Act). However, some courts upheld takeover statutes: e.g., John Alden Life Ins.
Co. v. Woods, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,617 (D. Idaho 1981), (examining the
Idaho Acquisitions of Control and Insurance Holding Company Systems Act);
Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Rousall, 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kansas 1981),
(examining the Kansas Insurance Holding Company Act); L. P. Acquisition Co. v.
Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985)(examining the Michigan Take-Over Offers
Act).
193. Defined in Section I(A) of the Model Act (see supra note 183) as follows: "[ain
'affiliate' of, or person 'affiliated' with, a specific person, is a person that directly
or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or
is under common control with, the person specified."
194. Equity Funding was a holding company with several life insurance company sub-
sidiaries. Early in 1973 Equity Funding was linked to rumors about its financial
condition and questions concerning "certain" operations. Based on these rumors
the Illinois Insurance Department conducted a surprise audit on Equity Funding
Life Insurance Company and discovered that 60,000 fake life insurance policies
were issued, then sold for cash to other insurance companies that do a reinsur-
ance business, and that $24 million in bonds that were supposed to be on deposit
at American National Bank & Trust Company were nonexistent. These discover-
ies triggered investigations by the insurance departments of California, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York. Eventually the FBI also
entered the picture and uncovered a massive counterfeit securities operation in-
volving as much as $100 million in bogus securities printed by printing subsidiar-
ies of Equity Funding. These bogus securities were then counted as part of
Equity assets (inflating the net worth of Equity Funding and consequently inflat-
ing its stock market price). An officer of Bankers National Life Insurance Com-
pany (another life insurance subsidiary of Equity Funding) stated that he was
repeatedly asked by Equity Funding officials to illegally transfer Bankers Na-
tional assets to the parent company. The California insurance department
charged that two-thirds of insurance in force, $2 billion out of $3 billion, claimed
by Equity Life was bogus and that bogus loans were issued to the phantom policy-
holders. The Massachusetts Commissioner stated that out of 4200 life insurance
policies claimed to have been sold in the state his department could account for
only 700. The California commissioner's office strongly criticized the First Na-
tional City Bank for relinquishing stock certificates of Northern Life Insurance
Company, another Equity subsidiary, held as loan collateral, during the week
prior to disclosure of the scandal, upon the urging of an Equity Funding officer.
The scandal triggered dozens of civil and criminal lawsuits involving major bro-
kerage firms, banks, other financial institutions, national accounting firms, secur-
ity analysts and executives of various Equity affiliates. For the sake of
completeness, I might add that Equity Funding Corporation was reorganized in
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deceive the Securities Exchange Commission, the New York Stock
Exchange, the banking regulatory entities, state insurance authorities,
accounting firms and security analysts. Such a spectre exposes the
weaknesses inherent in regulating the types of computer operations
which had played a substantial role'9 5 in perpetrating the fraud.
After lengthy deliberations, the NAIC (B1) Task Force to Consider
Insurance Holding Company Legislation submitted its report to the
Insurance Holding Companies (B1) Subcommittee, with the recom-
mendation that eight key provisions 96 in the Model Act be amended.
Notwithstanding the Equity Funding scandal, the Committee came to
the conclusion that no amendments were needed. 97 It took another
bankruptcy proceedings and several of the insurance company affiliates were re-
habilitated under state insurance regulatory proceedings.
195. A system of computer codes was programmed to manufacture $120 million of fic-
titious assets and to create about 60,000 bogus life insurance policies for nonexis-
tent persons and to handle phantom death benefits and nonexistent policy lapses.
The California and Illinois insurance commissioners stated that it is impossible to
protect the public with the antiquated methods of audit available to state insur-
ance regulatory bodies and that the fraudulent practices of Equity Funding would
not have been detected except for rumored irregularities and the resulting sur-
prise audits ordered by both states. The information in notes 194 and 195 was
obtained from numerous articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal
which appeared during 1973.
196. The eight items concerned dividends and distributions, the surplus test, the mate-
riality test (for disclosure of "material" transactions), the solvency test, independ-
ent directorships, and several matters relating to investigations and state
reciprocity. Report of the NAIC Task Force on Model Insurance Holding Com-
pany Legislation, I NAIC PROCEEDINGS 215 (1978).
197. As to the committee's objectives, the committee was appointed to com-
ment on the report of the NAIC (B1) Task Force to Consider Insurance
Holding Company Legislation. The task force reviewed the Model In-
surance Company System Regulatory Act first issued in 1969 by the
NAIC, under cover of a letter from the then Director of the Nebraska
Department of Insurance, Mr. E. Benjamin Nelson, the task force issued
its report on October 26, 1976. The task force considered several propos-
als to amend the act, which are the eight specific areas covered in our
committee paper.
The advisory committee took a new look at the Holding Company
Act. Essentially, the committee decided that after nearly ten years of
experience it was time to see whether a major overhaul of the act and
the regulatory principles affecting insurance holding companies were in
order. The committee considered the 1968 report of the industry advi-
sory committee on this same subject. As the committee deliberated, it
was mindful that in 1977, even more than in 1967-68, the insurance in-
dustry has a very direct interest in the enhancement of the regulatory
system in view of the guarantee laws almost universally applicable to
casualty property companies, and rapidly becoming so for the life compa-
nies.
As to the committee's conclusions, the essential conclusion was that
the act does not require a major change. It provides the commissioners
with the regulatory powers they need and the insurance industry with
the flexibility it needs.
The committee endorsed the NAIC's 1967-69 positive attitude to-
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disaster, the Baldwin-United collapse,198 to motivate the regulators to
wards insurance holding companies and again concluded that insurance
holding companies can be effectively regulated. The committee believes
the act does promote effective state regulation of the insurance holding
company system through extensive registration, disclosure and prior ap-
proval mechanisms.
Id. at 216.
198. Baldwin-United began as the Baldwin Piano Co. in 1862. One hundred years later
it was transformed into a financial conglomerate. This metamorphosis was born
out of the economic changes then occurring in the United States. The high infla-
tion of the 1960s and 1970s caused the public to feel that savings were being di-
luted. Additionally, the income tax "bracket creep" pushed people into higher
and higher tax brackets motivating them to seek havens where their money
would receive the highest returns and simultaneously shelter their income from
the ravenous tax collector. New, high yielding financial instruments were being
created by various investment industries resulting in a flood of disintermediation
of bank deposits into these new vehicles of wealth accumulation. Not to be left
out in the cold, insurance companies devised new products in order to garner
some of this "hot money". Universal Life and variable life products such as varia-
ble annuities were among the new creations. However, a product which had been
in existence for some time, but not previously "pushed", developed into the great-
est tap to the ocean of tax shelter seeking funds-the Single Premium Deferred
Annuity (SPDA). Enter Morley P. Thompson, president and chief executive of-
ficer of D.H. Baldwin Co., a subsidiary of Baldwin-United, a brilliant innovator
and corporations intermingler par excellence who masterminded the most com-
plicated conglomerate that ever bedazzled (and then duped and confused) the
moneyed tycoons of Wall Street. Prior to its collapse Baldwin-United consisted of
almost 500 separate business entities, including banks, savings and loans, mort-
gage bankers, real estate firms, twenty-two property and casualty insurers, fif-
teen life and annuity underwriters as well as numerous non-financial entities.
In terms of surface complexity the events that have come under the
[bankruptcy examiner's] scrutiny could hardly be matched. Any devotee
of baroque puzzles could find no happier pastime than losing himself for
hours, days, or weeks in the endless mazes of intercorporate transactions
and transfers among [Baldin-United's] myriad subsidiaries that have
been the constant activities [for the three fiscal years preceding the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, September 26, 1983].
Examiner's Statement of Investigation in Re: Baldwin-United Corporation and
D.H. Baldwin Company, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, 5 (1985)(on file with author).
An SPDA is a product purchased with a lump sum premium. When the
SPDA matures years later periodic payments are made to the annuitant either
for life or a definite period of time. Between the time of the original premium
payment and the maturity date, interest is credited to the account, but is not taxa-
ble until the time for payout, creating tax shelter feature which made SPDAs so
attractive).
Between 1970 (the time of Thompson's ascendancy to the presidency of Bald-
win) and 1982, numerous financial entities were acquired including National In-
vestors Life Insurance Company (NILIC) which became the main issuer of
Baldwin's SPDA.
The SPDA was the right product at the right time, and Baldwin made
the most of it by a marketing concept of promoting the product primarily
through major national brokerage firms such as Merrill Lynch instead of
through established insurance agents. During a period when most of its
other business activities were showing losses or minimal growth, Bald-
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question whether the 1969 Model Act sufficiently protected the sol-
win was reporting awesome increases in revenues in its SPDA insurance
subsidiaries. In 1979 revenues from SPDAs were $9 million. In 1980
they jumped to $233 million. In 1981 they exploded to over $1.5 billion.
The company's stock was soaring, and its president was acclaimed as one
of the great financial wizards of the decade.
Id. at 20.
The profits shown by this astounding growth were illusory. In the industry
the premiums received by the insurer were invested with the goal that the in-
come therefrom should cover expenses, a profit and the interest to be credited.
Even when interest rates are stable, matching assets to liabilities is a difficult
task. But when interest rates fluctuate (as they did during the 1970s the early
1980s) the task is almost impossible. The Baldwin SPDAs carried interest rates
higher than those of competitors, but the assets (ie., the investments) did not
produce income sufficient to cover the aforementioned elements, resulting in a
negative spread between the net earnings and crediting rates. How then did
Baldwin show profits? Answer: By creating them from thin air through clever
manipulation of tax laws. At the time it acquired NILIC, it also formed National
Investors Pension Insurance Company (NIPIC) which was a non-life insurance
company designed to act as reinsurer of NILIC.
Upon sale of a SPDA policy NILIC would, for income tax purposes, rec-
ord the initial premium as revenue and expense an identical figure as
initial reserve. It would also expense all acquisition costs such as com-
missions at the time of sale. It would reinsure the policy with NIPIC
which would pay it a 12% ceding commission. The difference the acquisi-
tion expenses of approximately 6% and the receipt of the 12% ceding
commission would be income to NILIC and taxed at the rates applicable
to life insurance companies, generally approximately 23%. The expenses
reflected in the payment of the ceding commission were thus incurred by
NIPIC which was not a life insurance company for tax purposes. This
created for tax purposes significant losses. Since NIPIC was consoli-
dated with the rest of Baldwin-United non-life insurance affiliates, those
affiliates could offset what would otherwise be taxable income, taxed at
the general corporate rate of 46%, against the NIPIC losses. This plan
served to shift income from the 46% general corporate rate to the 23%
life insurance company rate. In 1981 this tax arbitrage contributed $40.7
million to Baldwin's net income.
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
To illustrate this sleight-of-hand income creation, assume the sale of a
$100,000 SPDA. NILIC would pay $6000 in commissions and overhead expenses.
Upon reinsurance with NIPIC it would receive $12,000 of ceding commissions,
resulting in a $6000 profit upon which it would pay taxes of $1380, at the life
insurer rate of 23%, by filing separately from the Baldwin consolidated return.
Thus a $4620 after tax profit was realized, instead of a loss of $6000, NIPIC, on
the other hand, would incur a loss of $12,000, and by filing as part of the Baldwin
consolidated return, it would reduce total consolidated income by $12,000 giving a
tax benefit (to the consolidated group) of $5520. A total of $10,140 profit out of
thin air! In addition, reinsuring within the holding company attributes a healthy
appearance to the insurer when in fact it may be deficient. This is so because the
ceded insurance is no longer the liability of the original insurer but the premium
money from the policy flows to the reinsurer who invests it in various assets.
Baldwin, by having NILIC reinsure with NIPIC, did just that. With its
liabilities reduced, NILIC looked healthy on paper. NIPIC, in turn, in-
vested the ceded premiums heavily in Baldwin's affiliated securities,
thereby funneling the premium dollars up to the parent. The result: the
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vency of an insurer in a holding company system in an era of rapidly
expanding financial services giants.
security of the policyholder was actually dependent on the strength of
the parent holding company.
John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding Com-
pany, 20 FORUM 445, 449-450 (1985).
However, there are several flaws in this kind of financial legerdemain. First,
NIPIC's constant operational losses required frequent infusions of new capital
since its investments of premium money into Baldwin affiliates generated very
little income. Secondly, the generation of tax losses is senseless unless there are
income producing companies to take advantage of the losses, which gave rise to
additional pressure for expansion by acquisition. At the same time that this fe-
verish expansion activity was going on, the explosive sale of SPDAs created a
tension between two capital requirements: during a growth period insurance re-
serve requirements dictate the holding of capital at the insurance company level
and may even require additional infusions of new capital (see supra note 159 and
accompanying text) whereas aggressive expansion through new acquisitions re-
quires capital at the parent level. By the end of 1981 the cash needs of this con-
glomerate were far beyond the cash flows generated by the insurance companies
and myriad other subsidiaries of Baldwin-United. The house of cards was about
to collapse, when wizard Thompson came to the rescue in March of 1982 with the
final and biggest acquisition of all: MGIC Investment Corporation. Unfortu-
nately this rescue turned into Baldwin's fiasco. MGIC was a mortgage guarantee
insurance company from which Baldwin expected heavy cash flows. Thompson
expected to finance the $1.17 billion purchase price by internally generated cash
and borrowing $584 million from a bank consortium for one year. The internal
raising of cash was accomplished by a series of complicated intercompany trans-
fers among Baldwin subsidiaries designed to draw the cash from the operating
level to the level. NILIC, NIPIC and other insurance company subsidiaries were
among the entities being depleted of cash. In March 1980 and again in March 1981
the NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) examiner team de-
tected a need for regulatory attention of NIPIC. However, Arkansas, the primary
domiciliary regulator, proceeded cautiously, not wanting to becloud the reputa-
tion of an insurer. It was not till early 1982 that a special examination was begun
in conjunction with Missouri, Texas, Indiana and Arizona, also domiciliary regu-
latory states. By the time the audits were completed in late 1982, the financial
community became aware that Baldwin had problems and their stock price began
to plummet. Since a large portion of NILIC's and NIPIC's assets consisted of
stock in Baldwin subsidiaries, these assets had to be revalued downward, result-
ing in NIPIC becoming statutorily insolvent unless new capital was infused im-
mediately. This was done, but it left Baldwin so bereft that it was unable to meet
the payment of the loan due on the MGIC purchase. The house of cards fell;
Chapter 11 followed.
To summarize, Baldwin tried to accomplish its huge expansion program by
trading assets, funding loans, providing collateral and purchasing equity interests
among affiliated companies. The insurance companies were caused to transfer
liquid assets to other affiliates to fund other acquisitions and received, in return,
equity or debt securities in those affiliates. The goal of the Baldwin policy was to
aggregate its assets in the regulated affiliates and to assemble the liabilities in the
unregulated companies. But:
[tihe same dollar cannot be used to pay debts incurred in acquisitions at
one corporate level while meeting capital requirements at another corpo-
rate level. Baldwin became increasingly caught in a bind between the
demand for adequate capital for regulatory purposes at the level of its
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As indicated by the report of the 1969 Advisory committee, the
1969 Model Act relied on regulation by disclosure. The amended
Model Act of 1985 relies on prior regulatory approval of acquisitions
of or mergers with domestic insurers, and any interaffiliate transac-
insurance subsidiaries and the demand for adequate cash to service debt
at the holding company level.
Examiner's Statement, supra at 23.
The NAIC issued a paper in February 1985 entitled The Baldwin-United Cor-
poration Bankruptcy- Its Significance for Insurance Regulation. Its conclusion
on page 13 is reproduced below:
CONCLUSIONS
Baldwin's accomplishments occurred with the cooperation of virtually
all of the country's major retail stockbrokers, with state insurance de-
partment approvals, the silent acquiescence of federal agencies, as well
as the active participation of dozens of the country's most sophisticated
banks, plus a legion of lawyers, accountants and actuaries who had ac-
tively or passively approved the various stages of Baldwin's evolution.
Most of the transactions and acquisitions received the approval of the
appropriate regulatory agency-state or federal. Based on hindsight it is
easy to observe that some of the acquisitions and/or transactions should
not have been approved, but this raises larger issues for those in the busi-
ness of financial regulation. How can regulators detect a pattern detri-
mental to the viability of a corporate structure when each part appears
sound? How can the group of affiliated companies be gauged if its struc-
ture is changing almost daily? How can regulators detect problems soon
enough when management obscures the facts or engages in activity that
is detrimental to its own health? How can the cumulative or synergistic
effect of a series of permissible, but risky, transactions be measured?
Most important, if the regulator's role is defined as that of oversight and
supervision and not management of an insurer's operations, how can the
regulator respond when management has charted a determined and dan-
gerous course.
The normal difficulties plaguing financial regulators were exacer-
bated by the incredible complexities of Baldwin. This, added to an at-
mosphere of deregulation and new hybrid products, made life difficult
for regulators and, unfortunately, the various publics they serve. While
the situation is far from hopeless for Baldwin SPDA-holders due to the
Rehabilitation Plan we, as regulators, should waste no time in attempt-
ing to prevent future Baldwins.
Author's note: The material in this note is but a brief description of the activities
and transactions of Baldwin-United. This information was gleaned from the fol-
lowing sources: Examiner's Statement of Investigation in Re: Baldwin-United
Corporation and D.H. Baldwin Company, United States Bankruptcy Court,
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division (1985); NAIC, TEE BALDWIN-UNTED
CORPORATION BANKRUPTCY: ITS SIGNICANCE FOR INSURANCE REGULATION
(1985); John R. Dunne, Intercompany Transactions Within Insurance Holding
Companies, 20 FORUM 445 (1985); Complaint for Plaintiff, In the Matter of the
Rehabilitation of National Investors Pension Insurance Company, National In-
vestors Life Insurance Company and Mt. Hood Pension Insurance Company,
Linda N. Garner Rehabilitator/Receiver of National Investors Life Insurance
Company, National Investors Pension Insurance Company and Mt. Hood Pension
Insurance Company v. Morley P. Thompson, Circuit Court of Pulaski County,
Arkansas, Cause No. 84-5517 (1984); ARKANSAS INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REPORT
OF EXAIINATION OF NATIONAL INVESTORS PENSION INSURANCE COMPANY AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1982 AND JUNE 30, 1983 (1984).
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tions such as reinsurance, service contracts, management agreements
and expense allocations including taxes. Section 2 of the new Model
Act enumerates permissible activities of an insurer's subsidiaries and
sets out the limits of investment in them. Section 3 sets forth the "big
stick" procedures governing acquisitions of or mergers with insurers.
The requirements include submission of detailed information to the
commissioner, including specific data about the acquiring entity,
source and amount of funds to be used for effecting the merger or
acquisition, nature of the acquirer's business, future plans for the ac-
quired insurer, audited financial statements and many additional mat-
ters. It authorizes the commissioner to employ, at the acquirer's
expense, attorneys, accountants, actuaries and other experts to assist
in determining whether to approve or disapprove the application.
The new philosophy of prior regulatory approval embodied in the
1985 Model Act is clearly manifested in amended section 5, under
which interaffiliate transactions 99 or reinsurance agreements and
199. (2) The following transactions involving a domestic insurer and any per-
son in its holding company system may not be entered into unless the
insurer has notified the Commissioner in writing of its intention to enter
into such transaction at least thirty (30) days prior thereto, or such
shorter period as the Commissioner may permit, and the Commissioner
has not disapproved it within that period.
(a) sales, purchases, exchanges, loans or extensions of credit, guaran-
tees, or investments provided such transactions are equal to or ex-
ceed: (i) With respect to nonlife insurers, the lesser of three percent
(3%) of the insurer's admitted assets or twenty-five percent (25%) of
surplus as regards policyholders as of the 31st day of December next
proceeding;, (ii) With respect to life insurers, three percent (3%) of
the insurer's admitted assets; as of the 31st day of December next
preceding;,
(b) Loans or extensions of credit to any person who is not an affiliate,
where the insurer makes loans or extensions of credit with the
agreement or understanding that the proceeds of the transactions, in
whole or in substantial part, are to be used to make loans or exten-
sions of credit to, to purchase assets of, or to make investments in,
any affiliate of the insurer making the loans or extensions of credit
provided such transactions are equal to or exceed: (i) With respect to
nonlife insurers, the lesser of three percent of the insurer's admitted
assets or twenty-five percent (25%) of surplus as regards policyhold-
ers as of the 31st day of December next preceding;, b) with respect to
life insurers, three percent (3%) of the insurer's admitted assets, as
of the 31st day of December next preceding;,
(c) Reinsurance agreements or modifications thereto in which the rein-
surance premium or a change in the insurer's liabilities equals or ex-
ceeds five percent (5%) of the insurer's surplus as regards
policyholders, as of the 31st day of December next preceding, includ-
ing those agreements which may require as consideration the trans-
fer of assets from an insurer to a non-affiliate, if an agreement or
understanding exists between the insurer and non-affiliate that any
portion of such assets will be transferred to one or more affiliates of
the insurer;
(d) All management agreements, service contracts and all cost-sharing
arrangements; and
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dividend payments 200 require thirty days prior notice. One of the les-
sons of the Baldwin-United collapse was that after-the-fact reporting
(e) Any material transactions, specified by regulation, which the
Commissioner determines may adversely affect the interests of
the insurer's policyholders. Nothing herein contained shall be
deemed to authorize or permit any transactions which, in the
case of an insurer not a member of the same holding company
system, would be otherwise contrary to law.
(3) A domestic insurer may not enter into transactions which are
part of a plan or series of like transactions with persons within the
holding company system if the purpose of those separate transac-
tions is to avoid the statutory threshold amount and thus avoid the
review that would occur otherwise. If the Commissioner determines
that such separate transactions were entered into over any twelve
month period for such purpose, he may exercise his authority under
Section 10.
(4) The Commissioner, in reviewing transactions pursuant to Sub-
section A (2), shall consider whether the transactions comply with
the standards set forth in Subsection A (1) and whether they may
adversely affect the interests of policyholders.
(5) The Commissioner shall be notified within thirty (30) days of
any investment of the domestic insurer in any one corporation if the
total investment in such corporation by the insurance holding com-
pany system exceeds ten percent (10%) of such corporation's voting
securities.
MODEL ACr, supm note 183, § 5(A)(2)-(5).
200. (B) Dividends and other Distribution. No domestic insurer shall pay
any extraordinary dividend or make any other extraordinary distribu-
tion to its shareholders until (1) thirty days after the Commissioner has
received notice of the declaration thereof and has not within such period
disapproved such payment, or (2) the Commissioner shall have approved
such payment within such thirty-day period.
For purposes of this section, an extraordinary dividend or distribu-
tion includes any dividend or distribution of cash or other property,
whose fair market value together with that of other dividends or distri-
butions made within the preceding twelve (12) months exceeds the
lesser of (1) ten percent (10%) of the insurer's surplus as regards policy-
holders as of the 31st day of December next preceding, or (2) the net gain
from operations of such insurer, if such insurer is a life insurer, or the
net income, if such insurer is not a life insurer, not including realized
capital gains, for the 12-month period ending the 31st day of December
next preceding, but shall not include pro rata distributions of any class of
the insurer's own securities. In determining whether a dividend or dis-
tribution is extraordinary, an insurer other than a life insurer may carry
forward net income from the previous two (2) calendar years that has
not already been paid out as dividends. This carry-forward shall be com-
puted by taking the net income from the second and third preceding cal-
endar years, not including realized capital gains, less dividends paid in
the second and immediate preceding calendar years.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, an insurer may declare
an extraordinary dividend or distribution which is conditional upon the
Commissioner's approval and the declaration shall confer no rights upon
shareholders until (1) the Commissioner has approved the payment of
the dividend or distribution or (2) the Commissioner has not disapproved
such payment within the thirty (30) day period referred to above.
AL § 5(b).
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was too late to prevent debilitating interaffiliate transactions.201
Although the section 5 requirements should achieve control over
potentially precarious activities of insurers within a holding company
system, the information reaching the regulators even under this prior
approval scheme would be fragmented or isolated and not easily corre-
lated. To ensure that the regulators obtain inclusive information
about the total picture of a company's interaffiliate transactions, sec-
tion 4 of the Model Act sets up provisions for a comprehensive report-
ing format under a mandatory registration requirement. Every
domestic insurer must register 2O2 in its state of domicile and every for-
201. Baldwin-United was not the only holding company that milked its insurance sub-
sidiaries. During the late 1960s $1.5 billion was extracted from property-liability
insurers by their parent holding companies in the form of dividends and other
distributions. Richard de R. Kip, How to Get Capital Out of the Property-Liabil-
ity Insurance Business, 23 CPCU ANNALS 235, 236 (1970).
202. The registration statement shall include the following information:
(B) Information and Form Required. Every insurer subject to registra-
tion shall file the registration statement on a form prescribed by the
NAIC, which shall contain the following current information:
(1) The capital structure, general financial condition, ownership and
management of the insurer and any person controlling the insurer,
(2) The identity and relationship of every member of the insurance
holding company system;
(3) The following agreements in force, and transactions currently
outstanding or which have occurred during the last calendar year be-
tween the insurer and its affiliates:
(a) Loans, other investments, or purchases, sales or exchanges of
securities of the affiliates by the insurer or of the insurer by its
affiliates;
(b) Purchases, sales or exchange of assets;
(c) Transactions not in the ordinary course of business;
(d) Guarantees or undertakings for the benefit of an affiliate
which result in an actual contingent exposure of the insurer's as-
sets to liability, other than insurance contracts entered into in the
ordinary course of the insurer's business;
(e) All management agreements, service contracts and all cost-
sharing arrangements;
(f) Reinsurance agreements;
(g) Dividends and other distributions to shareholders; and
(h) Consolidated tax allocation agreements;
(4) Any pledge of the insurer's stock, including stock of any subsidi-
ary or controlling affiliate, for a loan made to any member of the
insurance holding company system;
(5) Other matters concerning transactions between registered insur-
ers and any affiliates as may be included from time to time in any
registration forms adopted or approved by the Commissioner.
(C) Summary of Registration Statement. All registration statements
shall contain a summary outlining all items in the current registration
statement representing changes from the prior registration statement.
(E) Reporting of Dividends to Shareholders. Subject to Subsection 5B
each registered insurer shall report to the Commissioner all dividends
and other distributions to shareholders within fifteen (15) business days
following the declaration thereof.
[Vol. 71:726
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eign insurer doing business in the state must also do so, unless it is
subject to registration in its domiciliary state under standards similar
to those set forth in certain parts of section 5 of the Model Act. An
examination of the listed items of information required by the provi-
sions evidences the attempt of the NAIC to correct the Baldwin-
United problems and forestall recurrences of similar fiascos. 203
V. PRESSURES ON BANKS TO EXPAND THEIR ACTIVITIES
A. The Changes in the Financial Services Industry
The skeletal discussion of bank regulation and insurance regula-
tion in the foregoing portions of this study was not intended to ex-
amine or express in detail the substance of the regulatory schemes
governing the two industries, but merely to highlight the emphasis
that such legislation places on the preservation of safety of the con-
sumer's investment. As long as banking, securities, insurance and real
estate were kept apart, the banking industry was not aggressive in at-
tempting to diversify into financial areas verboten by the respective
laws. However, during the past three decades the financial services
industry has undergone revolutionary changes at a galloping pace.
Unregulated entities have entered the field to perform services and
offer products similar to those formerly available only through
bAnks.204 More recently, thrift institutions were authorized to make
certain consumer loans2O5 and provide NOW accounts. 206 Addition-
(F) Information of Insurers. Any person within an insurance holding
company system subject to registration shall be required to provide com-
plete and accurate information to an insurer, where such information is
reasonably necessary to enable the insurer to comply with the provisions
of this Act.
MODEL ACT, supra note 183, § 4B, C, D, E, F.
203. The remaining portion of the MODEL ACT (Sections 6 through 17) are not ana-
lyzed herein.
204. For example, Sears opened financial centers offering insurance, securities, real
estate services, check cashing facilities and credit card availability; American Ex-
press, aside from credit card services, offered insurance, investment banking and
banking services through a Swiss bank.
The nation's largest stock insurer, Aetna Life and Casualty, now owns 40
percent of the Samuel Montagu and Company group, a leading British
investment bank and 87 percent of Federated Investors Incorporated,
this nation's second largest money market and mutual fund management
firm.
Security Pacific Corporation, one of the fastest growing and most di-
versified securities firms, now has among its $37 billion of assets the
country's tenth largest bank. Its growing empire includes fifteen retail
stockbroker offices, three wholesale bond houses, an investment bank-
ing group, a private Swiss bank, a group of sixteen common trust funds, a
New York state chartered trust company, and a wholesale discount se-
curities brokerage firm.
Dunne, supra note 6, at 345.
205. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA),
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ally, new financial products, such as money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) and Cash Management Accounts (CMAs) were introduced
to compete with traditional bank accounts. Because Regulation Q2O7
imposed ceilings on the interest rates that banks could pay, there was
an outflow or disintermediation of deposits into MMMFs, which paid
higher rates. Although not a demand deposit account, an MMMF is
similar to a traditional checking account in that it permits a depositor
check writing privileges. Introduced in the 1970s, the CMA combined
a securities brokerage account, a money market fund, a checking ac-
count with a bank and a debit card issued by the same bank.208
Through the use of computers and toll free telephone numbers instan-
taneous transfers of funds can be accomplished through the CMA
account.2 09
Not only have innovative products replaced traditional banking
services, "old fashioned" nonbank entities have carved out thick slices
of a highly profitable banking activity-consumer loans. Finance com-
panies and automobile finance companies have displaced commercial
banks as the major providers of installment credit.21o Furthermore,
the global aspects of the financial world have reduced the need for
domestic bank services:
The technology revolution has opened up twenty-four hour worldwide finan-
cial markets linked by instantaneously communicated financial information
on a global scale. This development has made it possible for financial custom-
ers to bypass banks and meet their credit and investment needs directly and
less expensively in the securities markets. By enhancing investor ability to
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-05, 94 Stat. 132, 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-04
(1988)).
206. Id. § 303. NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts are interest bearing
checking accounts. Prior to 1980 interest was not permitted to be paid on demand
deposits. Naturally many members of the public transferred their money from
demand deposits to the NOW accounts of thrift institutions.
207. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1992). The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited payment of interest on
demand deposits and authorized the Fed to impose interest rate ceilings on sav-
ings accounts or time deposits, such as certificates of deposit. The Banking Act of
1933, Ch. 89, § 11, 48 Stat. 162, 181. The Fed implemented this authority through
Regulation Q. But by the 1980s it became apparent that banks had been losing
their deposits since the 1960s to other liquid investments due to higher market
rates. In 1980 DIDMCA called for a phase-out of the ceilings with total elimina-
tion by March 31, 1986. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 204-05, 94 Stat. 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-04
(1982)).
208. The CMA is the "invention" of Merrill Lynch and is now offered by many securi-
ties firms.
209. When the owner of the CMA account purchases securities, writes a check against
the account, or uses his debit card, the needed funds are automatically withdrawn
and credited to the seller's or payee's account. The CMA account has become a
powerful substitute for traditional deposit accounts. AMMCAN BANKER (Octo-
ber 8, 1987 p. 1) reported that by 1987 the Merrill Lynch CMAs alone had $160
billion in deposits. Prrr supra note 102, at 712 n.21.
210. Whiting, supra note 6, at 361.
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assess credits and diversify risk without the need for banking expertise or
FDIC protection, computer technology has dramatically altered the credit
evaluation and diversification role of banks that once made them essential
intermediaries.2 1
The vast proliferation of retirement plans has also had its impact:
Moreover, increased institutionalization of savings in the form of pension and
retirement plans and the management of these funds by professional nonbank
money managers has diverted vast pools of funds away from banks to the se-
curities markets. 2
Worst of all, banks began to lose their large corporate customers:
Glass-Steagall's constraining effects have dramatically inhibited the ability of
banks to respond to the evolving financial needs of large corporate customers,
traditionally the strongest source of profitable banking activity. Prime corpo-
rate customers increasingly are sidestepping banks and satisfying their short-
term and intermediate credit needs by issuing commercial paper and securitiz-
ing their assets.2 1 3 Fifteen years ago, commercial banks controlled some 90%
of the short-term loan market. Today, roughly half of this market is satisfied
through the use of commercial paper.2 1 4 The securitization of assets has re-
duced the need for bank loans even further.
2 1 5
211. William M. Isaac and Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-
Steagall, 37 CATHoLIc U. L. REv. 281, 292-3 (1988)(footnotes omitted).
212. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).
213. The Securities Industry Association boasts that securities firms' distribution of
commercial paper enabled corporate borrowers to raise funds at costs well below
the 250 to 300 basis point spread over costs of funds typically demanded in bank
loans. Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Services: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 122 (1988)(statement of John Bachmann, Chairman, Securities Industry
Assoc.).
214. See Structure and Regulation [of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 124 (1986)]. (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK, RECENT TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL BANK PROFrrABILrTY: A STAFF
STUDY, 159-77, (1986)(hereinafter COMMERCIAL BANK PROFITABILITY STUDY)].
The commercial paper market has more than doubled since 1980, from $31 billion
to $78 billion in mid-1987. Structure and Role of United States Financial Institu-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1987)(statement
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
215. For example, mortgage pass-through securities accounted for approximately one-
third of all residential mortgage credit in 1987. The President of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York has stated that, "if securitization were to continue to
spread rapidly to other types of credit, the historic role of the deposit-based credit
intermediation process could be seriously jeopardized." COMMERCIAL BANK
PROFrrABILIrY STUDY, supra note [214], at xvi (foreword by E. Corrigan). [A pri-
mary function of financial intermediaries is to facilitate the flow of capital from
savers to borrowers. Financial institutions exist because they can do this at a
lower cost than would be possible through direct financing arrangements. Banks
and other depository institutions perform this intermediary function by making
loans and accepting deposits. Sometimes, however, a financial intermediary's de-
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By packaging automobile loans, leases, consumer loan receivables, and
portfolios of other assets into pools, a company can fund its operating costs by
selling interests in the pool directly to investors. 2 1 6 Bank loans are being used
increasingly as a source of back-up liquidity rather than a primary funding
source for many commercial customers.2 17 These customers need underwrit-
ing and distribution services to facilitate the sale of their own securities di-
rectly in the market. Glass-Steagall precludes banks from providing these
services. While banks have gained limited authority to assist corporate cus-
tomers in privately placing commercial paper after a decade-long battle,2 18
their ability to underwrite commercial paper and securitized assets has been
narrowly circumscribed and is entangled in ongoing litigation initiated by the
securities industry.2 19 2 2 0
mand for loans at a given rate is greater than its supply of deposits, in which case
it may purchase the Fed's funds or other uninsured deposits, sell securities under
repurchase agreements, sell short-term securities such as commercial paper or
bankers acceptances, or sell assets such as government securities or loans. When
an institution sells loans, it can sell whole loans or loan participations, or it can
"securitize" a portfolio of similar loans.
Securitization is a recent innovation in asset sales. It involves the pooling and
repackaging of loans into securities, which are then sold to investors. Like whole
loan sales and participations, securitization provides an additional funding source
and eliminates assets from a bank's balance sheet. Unlike whole loan sales and
participations, securitization is often used to market small loans that would be
difficult to sell on a stand-alone basis. Most importantly, securitization can in-
crease the liquidity and diversification of a loan portfolio. The ability to package
and sell these otherwise illiquid assets in an established secondary market in-
creases their liquidity. Christine Pavel, Securitization, 10 ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TIVE 16 (1986)].
216. The securitization of assets allows a company to eliminate intermediary expenses
in obtaining funding, transfer credit and interest rate risks, enhance balance
sheet liquidity, improve asset management, and diversify credit risk. The asset-
backed securities market is expected to grow to $100 billion in the next five years.
Standard & Poor's, Dramatic Growth Expected, in ASSET BACKED SECURrrIZA-
TION CREDIT REV., Mar. 16, 1987, at 1. See generally Christine Pavel, Securitiza-
tion, 10 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 16 (1986); AMERICAN BANKER ASSET SALES REP.,
Jan. 11, 1988, at 5.
217. See sources cited supra note [216]. Although the October 1987 stock market
plunge temporarily boosted the demand for commercial loans as major borrowers
fled from the volatile securities markets, the long-term downturn in the commer-
cial loan sector has not changed. Stock Crisis Could Boost Demand for Loans,
AMERICAN BANKER, Oct. 30, 1987, at 22, col. 2.
218. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468
U.S. 137 (1984); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1987); Bankers
Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987). See generally FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BOARD STAFF, COMMERCIAL PAPER PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES
(1977). Although banks may participate in the commercial paper market as issu-
ers of standby letters of credit providing back-up liquidity to issuers whose com-
mercial paper fails to sell in the market, they may not do so with respect to
commercial paper they place under restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve
Board. Moreover, this activity is not a substitute for commercial loans. Id.
219. In 1987, under the BHCA, the Federal Reserve Board approved for the first time
major banking holding companies' applications to engage, through subsidiaries, in
underwriting, and dealing in commercial paper, mortgage backed securities, mu-
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In summary, as banks lost their hold on the intermediation of finan-
cial activities, they began losing their profitability and viability. The
integrity and stability of the national monetary system was
threatened. The banking industry had to respond to what appeared to
be a calamitous environment.
B. The Banking Response
1. Bank Holding Companies
Banks sought to overcome the statutory limitations on their activi-
ties by forming bank holding companies (BHCs).221 In an effort to
evade geographic restraints,2 22 a bank would create a BHC that would
nicipal revenue bonds, and consumer receivable backed securities. The Chase
Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367 (1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473
(1987) [hereinafter Board Order of April 30, 1987]; The Chase Manhattan Corp.,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 607 (1987); Chemical New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 616
(1987); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 618 (1987); Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 73
Fed. Res. Bull. 620 (1987); Security Pacific Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 622 (1987);
The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 729 (1987); Chemical New York
Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987)(CRRs); Marine Midland Banks, Inc., 73 Fed.
Res. Bull. 738 (1987); PNC Financial Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 742 (1987); J.P.
Morgan & Co., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 875 (1987); First Interstate Bancorp, 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 928 (1987); Bank of New England Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 133 (1988). The
Board limited such activities to no more than 5% of each underwriting subsidi-
ary's total gross revenues and limited each to no more than a 5% share of the
market in each type of security. The Board also imposed numerous operating
restrictions on such underwriting subsidiaries, including a prohibition on man-
agement interlocks with affiliated banks, restrictions on extensions of credit to
issuers and purchasers of securities underwritten by the holding company's sub-
sidiary, and capital adequacy requirements. The Board's orders approving the
applications have been challenged in court by both the Securities Industry Associ-
ation as well as the bank holding company applicants and are the subject of a
judicial stay. See The Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., No. 87-1333 (D.C. Cir. filed July 20, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Nos. 87-4091, 87-4093, 87-4095 (2d
Cir. filed July 1 and July 15, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-4041 (2d Cir. filed May 1, 1987); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1169 (D.C. Cir. filed
April 17, 1987); Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., No. 87-1035 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 23, 1987); Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-1030 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 20,
1987). On Feb. 8, 1988, the Board's Order of April 30, 1987, was upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with the exception of the
5% market limit which the court struck down. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 87-4041 (2d Cir.Feb. 8,1988). The Securi-
ties Industry Association has filed a petition for certiorari seeking Supreme Court
review of the court's opinion. [cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (U.S. June 14, 1988).]
220. Isaac and Fein, supra note 211 at 293-94. Original footnote numbers 61 through 67
were renumbered 213 through 219.
221. A bank holding company is any entity that controls one or more banks.
222. Branch banking was strictly circumscribed. See supra text accompanying note
142.
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own it and also acquire other banks both in the home state and other
states where state law permitted. Branch banking restrictions could
be sidestepped because subsidiaries of BHCs were not considered
branch offices but corporations with their own charters. Because the
use of BHCs was fairly limited prior to the 1930s, Congress enacted no
special legislation to curb their activities. The Banking Act of 1933,
motivated by the 1929 crash, contained some controls on BHCs. Under
the act all BHCs which were members of the Federal Reserve were
placed under federal supervision.223 Like the Glass-Steagall provi-
sions,224 the goal of this ineffective provision was to separate banking
from affiliates engaged in investment banking. Because of the slow
but steady acquisition of nonbanking affiliates by BHCs,22z by the
early 1950s concerns arose about the concentration of banking re-
sources in other financial fields.
Congress reacted to these concerns by enacting the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.226 However, since Congress was primarily con-
cerned with the anticompetitive factors of large BHCs, the 1956 Act
applied only to BHCs controlling two or more banks.227 The 1956 Act
placed BHCs under the regulating power of the Fed and prohibited
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries from activities of a nonbank na-
ture, except those "of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature ...
which the Board . . .has determined to be so closely related to the
business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto."228 Since one-bank BHCs were not covered
by the 1956 act they were free to engage in nonbanking activities. As a
result, the post 1956 period saw a surge in one-bank BHCs conducting
interstate banking and nonbanking activities.229 Congress reacted to
223. The provision was triggered only if at least one bank in the holding company
entity was a member of the Federal Reserve System and the holding company
voted its stock in the member bank. By refraining from voting (or simply not
owning a member bank) the BHC did not come under the jurisdiction of the Fed
and could engage in activities prohibited by Glass-Steagall. Thus the provision
was a complete failure. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 191(e), 48 Stat. 162, 188
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 61), repealed in relevant part by Act of July 1, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-485, § 13(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242.
224. The Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, 78 respectively (1988)); see also
supra note 65.
225. The National Bank Act regulates national banks and their operating subsidiaries,
but does not regulate their affiliates or parents.
226. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)).
227. Congress expressly rejected regulation of one-bank holding companies because
such companies were few in number and controlled only small banks.
228. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133,137 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988)).
229. By 1968 $100 billion of deposits (approximately 25% of total deposits) of insured
commercial banks were held in this form. CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE,
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 13 (1969). During
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the surge by passing the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act (BHCA),230 which redefined the term "bank holding com-
pany" to include one-bank holding companies. This did not, however,
deter the continued expansion in the number of BHCs. At present
there are over 9,000 BHCs registered with the Fed.
2. Nonbank Banks
The nonbank bank phenomenon added to the arsenal of tools to be
used to escape the pincers of the BHCA. After 1970 and prior to 1987
the BHCA defined a bank as any institution "which (1) accepts depos-
its that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand and (2)
engages in the business of making commercial loans."231 Under this
definition commercial banks that accepted demand deposits but made
no commercial loans (or vice-versa) would not be banks for BHCA
purposes. Such institutions are referred to as "nonbank banks."
Soon this loophole was discovered by financial institutions and
there was a rush by securities entities, insurance companies, invest-
ment banks and other firms to buy or establish nonbank banks not
subject to the BHCA geographic and product limitations. Thus, banks
and BHCs came under additional competition from a multitude of
firms23 2 offering financial services previously the exclusive domain of
banks. Organizations that were not regulated under the BHCA were
able to enter the banking industry by acquiring FDIC-insured non-
bank banks. To offset this disadvantage, BHCs also acquired nonbank
banks for use in interstate banking activities233 such as acceptance of
deposits and consumer but not commercial lending.
Through the BHCs and nonbank banks, the banking industry has
attempted to expand its product and geographic activities. These vari-
1968 several major banks announced their intention to form one-bank holding
companies. By 1970 there were 1100 companies in control of banks covering 40
percent of total deposits. Richard M. Whiting, Bank Holding Companies: A Reg-
ulatory Primer, 2 BANKING L. REP. 190 (1986). These one-bank holding compa-
nies were engaged in about 100 different activities, including agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, transportation, and retail trade. LAsH, supra note 5, at 49.
230. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat.
1760 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
231. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1982)(amended 1987).
232. Some of these firms were: Merrill-Lynch, Prudential Insurance Company,
American Express, Fidelity Investments, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Dreyfus Corp., Sears, J.C. Penney Co., and many others.
233. BHCs were prohibited from acquiring any interest in banks outside the state in
which the principal operations of such BHC's banking subsidiaries were con-
ducted unless a state positively permitted such branching. This provision is
known as the "Douglas Amendment." Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch.
240, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1988)). This
provision supplements the interstate branching limitations of the McFadden Act.
44 Stat. 1224 (1927)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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ous undertakings will be discussed in connection with the legislative,
judicial, and administrative curbs that were being challenged.
VI. REGULATORY PROHIBITIONS
A. The Bank Holding Company Act
The Bank Holding Company Act234 (BHCA) regulates the activi-
ties of BHCs and their affiliates in nonbanking functions (either di-
rectly or through investments) and prohibits the undertaking of
business unrelated to banking. Germane to this paper are controver-
sies arising under section 3235 and section 4236 of the BHCA. Gener-
ally, section 3 prohibits any company, without the Fed's prior
approval, from taking any action that would result in the creation of a
bank holding company. Section 3 also prohibits any BHC from acquir-
ing control237 of any bank or merging with another BHC without prior
Fed approval. The Fed is prohibited from approving an application for
an acquisition or a merger that would result in a substantial lessening
of competition, unless the anticompetitive effect would be clearly out-
weighed by the beneficial effects in meeting the convenience and
needs of the local public. Furthermore, the Fed may not approve an
application for an out of state acquisition or merger unless the laws of
the target state expressly authorize the entry of the BHC. In contra-
distinction to section 3, which governs bank acquisitions, section 4 gov-
erns nonbanking acquisitions and activities of BHCs and their
nonbanking affiliates. Section 4 opens with a broad prohibition on
ownership or control by BHCs of "any company which is not a
bank."238 Then follows a list of exemptions;239 the most important of
which is section 4(c)(8). This exemption applies to:
shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper
incident thereto. In determining whether a particular activity is a proper inci-
dent to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall consider
whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably
be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience,
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse
effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices. In orders and regu-
lations under this subsection, the Board may differentiate between activities
commenced de novo and activities commenced by the acquisition, in whole or
234. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988).
235. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988).
236. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988).
237. For this purpose control is more than 5% of the stock of the bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(a)(1988).
238. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1)(1988).
239. Id. §§ 1843(c)(1)-(13).
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in part, of a going concern.2 4 0
Several elements of this provision bear closer examination. The
parenthetical phrase indicates that the Board may make its determi-
nations either by regulation or by order. The former is generally
made at the initiative of the Board; the latter in response to an applica-
tion. The Board has promulgated regulations24 L in which there are
listed twenty-five activities24 2 which are permissible under section
4(c)(8) as meeting the requirement that they be "so closely related to
banking... as to be a proper incident thereto." In addition, the Board,
has also approved by order more than twenty activities which are "in-
cident" to the business of banking. The applicant for a nonbanking
activity must pass the "closely related" test and the "benefits for the
public" test in order to receive a favorable determination.
In National Courier Association v. Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, the D.C. Circuit Court considered the meaning of
"closely related" and concluded that the intention of Congress was to
ensure that banks would not undertake activities "which are so clearly
of a purely commercial nature that the predominantly adverse effects
of a bank's engaging in them may be presumed."24 3 The test for the
requirement that the activity "be a proper incident [to banking]"244 is
referred to as the "public benefits" test because section 4(c)(8) specifi-
cally requires the Board to consider whether the activity will produce
benefits to the public "that outweigh possible adverse effects."245 Na-
tional Courier26 held that this test must be applied on a case-by-case
basis using the factors enumerated in section 4(c)(8), that is, the poten-
tial public benefits of greater convenience, increased coinpetition, and
gains in efficiency versus potential the adverse effects of concentration
of resources, decrease in competition, conflicts of interest, and un-
sound banking practices.24 7
B. Tiptoeing Through the Tulips of Restraints
This section will briefly review the more significant attempts of the
banking industry to overcome limitations on their financial activities
in face of increased competition by entities not regulated by federal or
state banking laws.
240. Id. § 1843(c)(8)(1976). The quoted version contains the wording used prior to the
1982 Amendment discussed infra note 283.
241. Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1992).
242. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(a), (b), and 225.25(b)(1)-(24).
243. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
244. See supra quotation accompanying note 239.
245. Id
246. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
247. See supra quotation accompanying note 240.
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Until 1963 it was commonly recognized that a mutual fund would
be considered an "affiliate" of its sponsor. Thus, under section 20 of
the Glass-Steagall Act 2 4 8 neither a member bank nor a BHC249 could
sponsor a mutual fund. In 1963 Comptroller Saxon promulgated a reg-
ulation 250 permitting national banks to sponsor (establish and oper-
ate) mutual funds. The Investment Company Institute (ICI)
challenged the validity of the regulation. The Supreme Court in ICI v.
Camp251 rejected the Comptroller's position, holding that under sec-
tions 16252 and 21253 of the Glass-Steagall Act a national bank is pro-
hibited from sponsoring an open-end investment company (a mutual
fund). The Court reasoned that shares of a mutual fund are securities
and, therefore, the sponsoring bank would be underwriting and dis-
tributing securities in violation of section 16 because the sponsor is in
control of the fund. Even though section 20 was not in issue, the Court
implied that an open-end mutual fund sponsored by a BHC would be
considered an affiliate of that BHC.
The Board interpreted the holding to mean that a BHC could spon-
sor a open-end mutual fund as well as a closed-end investment com-
pany.2M The ICI challenged this regulation but lost. In Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. IC1255 the Court held that
a BHC could sponsor a closed-end investment company without violat-
ing section 20 because neither the fund nor the sponsor would be "en-
gaged principally"256 in the issuance of securities.
The complexity of the meaning of the phrase "engaged principally"
248. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988) prohibits any affiliation between banks and securities orga-
nizations. See supra text accompanying note 140.
249. For definition of "affiliate" see 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b)(1988).
250. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(3)(1970)(current version at 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(1)(1992)).
251. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
252. For the contents of Section 16 (12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. H 1990)) see supra
note 101.
253. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). It forbids any entity in the securities business to receive
deposits.
254. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(f)(1992). The regulation explains the difference between
open-end or mutual funds and closed-end investment companies as follows:
Briefly, a mutual fund is an investment company which, typically, is con-
tinuously engaged in the issuance of its shares and stands ready at any
time to redeem the securities as to which it is the issuer, a closed-end
investment company typically does not issue shares after its initial or-
ganization except at infrequent intervals and does not stand ready to re-
deem its shares.
12 C.F.R. § 225.125(c)(1992).
255. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
256. Section 20 states:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated ... with any corporation, associa-
tion, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sales, or distribution . . . of
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)(emphasis added).
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arose again when in 1984 and 1985 several BHCs applied to the Board
for permission to engage, through affiliates, in underwriting and deal-
ing in bank-ineligible securities2 5 7 such as municipal revenue bonds,
commercial paper, mortgage-related securities and other debt securi-
ties. The BHC applicants were Citicorp25 S (the largest bank organiza-
tion in the country), Bankers Trust and J.P. Morgan & Co. The most
crucial issue involved in the matter was a determination of the quanti-
tative limits of activity to be permitted in ineligible securities under
section 20.259 The applicants contended that "engaged principally"
meant that the volume of activity in ineligible securities would have to
exceed fifty percent of the total business of the affiliate.260 After two
years of deliberation, the Board, in a lengthy order,26 1 rejected this
interpretation and held that five to ten percent of the affiliate's total
gross revenue on average over any two year period would be the
proper measure and also added a market share test. The order limited
the applicants to the lower end of the scale, five percent. As required
by the BHCA262 the Board found that the activities in which the appli-
cant intended to engage met the two required tests; 26 3 i.e., the activi-
ties were so closely related to banking as to be an incident thereto and
that the public benefits outweighed possible adverse effects. Thus, the
Board granted approval for underwriting and dealing in commercial
paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage related securities, sub-
ject to the five percent limitation and subject to a long list of condi-
tions and terms.264
While the Board engaged in lengthy deliberation, Congress passed
CEBA,265 which, inter alia, contained moratorium provisions which
prohibited federal banking regulatory agencies to approve any BHC or
affiliate thereof to engage
in the flotation, underwriting, public sale, dealing in, or distribution of securi-
ties if that approval would require the agency to determine that the entity
which would conduct such activities would not be engaged principally in such
257. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act permits national banks to underwrite or deal
in eligible securities such as federal government and general obligation municipal
securities. All other securities (ie., those not listed in Section 16) are ineligible
securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
258. This was Citicorp's revised application. It withdrew its earlier application when it
became apparent that it would not be granted.
259. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
260. The applications, however, voluntarily limited the activities to a much lower
percentage.
261. Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987).
262. See supra quotation accompanying note 240.
263. See supra text following note 242.
264. See supra note 261. The Board thereafter approved several applications from
other banks, including Chase Manhattan, Chemical New York Corp., Security
Pacific, Manufacturers Hanover and others.
265. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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activities.2 6
6
The foregoing decisions of the Board were rendered after the effec-
tive date of the above provision, March 6, 1987. Immediately after the
Citicorp decision, the Securities Industry Association (SIA) filed suit
in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the Board's con-
struction of the term "engaged principally" and asking the court to
stay the Board's orders in light of CEBA's moratorium.267 Several
BHCs also filed suit in the same court challenging the Board's quanti-
tative and market limitations. The court imposed a stay on the orders
until March 1, 1988, but proceeded to decide the substantive issues
raised by the opposing parties and consolidated all the cases into
one.268 It denied SIA's challenges and affirmed the bank holding com-
panies' arguments as to the market limitation imposed by the Board.
However, the court upheld the Board's quantitative limitation of five
percent.269
The Citicorp decision represents a foot in the door of securities ac-
tivities for BHCs. The result could be the dismantling of Glass-Stea-
gall. The subtle beginnings of such dismantling are already
perceptible in Chemical New York Corporation27o in which the Board
approved underwriting and dealing in consumer receivable-related se-
curities.27 1 A giant step in this incursionary process was the recent
decision of the Board272 to permit BHCs, through nonbank subsidiar-
266. Competitive Equality Banking Act § 201(b)(2), 101 Stat. 552, 582 (1987).
267. The moratorium was effective until March 1, 1988. Id. § 201(a).
268. The citations to the court's orders staying all orders and its order of consolidation
are omitted.
269. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059, (1988). This decision again points out
(by implication) that Glass-Steagall treats affiliates of banks (section 20) differ-
ently from banks (section 16). Thus a less stringent standard may be applied to
activities of an affiliate than to a bank. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys. v. ICI, 450 U.S. 46, 60, 71 (1981).
270. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987).
271. An exhaustive exposition of the numerous securities related activities that banks
or BHCs are now permitted to engage in would be too cumbersome and not essen-
tial to this paper. However, a sampling is worth mentioning. An acquisition of a
discount brokerage house (Schwab) was approved by the Board in BankAmerica,
69 Fed. Res. Bull. 105 (1983), upheld by the Supreme Court in Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, 468 U.S. 207 (1984). In-
vestment advisory services to investment companies is permitted under Regula-
tion Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4)(ii)-(iii)(1992). Full service brokerage was
approved in Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700 (1988). Full ser-
vice brokerage to retail customers was allowed in respect to ineligible securities
held as principal in connection with authorized underwritings and dealing activi-
ties in PNC Financial Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 396 (1989).
272. J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989). The SIA challenged this
order and filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit which was
denied. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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ies, to underwrite and deal in all types of debt and equity securities
within certain quantitative limits.273 Congressional reaction to this
decision was immediate and vehement. Rep. John Dingell (D. Mich.),
chairman of the House committee that oversees securities regulation,
said through a spokesman, "The Fed is on its way to giving banks an
invitation to shoot craps with the taxpayer's money. This is the kind
of irresponsible behavior that gave us the savings and loan crisis and
brought about the 1929 crash."274 House Banking Committee Chair-
man Henry B. Gonzalez (D. Tex.) said, "Some may argue that the Con-
gress has moved too slowly to resolve the issue. But this indicates the
divisiveness and complexity of the issue and does not cloak the Fed-
eral Reserve with the authority to supplant congressional action."275
In summary, BHCs may engage in discount brokerage; full-service
brokerage; limited underwriting and dealing in commercial paper, mu-
nicipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, consumer-receiva-
ble-backed securities, corporate debt and equity securities, securities
of affiliates; sponsoring closed-end mutual funds and numerous other
securities activities. The Office of the Comptroller of Currency has
authorized similar (and more expansive) activities for national banks
and the FDIC has given permission to state nonmember banks subject
to state law to engage through affiliates in even broader securities
transactions.
Banks have attempted to enter other financial spheres. The pres-
sure to expand products and services impelled the banking industry to
cast an eye towards the lucrative insurance domain which had histori-
cally been closed to such competition. The legal separation which had
existed between banking and insurance did not come about through
any one particular piece of legislation as with the Glass-Steagall Act
separating the banking and securities industries. Rather, the separa-
273. The revenue from securities trading cannot exceed five percent of the subsidi-
ary's revenue. The Board required that underwriting and dealing in equity secur-
ities be delayed for at least one year, pending a review of the track record
established in bonds. These subsidiaries are referred to as section 20 subsidiaries.
See supra note 256 and text accompanying notes 258-260.
274. Kathleen Day, Fed Grants New Powers to 5 Banks, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 19, 1989, at
F1, F2.
275. Id. But all this bluster and saber rattling did not cow the Board. As if to further
challenge Congress, in its Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull.
751 (1989), the Board raised from 5 to 10 percent the revenue limit on the amount
of total revenues a section 20 subsidiary may derive from ineligible securities un-
derwriting and dealing activities. See supra note 273. In addition the modifica-
tions permit, with certain conditions, underwriting and dealing in securities of
affiliates. Furthermore, in Bankers Trust New York Corporation, 75 Fed. Res.
Bull. 829 (1989) and J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 26 (1990), the
Board authorized the private placement of all types of securities, permitted the
provision of related advisory services, and permitted the buying and selling of all
types of securities on the order of investors as a "riskless principal." The Board
also held that on such transactions the 10 percent limitation does not apply.
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tion resulted from the generally accepted view that banks should not
be allowed to engage in nonbanking activities.276 This perception was
reflected by Congress's decision to permit banks to engage in minimal
insurance activity embodied in section 92 of the national bank laws.277
When the Comptroller, a half century later, attempted to enlarge
this power of national banks,278 he was overruled in Georgia Associa-
tion of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Saxon.279 The Comp-
troller had more success in empowering national banks to sell and
underwrite credit life insurance and title insurance in connection with
loans.280 As can be seen from the foregoing decisions, the Comptrol-
ler's Office has taken a fairly permissive attitude towards bank activ-
ity in the insurance field.
A more significant matter was the right of national banks to en-
gage through their subsidiaries in underwriting of municipal bond
guaranty insurance. Such underwriting not only raised the substan-
tive issue of banking and insurance but also raised a controversial ju-
risdictional issue between the Comptroller and the Board. In January
1985, Citibank, a national bank and subsidiary of the BHC Citicorp, in
a letter to the OCC proposed the establishment of a new operating
subsidiary,28 - American Municipal Bond Assurance Corporation
(AMBAC) for the purpose of issuing "standby letters of credit" for
municipal bonds. Municipalities issuing bonds would apply for
AlVIBAC insurance and, if there were a default thereon, the bondhold-
ers would apply to AMBAC for payment of interest and principal due.
The Citibank reasoned in its proposal that this activity was not insur-
ance but standby letters of credit, a long standing permissible banking
activity. In May 1985, the Comptroller approved Citibank's proposal,
agreeing that this was not insurance.28 2
In immediate response to this bombshell, the American Insurance
276. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Insurance Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010
(5th Cir. 1968). See supra text accompanying notes 115 through 118. Because of
the lack of comprehensive legislation, each banking authority developed its own
interpretations as to the sphere of insurance activity to be permitted. Thus, the
Fed, the Comptroller, the FDIC and the state authorities made independent and
conflicting decisions.
277. 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988). For subsequent history of § 92 see supra note 125. For pro-
vision of § 92, see supra text accompanying note 119.
278. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
279. 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968). For discus-
sion of this case, see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
281. Although section 16 of Glass-Steagall (12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982)) prohibits national
and member banks from owning stock in a corporation, both the OCC and the
Fed ruled that such banks may establish operating subsidiaries with the restric-
tion that such subsidiaries may engage only in activities permitted their parents,
12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34, 225.22(d)(1988).
282. Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter No. 338, reprinted in [1985-1987 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,508 (May 2, 1982).
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Association (AIA) filed suit in the D.C. District Court. The AIA
raised several issues including the contention that the proposed activ-
ity was insurance and, furthermore, that this activity was prohibited
under the BHCA as amended by the Garn-St Germain Act.28 3 The
283. Under the 1956 BHCA, Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-49 (1988), and prior to the 1970 amendments thereto, Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), the Fed permitted BHCs to engage in
insurance activities which were far broader than what is considered permissible
today. The language of the 1956 Act led to this latitude. This language prohibited
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries from engaging in activities of a nonbank
nature, except those "of a financial, fiduciary or insurance nature ... which the
Board... has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133,137 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988)). In the 1970 Amendment, Congress, in-
ter alia, deleted the "of a financial, fiduciary, or insurance nature" language and
substituted the language containing the two tests mentioned in the quoted text
accompanying supra note 240; see also supr text accompanying notes 243-245.
On the basis of this new language the Fed adopted regulations and interpreta-
tions which were more definitive and somewhat more restrictive by promulgating
§ 225.4(a) of Regulation Y (now § 225.25), of which § 225.4(a)(9)(now
§ 225.25(b)(8)) related to insurance activities. Section 225.4(a)(a) stated- [Permis-
sible activities which the Board determined to be so closely related to banking or
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto are]:
(9) acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the holding
company or its subsidiaries are otherwise engaged in business (or in an
office adjacent thereto) with respect to the following types of insurance:
(i) Any insurance for the holding company and its subsidiaries;
(ii) Any insurance that (a) is directly related to an extension of credit by
a bank or a bank-related firm of the kind described in this regulation, or
(b) is directly related to the provision of other financial services by a
bank or such a bank-related firm, or (c) is otherwise sold as a matter of
convenience to the purchaser, so long as the premium income from sales
within this subdivision (ii)(c) does not constitute a significant portion of
the aggregate insurance premium income of the holding company from
insurance sold pursuant to this subdivision (ii);
(iii) Any insurance sold in a community that (a) has a population not
exceeding 5,000, or (b) the holding company demonstrates has adequate
insurance agency facilities.
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9)(1976). (Now 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8)(1988)).
The Alabama Association of Insurance Agents brought suit against the Board,
contending that the activities listed in § 225.4(a)(9) violated § 4(c)(8) of the
BHCA in that they were not sufficiently "closely related to banking". Alabama
Ass'n, Ins. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 553 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated in part on rehearing, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
As a result of this litigation BHCs could continue to engage in the following in-
surance activities:
1. Credit life and credit accident and health insurance sold in con-
nection with extensions of credit by a bank holding company or its non-
bank subsidiary. This type of insurance may also be underwritten by
bank holding companies.
2. Property and casualty insurance sold, on an agency basis, in con-
nection with extensions of credit or the provision of a financial service
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:726
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Comptroller, holding
(such as mortgage servicing). Bank holding companies may not under-
write this type of insurance.
3. Insurance (liability, employee health, etc.) sold to banking subsid-
iaries of the bank holding company. This insurance cannot be under-
written by the holding company.
4. General insurance to the public in towns with under 5,000 citi-
zens, so long as the parent bank holding company's principal place of
banking is located in a town of less than 5,000.
but are prohibited from the following activities:
1. "Convenience insurance" (whole life or other types of insurance
products not necessarily connected to any specific loan) usually sold to
customers of a bank holding company or its nonbank subsidiaries;
2. The sale of property and casualty insurance, fidelity insurance, or
group life or health insurance for a bank holding company, any of its
nonbanking subsidiaries, or employees thereof;
3. The sale of renewal insurance after a loan from a bank holding
company nonbank subsidiary has been repaid.
4. The combined sale of mutual funds and insurance, that is, insur-
ance premium funding; and
5. Underwriting life insurance not sold in connection with a credit
transaction by a bank holding company or a nonbank subsidiary.
S. REP. No. 97-536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
This brings us to the Garn-St Germain Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Congress, reflecting the
traditional public view against concentration of economic power (see supra text
accompanying note 27), became concerned with the growing penetration of banks
into the insurance industry. For several years prior to 1982, Congress held hear-
ings on legislation designed to restrict the insurance activities of BHCs. The re-
sult was a provision in the Garn-St Germain Act which divested the Fed of its
duty and power under § 4(c)(8) to determine whether an insurance activity is "so
closely related to banking... as to be a proper incident thereto." Section 601 of
the Act, incorporated into § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), has been modified as
follows:
[The prohibition that a BHC shall not acquire a company which is not a bank
shall not apply to]
(8) shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due
notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order of regula-
tion) to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks
as to be a proper incident thereto, but for purposes of this subsection it is
not closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks for a
bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent, or bro-
ker except ....
There follow seven exemptions to this general prohibition. Exemption A permits
BHCs to act as underwriters, agents or brokers with respect to credit life, disabil-
ity and involuntary unemployment insurance if the insurance is limited to paying
off loan balances in case of the borrower's death, disability or involuntary unem-
ployment. Exemption B permits finance company subsidiaries of BHCs to sell
(not underwrite) property insurance on loan collateral on loans of $10,000 or less
(as adjusted annually by the Consumer Price Index). Exemption C permits
BHCs and their nonbank subsidiaries to engage in general insurance agency ac-
tivities in towns of 5,000 or less population. Exemptions D and G are grandfather-
ing provisions. Exemption E authorizes BHCs to supervise retail insurance
agents who sell insurance to the BHC or its subsidiaries. Exemption F permits
small BHCs (assets of $50 million or less) to engage in any insurance agency activ-
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that the guarantee insurance offered by AMBAC was not insurance
but the functional equivalent to providing standby letters of credit.28 4
The court made short shrift of the AIA's argument that the proposed
activity violated the BCHA by saying that it was unnecessary to ad-
dress this contention. The court noted that under section 4(c)(5) and
the Board's own regulation a BHC bank subsidiary may own any oper-
ating subsidiary whose activities are deemed permissible under the
National Bank Act by the Comptroller. The court further stated
that the Board will defer to the Comptroller's judgment,28 5 in effect
holding that the BHCA does not apply and the Board had no jurisdic-
tion in the matter.
In American Insurance Association v. Clarke,2 8 6 in which the AIA
appealed the decision, the D.C. Circuit Court in effect overturned the
Comptroller and the district court. The court did agree with the OCC
that the guarantee insurance was analogous to standby letters of credit
and, as such, permissible under the National Bank Act. However, it
noted that the OCC's 1985 decision that Board approval is unnecessary
because the BHCA covers only the nonbank subsidiaries of the BHCs
and not their banking subsidiaries, was incorrect. The BHCA does
limit the activities of a BHC bank subsidiary's subsidiary. Section
1843(a)(1) 28 7 bars a BHC from acquiring "direct or indirect ownership
or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank,"
unless an exception applies. 28 8
The court concluded that ultimate control of AMBAC by Citicorp,
a BHC, triggered the section 4(c)(8) prohibition of a BHC engaging
directly or indirectly through a subsidiary's subsidiary, here Citibank,
in insurance activities. The decision that standby credits were not in-
surance activities was not a judgment that the Comptroller was to
make, but was to be left to the Board. Finally, the court held that that
district court's reliance on section 1843(c)(5) 28 9 in its conclusion that
the BHCA does not apply to any OCC approved investments by a na-
tional bank was also misplaced. Section 24 applies only to securities
held for investment, but not to shares of an operating subsidiary such
as AMBAC, which is neither a security nor an investment as contem-
ity, provided that sales of life insurance and annuities is limited to activities per-
mitted under exemptions A, B or C.
284. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd on reh'g, 865
F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
285. ML at 413-14 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5)(1982) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.22(d)(1)(1985)).
286. 854 F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988), vacated in part, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
287. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1)(1982).
288. 854 F.2d 1405, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
289. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5)(1988). This section provides that national banks and their
subsidiaries may only own stock explicitly authorized by statute for investment
by national banks under the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
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plated in section 24. To summarize, the D.C. Circuit held that Ci-
tibank must obtain Board approval before issuing "standby credits"
(i.e., municipal bond insurance) through AMBAC, even though the
OCC granted it permission to do so. This decision caused great con-
cern to the Comptroller and the banking industry as it was viewed as a
shift of jurisdiction from the deregulation oriented OCC to the more
conservative Board. This motivated the Justice Department, OCC,
and Citibank, to petition the court to reconsider whether it had been
appropriate for the court to consider the OCC's interpretation of the
BHCA and whether the acquisition of an insurance subsidiary by a
national bank subsidiary of a bank holding company required prior
approval by the Board. The court granted a rehearing on October 24,
1988. On January 6, 1989, the court vacated the portion of its decision
relating to the BHCA issue, holding that, because the Board and not
the OCC had exclusive jurisdiction in interpreting the BHCA the
court would not review the OCC's interpretation.290
The Justice Department took the position that the Board does not
have jurisdiction over the operating subsidiaries of holding company
banks and refused to permit the Board to file its own brief in the re-
hearing.291 The Board, on November 21, 1988, decided to issue for
comment proposed amendments to Regulation y292 that would re-
scind its existing regulation 2 93 which permits BHCs to acquire, with-
out the Board's approval, through their subsidiary state banks,
companies engaged in activities that the bank is permitted to conduct
under state law (the so called "South Dakota loophole"). 294 If the ex-
isting rule were rescinded, BHCs would be required to obtain approval
under section 4(c)(8) prior to acquiring or creating an operating sub-
sidiary through a state bank. Until the AMBAC matter is resolved (at
the date of this writing it still is in limbo) the Board will probably not
extend its rulemaking proposal to national bank operating subsidiar-
ies. To understand the meaning of the issues involved as well as their
implications, it is necessary to review two additional matters involving
insurance, the "South Dakota loophole" and the Merchants National
case.
290. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court did not
say that Citibank cannot continue ownership of AMBAC and, therefore Citibank,
at the time of this writing, is continuing with this activity.
291. The Justice Department represents federal agencies in litigation and has the
power to prevent individual agency self-representation.
292. 53 Fed. Reg. 48915 (December 5, 1988).
293. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii)(1988). This rule is referred to as the "operating sub-
sidiary" rule.
294. This rulemaking is not directed at the operating subsidiary rule at issue in
AMBAC (where BHC ownership of the operating subsidiary was through a na-
tional bank) but it does address the same legal issues. The national bank operat-
ing subsidiary rule is found in 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1)(1992).
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Late in 1982 when the Garn-St Germain Act was passed, the insur-
ance industry had cause for celebration: it hoped that Congress had
finally passed a law that would separate banking and insurance once
and for all, and thus thwart Citicorp's (and other banks') longstanding
desire to enter the insurance business. Citicorp, however, began lob-
bying several states to allow state banks to engage in insurance activi-
ties. By March 2, 1983, the South Dakota legislature took the bait and
passed a law allowing state banks and their subsidiaries to engage in
"all facets of the insurance industry."295 At the same time, legislation
was passed to permit out of state BHCs to acquire South Dakota
banks.296 Thus the insurers' celebration did not last long. In April of
1983, Citicorp filed an application with the Board to obtain permission
to acquire American State Bank of Rapid City, a South Dakota state
bank, and thus to enter into any insurance activity nationwide.297 Cit-
icorp's application was filed under section 3 of the BHCA (which gov-
erns the acquisition of banks)298 in an attempt to avoid the prohibition
of section 4 which governs the acquisition of nonbanks.2 99 Citicorp re-
lied on section 4(a)(2),300 section 225.4(e) of Regulation Ys01 and two
295. S.D. CODFIED LAws ANN. § 51-18-30 (Supp. 1983).
296. S.D. COD=~a LAws ANN. § 51-16-40 to -42 (Supp. 1983).
297. Soon thereafter, BankAmerica Corp., First Interstate Bancorp and Security Pa-
cific Corp announced plans to buy state banks in South Dakota for the purpose of
entering the insurance business. Note, Paving the Way in the Financial Services
Industry: South Dakota Opens the Insurance Industry to Banks, 29 S.D.L. REV.
172, n.36 (1983). They all filed applications with the Board, but later withdrew
them (including Citicorp) when the Board issued a statement in January 1984
which concluded with the following paragraph:
Taking account of the important and fundamental legal and policy
issues raised by these applications, and their pending consideration
before the Congress, the Board reached the tentative judgment that it
could not approve the proposed bank acquisitions in view of present law
and expressions of Congressional intent, subject to any further consider-
ation by the Congress. However, the Board has, in the past, taken the
position that the processing of an application may be suspended where
the issues raised are the subject of pending litigation, legislation or
rulemaking. Accordingly, the Board staff has informed the Applicants
of the Board's views on these matters and the Applicants have requested
the Board to suspend the processing of their applications. Similarly, be-
cause of the pending legislation, the Board decided to defer further ac-
tion on the rulemaking now in progress on section 225.4(e) of Regulation
Y, which permits subsidiaries of state banks that are owned by bank
holding companies to acquire or form an operating subsidiary to engage
in any activity that the Bank itself may engage in directly.
Board Statement on Applications to Acquire State-Chartered Banks in South Da-
kota, January 5, 1984, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
99,820. Citicorp requested the Board to reactivate its application in February
1985.
298. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1988).
299. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988). See also text accompanying notes 238-240.
300. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988).
301. Now 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(1988).
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old Board orders.3 02 Citicorp argued that the language of section
4(a)(2) covers only the BHC itself and its nonbanking subsidiaries, but
does not relate to its banking subsidiaries. 303 Under section 225.4(e)
the Board declared in 1971 that
So far as federal law is concerned, a state chartered bank or a subsidiary
thereof may ... acquire or retain all ... of the shares of a company that
engages solely in activities in which the parent bank may engage, at locations
in which the bank may engage in the activity, and subject to the same limita-
tions as if the bank were engaging in the activity directly.3 0 4
Citicorp contended that this language clearly exempted state banks
owned by BHCs from the constraints of the "closely related to bank-
ing" standards of section 4(c)(8);3 05 the scope of their nonbanking ac-
tivities being subject only to the limitations of state law. In relation to
the Piedmont and American Bancorp orders,306 Citicorp maintained
that the Board had held that BHC insurance activities through state
bank subsidiaries are consistent with the BHCA. These cases involved
applications under section 3 for the formation of new BHCs by the
existing banks, and under section 4 for the acquisition by the new
BHCs of several finance companies. The existing banks were already
engaged through subsidiaries in general insurance agency activities
permitted by state law. Pursuant to section 4(c)(5) of the BHCA and
section 225.4(e) of Regulation Y, the Board approved the applications
and stated that Board approval was not required.3 07
The Board nevertheless denied Citicorp's application without spe-
cifically addressing Citicorp's contentions.3 08 The Board approached
the matter from a wholly different point of view; it concluded that the
proposed acquisition was an attempted evasion of the requirements of
section 4.309 It analyzed the South Dakota statute as follows:
South Dakota law specifically provides that an out-of-state bank holding
302. Piedmont Carolina Fin. Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 766 (1973); American
Bancorp, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 22,468 (1974).
303. The language referred to is as follows: "No bank holding company shall... retain
direct or indirect ownership or control... of any company which is not a bank or
bank holding company or engage in any activities other than.., banking or of
managing or controlling banks ... and.., those [activities] permitted under [Sec-
tion 4(c)(8)]." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1982)(emphasis added).
304. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(e)(1983). In 1984 the Board replaced this provision with
§ 225.22(d)(2), supra note 301, in which there was added the italicized phrase: "A
state chartered bank or its subsidiary may, insofar as federal law is concerned
and without the Board's prior approval ... acquire or retain all ... of the securi-
ties of a company." 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(1988)(emphasis added). This addi-
tional language seems to strengthen the argument set forth by Citicorp.
305. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988).
306. See supra note 302.
307. Piedmont Fin. Servs., Inc., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 766, 768 (1973).
308. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985).
309. Thus leaving the South Dakota loophole issue still an open question. In fact the
Fed specifically refused to decide that point:
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company may acquire a single existing state chartered bank in South Dakota.
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-16-40(b)(1984). South Dakota law also permits
all banks chartered under the laws of South Dakota to engage, either directly
or through subsidiaries, in all facets of the insurance business. S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 51-18-30 (1984). Under South Dakota law, however, a South Da-
kota bank acquired by an out-of-state bank holding company is prohibited
from expanding or acquiring new banking offices or remote service units by
merger, acquisition or de novo and is required to conduct its insurance activi-
ties in South Dakota in a manner and at a location that is not likely to attract
customers from the general public in South Dakota to the substantial detri-
ment of existing insurance companies, brokers and agents in the state. S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-16-41 (1984). In addition, a de novo South Dakota
bank acquired by an out-of-state bank holding company is limited to operating
a single banking office in South Dakota and is required to conduct its banking
business in South Dakota at a location and in a manner so that it is not likely
to attract customers from the general public in South Dakota to the substan-
tial detriment of existing banks in the state. Id. South Dakota banks owned
by South Dakota bank holding companies are not subject to the same limita-
tions or restrictions as apply to state banks owned by out-of-state bank holding
companies, and may, for example, establish branches statewide.3 1 0
The Board concluded that the primary, if not sole, purpose of the pro-
posed acquisition is to enable Citicorp to engage in nationwide insur-
ance activities prohibited under section 4. It further found that the
acquisition of the South Dakota bank would amount to the acquisition
of a nonbank and an attempt to bypass the strictures of section 4(c)(8)
because the acquired "bank" would be predominantly an insurance
agency engaged in little, if any, banking business. The Board noted
that it is authorized under section 5(b)311 to deny applications that
manifest an evasion of the purposes of the BHCA, even if the proposal
technically meets the letter of the law.3 12 This decision raised fears in
In light of this conclusion, the Board finds it necessary to make a
determination regarding Protestants' contention that the nonbanking
and insurance provisions of the Act apply to holding company banks.
The Board has, however, previously determined that the nonbanking
provisions of the Act apply to acquisitions by holding company banks of
voting shares of a company. 12 C.F.R. 225.101. The Board has adopted a
regulatory exemption from this prohibition, found in section 225.22(d)(2)
of Regulation Y, for acquisitions by holding company state banks of all of
the voting shares of a nonbanking company engaged only in activities
that the bank may conduct directly. This exemption was adopted in or-
der to promote competitive equity between holding company banks and
independent banks in the absence of evidence of use by bank holding
companies of holding company banks to evade the nonbanking provi-
sions of the Act. Because Citicorp proposes to utilize Bank to evade the
nonbanking provisions of the Act, the Board concludes that the proposal
is not consistent with regulation.
Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789, 791, n.6. The Board is now in the process of
resolving the matter through the rulemaking process. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 291-294.
310. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985)(emphasis added).
311. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b)(1980).
312. Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull 789, 790, n.3. Although the Board did not stress Cit-
icorp's § 225.4(e) argument, in its rulemaking notice for amending
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the insurance industry that, absent an evasionary motive, the Board
would approve BHC applications of the South Dakota-type loophole.
The decision motivated Congress to hold hearings on the matter.313
The main issue was whether the insurance prohibition provision of
section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA314 should be applied to bank subsidiaries
of BHCs. Under the present wording of that section and section
4(c) (5) the Board has held that it only applies to the BHCs themselves
and their nonbank subsidiaries.3 15 Unfortunately, Congress did not
follow through and act on this matter 316 and the fears of the insurance
industry were realized when the Board made its decision in the
Merchants National Corporation case.317
In 1986 the Board approved applications by Merchants, a BHC, to
acquire two Indiana state banks, Anderson Bank and Mid State
Bank.318 Both banks had been engaged in selling insurance of all
kinds, except life insurance, as authorized by Indiana law.319 The
Board approval included permission to continue the insurance busi-
ness, directly by the banks themselves and not through subsidiaries of
the banks, reiterating the Board view that section 4(c)(8) does not ap-
ply to subsidiary banks of BHCs. The response of the insurance indus-
§ 225.22(d)(2)(the successor provision), see supra text accompanying notes 292-
294, the Board, in its introductory remarks stated:
In adopting these rules in 1971, the Board noted that it did so based
upon notions of competitive banks and in the absence of evidence that
acquisitions by holding company banks were resulting in evasions of the
Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971) .... The Board, however, recognized that
over time these rules could become the focus for evasion of section
4(c)(8) of the Act and cautioned that it would review the merits of its
decision not to apply the Act to these subsidiaries from time to time
based upon its experience in administering the Act.
At year-end 1971, bank holding companies controlled 2,420 banks, or
approximately 18 percent of the total banks in the United States. These
banks held approximately 57 percent of the total assets in commercial
banks in the country. By year-end 1987, bank holding companies con-
trolled 9,316 banks with 92 percent of assets in commercial banks.
Citicorp, 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789, n.3 (emphasis added). Thus it appears that the
Board has in fact, sub silentio, applied the above quoted caveat in the Citicorp
case, and therefore did not need to address the Piedmont and American Bancorp
contentions, nor the other contentions of Citicorp. Piedmont Fin. Servs., Inc., 59
Fed. Res. Bull. 766 (1973); American Bancorp, Inc. 39 Fed. Reg. 22, 468 (1974).
313. The South Dakota Loophole: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institu-
tions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
314. See supra note 283.
315. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1988).
316. Since 1982, Congress has repeatedly considered legislation that would restrict in-
surance activities of banks, but has not done so, notwithstanding numerous and
extensive hearings on the subject.
317. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876 (1987).
318. 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 838 (1986).
319. IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2 (Burns 1986).
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try was immediate and vehement. A large number of trade groups
protested the Board's order on the grounds that it violated section 4 of
the BHCA. Merchants did not want to get involved in long litigation
and, therefore, made a commitment that it would cause the two banks
to divest themselves of their insurance agency activities within two
years unless, within that time, the Board approved the banks to retain
their insurance activities. During this period, Merchants agreed to sell
only renewal policies. Subsequently, Merchants requested the Board
to release it from its commitment on grounds not relevant to this dis-
cussion. The Board granted the release on the grounds that the insur-
ance prohibitions of section 4 of the BHCA do not in any way limit the
direct activities of subsidiary banks of BHCs, except where the record
demonstrates that the type of evasion described in the Citicorp/South
Dakota case is present. 20 In the instant case, the Board concluded
that:
the record does not show that the banks would be operated by Merchants
predominantly as insurance agencies or that the acquisition of the banks is a
device to enable the applicant to engage in insurance activities. Rather, the
record shows that the insurance activities of the banks are incidental and
small relative to their banking operations.
3 2 1
Thus, the Board apparently legitimized the South Dakota loophole.
The Board went further; even though the Merchants case did not in-
volve nonbank subsidiaries of state banks in a BHC system, the Board
used this case as a vehicle to clarify its view as to applicability of sec-
tion 4 of the BHCA including the Garn-St Germain amendment. The
Board stated that it draws a distinction between direct activities and
those conducted through a subsidiary of a bank. As to the latter, the
restrictions of section 4 of the BHCA do apply.3 22 Thus, if the
Merchants order is permitted to stand, bank holding companies will be
free to enter the insurance business through the acquisition of state
chartered banks provided that all insurance activities not expressly
permitted by section 4(c)(8) are conducted directly by the state bank
and not through a subsidiary.
The insurance industry was very upset, especially since this prece-
dent could be expanded to permit BHC bank subsidiaries not only to
sell insurance but also to underwrite insurance and engage in any non-
banking activity authorized by the particular state. The Independent
Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) immediately filed a motion to
stay the Board's order pending judicial review in the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. The suit was grounded on several substantive
320. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 (1987). The Board also noted
that the insurance prohibitions of the Garn-St Germain Act do not apply. "Thus,
the provisions of the Garn-St Germain Act have no applicability where the non-
banking provisions of -section 4 of the Act do not apply." Id. at 878 n.7 (1987).
321. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 878 n.9 (1987).
322. Id. at 888.
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issues and on the CEBA323 moratorium3 24 which bars the Board from
issuing orders of the type issued here.32 5 The Second Circuit vacated
the Board's order,326 holding that it fell within the CEBA moratorium
provisions but did not address the substantive issues involved.327 Af-
ter the expiration of the moratorium, Merchants requested that the
Board reissue the order. On March 3, 1989 the Board granted the re-
lief prayed for,328 reiterating its view that section 4 of the BHCA does
not regulate the direct activities of bank subsidiaries of BHCs.329 The
323. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified as amended at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
324. Id. at § 201(b)(4).
The provision reads as follows:
[The Board] may not approve the acquisition of a bank holding company
... of... a State chartered bank, unless the bank holding company .....
has agreed to limit the insurance activities in the United States of the
company to be acquired to those permissible under section 4(c)(8)....
12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988).
325. The Fed in its order stated that the moratorium provision did not apply in
Merchants because "It]he Board's decision to grant relief from the commitments,
..., does not constitute the authorization of any activity under the BHC Act." 73
Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 893 (1987) (emphasis added). In other words, the Fed felt that
the relief granted "would not increase the banks' insurance powers since the
banks already had the powers by virtue of state law and those powers were not
and never had been limited by the BHC Act." Merchants National Corp., 75 Fed.
Res. Bull. 388, at 389 (1989).
326. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1988).
327. We have no authority to predict that the Board, now advised that the
moratorium applies to the approval of Merchants National's application,
will choose to reissue its order with an effective date of March 1, 1988.
The proper course is to vacate the order and permit the Board to proceed
as it sees fit in a manner consistent with our decision and applicable law.
In view of our disposition, it is both unnecessary and inappropriate
for us to review that portion of the Board's order that concerns the scope
of the nonbanking prohibitions of section 4 of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act.
The petition for review is granted, and the order of the Board is
vacated.
Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
328. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989).
329. The Board carefully analyzed §§ 1843(a)(1) and (a)(2)(12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(a)(1982)(see supra note 303), and concluded that:
By its terms, this restriction in section 4 does not apply to shares of a
company that is itself a bank. Thus, a bank holding company that con-
trols an institution that qualifies as a "bank" under the definition in the
Act is not required, in order to acquire or retain the shares of the institu-
tion, to limit the institution's activities to those permitted under the
closely related to banking standard of section 4 (or one of the other lim-
ited exceptions in the Act), except where the record demonstrates an
evasion of the Act, such as presented in the Citicorp (South Dakota)
case. It is only companies that do not qualify as "banks" under the Act
that must limit their nonbanking activities to those permitted under the
closely related to banking standard in section 4(c)(8) of the Act (or qual-
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IIAA immediately appealed to the Second Circuit, 330 which handed
down a shattering decision in November of 1989. Unless the Supreme
Court reverses or Congress takes some action to limit the effect of the
holding, the Second Circuit's decision may have an enormous impact
on financial institutions.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed sections 3
and 4 of the BHCA.331 It found that section 3 sets forth factors gov-
erning Board approval of bank acquisitions by BHCs. Section 4 sets
forth two sets of prohibitions, characterized as the "ownership clause"
and the "activities clause." The former provides that a BHC may not
"retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of
any company which is not a bank or bank holding company."33 2 The
latter forbids a BHC to "engage in any activities other than (A) those
of banking or managing or controlling banks... and (B) those permit-
ted under [section 4(c)(8) of the Act] .... ,333 Section 4(c)(8) 334 sets
forth the "closely related to banking" exception to the nonbanking
provision.335
The court then reviewed the Board's decision which held that the
provisions of section 4 limiting the nonbanking activities of the BHCs
do not apply to bank subsidiaries of a BHC. The Board held that the
limitations of section 4(a)(2)3 36 apply in express terms only to BHCs,
not to banks. Furthermore, the "ownership clause" of section 4 re-
stricts the entities a BHC may acquire or retain while the "activities
clause" restricts the activities the BHC itself may engage in. If the
restriction on activities were to apply to subsidiaries of the BHC, the
Board determined, the restriction on acquisition of nonbank entities
would be superfluous. The inclusion of the phrase "direct or indirect"
in the "ownership clause" and its omission in the "activities clause"
further compelled the Board's decision that the restrictions of section
4 do not apply to BHC subsidiaries. Finally, relying on section
2(g)(1)3 37 of the BCHA, the Board held that the insulation of bank
subsidiaries of BHCs from section 4 limitations does not apply to the
banks' own subsidiaries. Section 2(g)(1) provides that stock of such
third generation entities are deemed to be held indirectly by the BHC
ify under some other exception in section 4) in order to be acquired or
retained directly or indirectly by a bank holding company.
Merchants Nat'l Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388, 391 (1989)(footnote omitted).
330. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d
1275 (2d Cir. 1989).
331. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1843 (1988).
332. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988).
333. Id.
334. Id. at § 1843(c)(8).
335. See supra note 283 for the wording of this provision.
336. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(1988).
337. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1)(1988).
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and, therefore, in the Board's view, the question of the ownership of
such entities and the scope of activities of such entities are governed
by section 4. The Board further noted that the legislative history of
the BHCA and its amendments shows Congress's purpose to maintain
the power of state and national chartering authorities to determine
the scope of permissible activities of a BHC's bank subsidiaries regard-
less of whether the BHC is subject to the jurisdiction of the Board.338
The court initially noted that the BHCA did not speak precisely to
the question at hand:
We find no provision that says, in substance, 'The Board may not regulate the
activities of bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies' or 'Bank subsidiar-
ies of bank holding companies may engage in nonbank activities to the extent
permitted by their chartering authorities.' The Board reads the Act as if it
contained such language. On the other hand we find no provision that says, in
substance, 'Bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies may not engage in
nonbank activities.' The IIAA reads the Act as if it contained this wording.
The question for us is whether the Board's interpretation of the language that
does appear in the Act is reasonable .... 339
Although the court found some of the Board's arguments fallacious, it
found somewhat more persuasive textual arguments arising from
comparisons of the "activities clause" with certain other provisions of
section 4(a)(2). The grandfather clause of section 4(a)(2) permits a
BHC to conduct those activities "in which directly or through a subsid-
iary" it was engaged in at the designated times and conditions. No
similar clause modifies the "activities clause." Additionally the "own-
ership clause" prohibits retention of "direct or indirect" ownership of
nonbanks, but no such phrase modifies the "activities clause." The
court found stronger support for the Board's interpretation in the
structure of the Act. The Board argued that if the "activities clause"
did apply to subsidiaries of a BHC, then the "ownership clause" would
be superfluous, since under that reading, the "activities clause" alone
would preclude a BHC from owning a nonbank. The court agreed
with this view, but found perplexing the Board's contention that it had
no authority to regulate bank subsidiaries of BHCs in their nonbank
activities but did have the authority to regulate the subsidiaries of the
bank subsidiary. It found the IIAA's interpretation of the BHCA
more consistent.
The IIAA pointed out that the section 4(c) (8) exemptions including
those of the "activities clause," use the term "company" to describe
338. The view of the Board as to the congressional intent in the BHCA in respect to
limitations on permissible activities of subsidiary banks of BHCs is again a mani-
festation of the traditional national concern of balancing of federal and state au-
thority over banking. See supra note 78. See also supra text accompanying notes
11 - 28.
339. Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d
1275, 1281 (2d Cir. 1989).
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those entities. "Company" is defined in section 2(b)340 to include a
bank. Further, section 4(c)(8) requires of the Board, in determining
whether a particular activity is a "proper incident to banking", to as-
sess whether the performance of that activity "by an affiliate of a
holding company" will produce public benefits. Section 2(b)341 defines
"affiliate" to include "company", and thus a bank. Therefore, the
IIAA argued, subsidiary banks should be subject to the "activities
clause" because they are within the class exempted from that clause
by section 4(c)(8). The IIAA maintained that, it is more logical to hold
that the Board has regulatory power over the nonbanking activities of
all three tiers (the BHC, the bank subsidiary of the BHC and the
bank's subsidiary) rather than permit the generation-skipping effect,
which would result from the Board's interpretation.342
Although the court seemed to indicate that the IIAA had espoused
a more justifiable position, it ultimately held for the Board. The court
seemed to ignore the force of the IIAA's contentions regarding section
4(c)(8) and relied on legislative history to reach its conclusion:
Plainly, as the ownership clause commands, Congress did not want bank hold-
ing companies to own nonbanks. The legislative history, however, is remarka-
bly free of clear statements indicating disapproval of nonbanking activities
engaged in directly by bank subsidiaries. If such were the intent of Congress,
one would expect to find a clear statement of such purpose in the key House
and Senate reports. Finally, during the hearings the attention of Congress
was specifically called to the range of activities that state chartering authori-
ties were permitting for bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies ..., and
some Congressmen expressed the view that the holding company still would
not modify the state regulatory authority ... 343
In connection with the 1970 amendments to the Act, the court quoted
the following portion of the Banking Committee report:
It should be emphasized that these two prohibitions [insurance activities and
sale of mutual funds] apply only to the bank holding company and its non-
banking subsidiaries and not to the bank subsidiaries of bank holding compa-
nies whose insurance agency and mutual fund operations are governed by
other Federal and State laws. This is in keeping with the original concept of
the 1956 ac which was to regulate bank holding companies and not subsidi-
ary banks. [Emphasis added]34 4
The IIAA's petition for certiorari was denied.34 5
340. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(1988).
341. Id. at § 1841(k)
342, The IIAA points out that under the Board's interpretation the prohibition of the
"ownership clause" can be avoided by merging the "grandchild" into the bank
subsidiary and then conducting the nonbank activities itself.
343. Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 536, 553
(1955).
344. H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969)(emphasis added). The bill on
which the quoted portion of the report was made did not pass.
345. Independent Ins. Agent of America v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 111 S.Ct. 44 (1990).
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To summarize the present situation it may be stated that the posi-
tion of banks with respect to insurance is in a state of obfuscated
limbo. The Board's interpretation of section 4 of the BHCA supports
the view that direct activities of bank subsidiaries of BHCs are not
regulated by the nonbank activities regulatory provisions of the
BHCA, and, therefore, such bank subsidiaries may engage in such ac-
tivities to the extent permitted by the applicable state laws or the Na-
tional Bank Act. The Second Circuit agreed with this view.
Nonbank subsidiaries of state banks in a BHC system are consid-
ered by the Board to be under its jurisdiction, but under its present
regulation they are subject to the liberal "operating subsidiary"
rule,346 now under review by the Board.347 For nonbank subsidiaries
of national banks in a BHC system the "operating subsidiary" rule34s
seems to give all jurisdiction to the Comptroller. Clark,3 49 however,
draws this matter into question and the Board does not seem to wish
to clear it up.350 It appears that the Board, the Comptroller and the
courts are all waiting for Congress to stabilize the matter legislatively.
C. Congressional Activity and Lack Thereof
Since the early 1980s Congress has sought solutions to the
problems raised by the new financial environment.3 51 Extensive hear-
ings have been held352 and many bills have been introduced, but virtu-
346. See supra text accompanying note 294.
347. See supra text accompanying note 293.
348. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22 (d)(1)(1992).
349. American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 854 F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988) vacated in part 865
F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
350. See supra text following note 294. On the other hand, the banking industry con-
tends that not only are subsidiary banks of a holding company free from section 4
BHCA regulation (as per the Fed) but that their nonbanking subsidiaries are
likewise so. The insurance industry argues that all subsidiaries of BHCs are sub-
ject to section 4 of the Act. The courts are divided.
351. See supra part V. A.
352. A sampling (chronologically listed) is as follows:
Bank Holding Company Legislation and Related Issues: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, and Insurance of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1980); Competition and Conditions in the Financial System"
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Financial Institutions Restructuring
and Services Act of 1981: Hearings on S.1720 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Fi-
nancial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act. Hearings on S.1686,
S.1703, S.1720, and S.1721 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Seass. (1981); Depository Institu-
tions Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S.2879 Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982); Competition in Financial Services: Hearing on HR. 3537
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the
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ally no remedial legislation has emerged from this feverish activity.
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Fi-
nancial Services Industry: Oversight Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); Competitive Equity in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings
on S.2181 and S.2134 Before the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984); Financial Restructuring: The
Road Ahead: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); How the Financial System can
Best Be Shaped to Meet the Needs of the American People: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); The South Dakota Loophole: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insur-
ance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Finan-
cial Services: Blue Print for Reform: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
Comprehensive Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and
Holding Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 99th-Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Structure and
Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Financial Condition of Federally Insured Deposi-
tory Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Financial
Modernization Act of 1987 and the Financial Services Oversight Act:
Hearings on S.1886 and S.1891 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Reform of the
Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance
of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Structure of the Financial Services Industry:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); New Securities Powers for Bank Holding Companies: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, and Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Implications of New Technology for
Banking Regulation Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Role of Finan-
cial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1987); Changes in Our Financial System: Globalization
of Capital Markets and Securitization of Credit Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); Legislative Proposals to Restructure our Financial System:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Financial Restructuring Proposals:
Hearings on H.R. 3063 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); Interrelationships of
the Banking and Insurance Industries: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hear-
1992]
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For example, a bill proposed by Senator Gain 353 in 1981 would have
permitted increased flexibility in lending transactions between a bank
and its affiliates, allow all depository institutions to sponsor and sell
shares in mutual funds, restrict bank holding company insurance ac-
tivities and authorize commercial banks to underwrite municipal rev-
enue bonds. It would have broadened the powers of savings and loan
associations allowing them to offer checking accounts, make commer-
cial loans and invest in nonresidential real estate and corporate debt
instruments.35 4 However, the thrust of S.1720 was directed toward fa-
cilitating, under extraordinary circumstances, interstate and cross
country mergers and acquisitions of troubled S & Ls.35 5 The Regula-
tors' Bill,356 another 1981 bill that focused the ailing thrift industry,
offered only short-term relief as distinguished from the long-term out-
look of S.1720.357 However, the Senate Banking Committee submitted
an alternative bill, the Deposit Insurance Flexibility Act358 which also
offered solutions to the endangered thrift institutions but with a
broader panoply than the Regulators' Bill.
Having witnessed the failure of these proposed bills, Senator Garn
introduced a new bill, the Depository Institutions Amendments of
1982.359 The bill would have amended Glass-Steagall to permit banks
to establish "bank securities affiliates," which could underwrite and
deal in municipal revenue bonds and also organize, sponsor, under-
write and distribute shares of mutual funds. However, the Senate
Banking Committee amended the bill and substituted it for the House-
passed H.R.6267, which then required a joint conference committee to
resolve the differences between the two bills. The result was the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.360
This was a massive piece of legislation focused mainly on relieving
the growing crisis in the thrift industry. 6 1 A number of provisions
ings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Financial Modernization Act of 1988: Hear-
ings on S.1886 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
353. The Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981, S.1720, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
354. The very items that eventually became permitted activities of S & Ls and brought
about the calamitous disaster in that industry.
355. It was already obvious at the beginning of the 1980s that disaster would hit the S
& L industry, yet Congress waited to the end of the decade to come to the rescue,
at a projected cost to the taxpayer of $300 billion.
356. H.R. 4603, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
357. See supra note 353.
358. S.2532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., (1982). Other bail-out bills were the Capital Assist-
ance Act of 1982, S.2531, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and the Net Worth Guarantee
Act, H.R.6267, 97th Cong., 2d Sess (1982).
359. S.2879, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
360. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
361. The problem of the thrift industry did not develop overnight; Congress had con-
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did, however, deal with the problems of insurance and banking. Title
VI of the Act362 restricted BHCs from engaging in insurance activities
except certain specific enumerated types.363
In 1983 the Isaac Bill, sponsored by the FDIC, was introduced in
the House and Senate.36 4 This bill not only failed to address restruc-
turing the financial services industry, but reinforced then existing
laws and eliminated the loopholes created by the courts and regula-
tory agencies.3 65 In contrast to the Isaac Bill, Senator Garn and Rep-
resentative St Germain introduced the Financial Institutions
Deregulation Act of 1983,366 (FIDA). FIDA was designed to revamp,
deregulate and reorganize the financial services industry. It provided
for partial repeal of sections 20 and 32367 of the Glass-Steagall Act, to
allow banks to be affiliated with securities affiliates and permit cross
employment of directors, officers, and employees between banks and
their securities affiliates. FIDA would have enabled banks to indi-
rectly involve themselves in securities underwriting and dealing and
also sponsoring mutual funds. These activities would have been ef-
fected through Depository Institution Holding Companies, 368
(DIHCs), and Depository Institution Securities Affiliates, (DISAs).
BHC formation would have been simplified and the creation of non-
bank banks 369 would have been eliminated. One significant provision
of FIDA would have been the expansion of BHC permitted activities
to include "activities of a financial nature," insurance underwriting
and other risky ventures, such as real estate investment and develop-
ment.37 0 The provision "activities of a financial nature" was to be in-
terpreted broadly by the Board so as to include such services as are
sidered many relief bills prior to the 1982 Act, but passed none of them. Among
the relief measures were provisions authorizing the FDIC and FSLIC to arrange
acquisitions of financially troubled entities, to make loans to or deposits in, or
purchase the assets or assume the liabilities of, such institutions. Another provi-
sion gave thrifts the power to make nonresidential real estate loans and con-
sumer loans. This led to speculative investments by the more venturesome S &
Ls and accelerated the fiscal calamity that followed. See supra note 355.
362. Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VI, § 601, 96 Stat. 1536-38 (1982)(codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8)).
363. See the latter portion of supra note 283 for a more detailed discussion of this
provision.
364. S.1682, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.3768, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
365. For example, the nonbank banks.
366. S.1609, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3537, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
367. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1982); see also supra note 256.
368. In order to permit the creation of the DIHCs, nine federal statutes would have
required amendment: The Glass-Steagall Act, The Securities Act of 1933, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, The BHCA, The SLHCA (Savings & Loan Hold-
ing Company Act), The Bank Service Corporation Act, The Investment Company
Act, the Home Owners Loan Act and the Federal Reserve Act.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 231-33.
370. If S & Ls can, why not commercial banks?
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offered by companies not regulated as BHCs.37' Additional bills372
were introduced in 1983, but no law came forth that year.
The Financial Services Competitive Equity Act of 1984373 was a
watered down version of FIDA.374 Introduced in the Senate, this bill
would have eliminated the nonbank bank loophole, would have pro-
hibited insurance activities for BHCs and all their subsidiaries, but
would have exempted certain instruments from the coverage of Glass-
Steagall. It would have also permitted the creation of DISAs through
which banks and BHCs could deal in and underwrite certain securi-
ties.3 75 The House Banking Committee reported out the Financial In-
stitutions Equity Act of 1984,376 which provided for the closing of the
nonbank bank and South Dakota loopholes and also for tightening
certain provisions of Glass-Steagall, a much more conservative ap-
proach than the Senate's. With such divergent views in the House and
Senate no banking legislation came out of Congress in 1984.377 In
1985, the one bill that would have dealt with bank regulation,
H.R.20,378 submitted by Representative St Germain, never made it to
the House floor.3 7 9
The year 1986 was an extremely active insofar as bills being intro-
duced, but no fruit was harvested from any of them. The most encom-
passing bill was the omnibus bill introduced by Senator Garn, the
Deposit Insurance Reform and Competitive Enhancement Act
371. See supra text accompanying notes 204-220.
372. The Financial Services Competitive Equity Act of 1983, S.2181, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), a massive bill similar to FIDA with some additional provisions. The
Depository Institutions Holding Company Act of 1983, S.2134, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), introduced by Sen. Proxmire, provided for the elimination of non-
bank banks and closing the South Dakota loophole. S,2072, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) would have closed the loophole now opened wide by the Merchants Na-
tional decision, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989), by prohibiting bank subsidiaries of a
BHC from engaging in activities prohibited to a BHC or any subsidiary thereof.
This bill would have prevented the decision in the aforementioned case as well as
the Fed's incipient order in this case and its view and interpretation of
§ 4(c)(8)(see supra note 329). Had S.2072 become law in 1983, a great deal of liti-
gation would have been eliminated in the latter part of the '80s.
373. S.2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
374. Supra note 366.
375. By 1990 court decisions and Fed orders had not only empowered BHCs to engage
through subsidiaries in such activities but in additional ones, too. See supra text
following note 275.
376. H.R. 5916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
377. With one exception: The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
But this act is not germane to this paper.
378. H.R.20, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
379. Although it was reported out of the House Banking Committee, it was blocked in
the House Rules Committee, because its chairman, Claude Pepper, opposed the
nonbank bank loophole closing provisions therein.
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(DIRCEA).380 This was a massive comprehensive bill which included
provisions for expansionary (ie., deregulatory) powers for banks that
were included in the 1984 FSCEA381 as well as provisions for inter-
state purchases of banks (failing or about to fail) which would have
given great impetus to interstate banking, and provisions to close the
nonbank bank and South Dakota loopholes and many provisions of
earlier bills which addressed narrow separate issues only. But opposi-
tion from the House and from those who did not want the nonbank
bank loophole closed forced Senator Garn to abandon efforts to pass
the bill. On the House side Representative St Germain introduced an
omnibus bill382 with restrictive measures rather than expansionary
ones. Many other bills were introduced during 1986,383 but none came
to fruition.
The year 1987, however, did bring forth CEBA, a massive piece of
legislation.384 Before discussing CEBA it would be instructive to
briefly review two of the many other bills that were introduced during
1987. One of the earliest ones was The Financial Service Holding
Company bill, introduced as H.R. 3360.385 It was proposed by the As-
sociation of Bank Holding Companies and endorsed by four other
banking associations (including the American Bankers Association,
the largest national banking association) and introduced by Republi-
can Representatives Dreier of California and Roth of Wisconsin. This
bill would have, in effect, repealed most of the Glass-Stegall limita-
tions and the BHCA limitations on bank activities or BHC activities
and would have permitted:
(1) the control of a savings and loan association; (2) underwriting and distrib-
uting securities; (3) operating, sponsoring, and selling securities of an invest-
ment company; (4) acting as an investment advisor, (5) engaging in the
business of selling and underwriting insurance; (6) engaging in real estate de-
velopment and brokerage; and (7) engaging in any activity permissible for a
multiple savings and loan association or a bank holding company.3 8 6
These activities would be carried out through financial services
holding company (FSHC) subsidiaries, a FSHC being "defined by own-
ership of a BHC and any other subsidiary engaged in 'financially re-
380. S.2592, 100th Cong., 2d Sess (1986).
381. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
382. H.R. 5565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
383. The 1986 Regulators' Bill, S.2372, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), H.R. 4701, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements Act of 1986,
H.R. 4997, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
and Financial Regulations Act, S.2752, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); The Banking
Stability, Housing Improvement and Consumer Protection Act of 1986, H.R. 5565,
99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986).
384. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
385. H.R. 3360, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
386. Richard W. Whiting, A Perspective on Financial Services Restructuring, 37 CATH.
U. L. REV. 347, 366 (1988).
1992]
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lated' activities."387 "Financially related" is defined to encompass the
activities mentioned in the above quotation. It may be noted that
many of the above quoted activities are now permitted to banks or
BHCs through judicial and administrative decisions.3 88 Time does not
wait for Congress' indecisiveness.
Senators Wirth (D-Colo.) and Graham (D-Fla.) introduced the Fi-
nancial Services Oversight Act,38 9 a complex bill, conceived by Gerald
Corrigan, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It pro-
posed three different types of holding companies, most germane to
this paper being the bank holding company. This entity could engage
(through subsidiaries) in all sorts of financial activities including se-
curities and insurance as well as normal banking business. It would
also have access to the payments system and discount window through
its depository subsidiaries. The subsidiaries would be regulated by ex-
isting regulators, the parent being subject to Board supervision. The
second type would be called a financial holding company. It could en-
gage in financial services but could not own depository institutions. It
would have limited access to the discount window, but full access to
the payments system. The third type would be the commercial finan-
cial holding company. Such a company could pursue both commercial
and financial activities except for banking (i.e., ownership of a bank or
thrift) and it would have no access to the payments system or discount
window. While this third type holding company could be owned by a
nonfinancial entity, the other two types could not be so owned.
Notwithstanding the fact that the two aforementioned bills (as
well as some others) were broadly deregulatory in orientation, CEBA
did not address the issues of expanded or continued limited bank (or
BHC) activities in securities, insurance, real estate, mutual funds, rev-
enue bonds, mortgage-backed securities and other financial products.
CEBA did close the nonbank bank loophole (with a March 5, 1987
grandfather clause), apply §§ 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall90 to non-
member banks (i.e. tighten rather than deregulate), and provide a
moratorium until March 1, 1988, during which period no federal bank-
ing agency was permitted to expand the real estate and insurance pow-
ers of banks and bank holding companies within their respective
jurisdictions.3 91 However, it further provided that state chartered
387. Id.
388. See supra text following notes 273 and 322.
389. S.1891, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
390. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1988); see also supra note 256.
391. Note that the statute specifically prohibited the Fed from approving (during the
moratorium) the acquisition of state chartered banks that engage in insurance
activities, yet the Fed approved such in Merchants National. See supra text ac-
companying notes 323-327. The statute also specifically prohibited the Comptrol-
ler from permitting national banks to expand their geographic limits of insurance
activities. See supra text accompanying notes 119-123.
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banks that are not under BHC control are not subject to the morato-
rium and may engage in any insurance activity that state law per-
mits.3 92 The bulk of CEBA, however, was focused on repairing the
badly ailing thrift industry, and is not germane to this paper. In addi-
tion, CEBA included a provision which mandated a comprehensive re-
view of the nation's banking and financial laws with a view of
legislating a restructuring thereof.393
Since CEBA did not address the restructuring issues that have
plagued Congress for several years, several bills were introduced after
its passage to bring about some resolution of the matter. Senators
Proxmire and Garn introduced the Proxmire Financial Modernization
Act of 1987394 which would have in effect repealed most of the Glass-
Steagall limitations, permitting commercial banks to affiliate with se-
curities firms. The bill did not provide for expanded insurance or real
estate activities for BHCs, as did the Corrigan proposal.3 95 A bill dif-
ferent from the others was H.R.3063396 introduced by Representative
Thomas Casper (R-Del.). This bill provided that, subject to disap-
proval by the Comptroller, a national bank may engage (through a
subsidiary) in the same activities that state banks are permitted in the
state in which the national bank is located. This would be a South
Dakota loophole with a vengeance! The most "radical" bill (as a back-
lash to CEBA) was introduced by Senators Cranston (D-Cal.) and
D'Amato (R-N.Y.), called the Depository Institution Affiliation Act.39 7
This bill would have eliminated the distinction between investment
and commercial banking and would have permitted "depository insti-
tutions holding companies", through subsidiaries, to engage in virtu-
ally every kind of financial activities (including selling and
underwriting insurance) as well as commercial activities. Functional
regulation of the subsidiaries would continue under present regula-
tory agencies. Inter-affiliate transactions would be strictly limited to
preserve safety of the depository affiliates.3 98
The Proxmire bil1399 having failed to pass in 1987, was again taken
up in 1988, and, after many amendments in the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, was passed by the Senate as the Proxmire Financial Moderni-
392. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 295, 296.
393. 12 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1988).
394. S.1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
395. See supra text accompanying note 389.
396. H.P 3063, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
397. S.1905, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
398. Among other bills proposed in 1987 were: The Barnard bill, H.R. 3799, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), a broad deregulatory proposal; the American Bankers As-
sociation pressed for the passage of S.60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) and H.R. 50,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), also a proposal for expanded bank powers.
399. Supra note 394.
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zation Act of 1988.400 The House passed its own bill, H.R. 5094,401 a
much less expansionary bill than the Senate bill. Unfortunately, the
two chambers were unable to reconcile the differences and the 100th
Congress closed without any law coming forth, leaving it to the judici-
ary and regulatory agencies to determine what banks may do.
During 1989 Congress was deeply concerned with the crisis in the
savings and loan industry and concentrated on passing a law to solve
it. It did pass the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),402 not germane to this study. How-
ever, there were two bills submitted, proposing expanded powers to
banks and BHCs. The first, the Proxmire Financial Modernization
Act of 1989,403 would have repealed §§ 20 and 32 of the Glass-Stegall
Act,40 4 permitting BHCS to acquire securities affiliates and also would
have amended the BHCA to permit limited insurance activities to
state banks owned by BHCs. The second bill was the Depository Insti-
tution Affiliation Act,405 a broad deregulatory bill which would have
permitted affiliates of a DIHC (Depository Institution Holding Com-
pany) to engage in activities of a financial nature, including securities,
insurance and real estate. Banking and other insured affiliates would
be prohibited from direct involvement in the foregoing activities and
would be insulated from the other affiliates of the DIHC by being ex-
tensively prohibited from interaffiiate transactions.
From the foregoing skeletal discussion it can be seen that Congress
was not idle in 1980s in regard to banking reform proposals, but was
unable to reach a consensus on the appropriate action to take. Some
state legislators, however, saw an opportunity to take advantage of
Congress' indecision and went ahead with legislation of their own.4 06
400. S.1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
401. H.R. 5094, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
402. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
403. S.305, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
404. 12 U.S.C. §§ 378, 378 (1988).
405. H.R. 1992, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
406. The most familiar state law is that of South Dakota, referred to as the "South
Dakota Loophole", passed on March 2,1983, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-18-30
(1984). It permits South Dakota state banks and their subsidiaries to engage in
"all facets of the insurance industry". In addition, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-
16-40(b)(1984) permits out-of-state BHCs to acquire South Dakota banks. How-
ever, under S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 51-16-41 (1984) a South Dakota bank ac-
quired by an out-of-state BHC must conduct its insurance business in such a
manner as to not attract customers from the general public in South Dakota to
the detriment of existing insurance companies, brokers and agents in the state.
In effect the goal of this statute is to entice out-of-state BHCs to come into South
Dakota to acquire South Dakota "banks" (i.e. non-member banks) to be used as a
vehicle to do a nationwide insurance business, but not within the state. For the
Board's view of the matter, see the text following supra note 309.
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A statute was passed by Delaware on May 30, 1990,407 which per-
mits Delaware state banks to sell and underwrite all types of insur-
ance nationwide. A most unusual aspect of this law is its authorization
to conduct the insurance business directly within the bank, rather
than through a legally separate subsidiary (although such is also au-
thorized). If conducted within the bank, it must be in a separate de-
partment with separate officers and a separate set of books, with the
same minimum capital requirement as the Delaware Insurance Code
requires of independent insurance companies. After providing for this
superficial facade of separateness, the statute goes on to authorize the
bank to "make loans to and transact other business with such depart-
ment, division or subsidiary" as it would with other customers.408 It is
astonishing to find that this statute authorizes a behavior pattern
which even the most expansionist proponents of bank deregulation
would be opposed to, viz., that the insurance business be permitted to
be conducted inside the bank and that interaffiliate loans and transac-
tions between the bank and the insurance entity be allowed. Almost
without exception, deregulation proponents advocate absolute separa-
tion of the insurance and securities functions from the banking activ-
ity (through a subsidiary of the holding company), and mandatory
comprehensive financial insulation of the bank (i.e. the bank subsidi-
ary within the holding company structure) from the other affiliates
(referred to as noninsured affiliates, i.e. not insured by the FDIC).
But as shall be seen from the Citicorp and Family Guardian Life In-
surance order, there was "method to the madness" of the Delaware
legislation.
In addition, the Delaware legislature apparently did not make a
legal analysis to determine the legal status of the insurance "depart-
ment" or "division." Such status can become extremely important in
certain situations. Suppose a BHC wants to acquire a Delaware bank
with an insurance department. The Board, in order to grant or deny
the application, will have to determine whether the "department" is
or is not in fact a separate subsidiary for purposes of the BHCA. It
might become an extremely delicate legal issue, only determinable on
a case-by-case basis. Or suppose the bank becomes insolvent and the
FDIC has to take over? Will the assets of the insurance "department"
be swept in with the other assets of the bank to compensate the FDIC
for its salvage operation? In other words, will the policyholders of the
insurances underwritten by this insurance "department" bail out the
depositors of the bank, leaving the policyholders with no assets? And
in such a case would the insurance guaranty funds of the various states
be required to rescue the policyholders? The foregoing two examples
407. The Bank and Trust Company Insurance Powers Act of 1989, DEL. CODE. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2304 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
408. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 767(b)(Cum. Supp. 1990).
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are but a fraction of the situations where the legal status of the insur-
ance "department" becomes a critical matter. These are the kinds of
statutes that become the nightmares of regulators and judges.
The Independent Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) moved
quickly to nullify the potential effects of this legislation, by filing with
the Federal Reserve Board a "petition for enforcement" to require
Citicorp to terminate prohibited insurance activities conducted pursu-
ant to the aforementioned Delaware statute by its nonbank subsidiary,
Family Guardian Life Insurance Company.409 The IIAA argued that
Citicorp cannot rely on the "operating subsidiary"410 rule to continue
insurance activities through Family Guardian. It maintained that the
statute does not permit state banks to directly underwrite or sell in-
surance, but only permits their quarantined and separated "insurance
division" to do so. Thus, the fundamental requirement of the "operat-
ing subsidiary" rule is missing. Citicorp's response was weak: it con-
tended that the rule does apply since the statute "on its face"
authorizes Delaware state banks to transact an insurance business and
the requirement that it be done in a separate department is the tradi-
tional way of doing it.
The Board rejected Citicorp's arguments. The Board reiterated the
operating subsidiary rule limiting a subsidiary of a state bank to the
same activities that the parent bank may engage in directly. The
Board found that although on its face the statute permits Delaware
state banks to underwrite and sell insurance,
[T]he Board cannot ignore the fact that this authorization is conditioned on
compliance with an unprecedented and comprehensive set of regulatory re-
strictions, the practice effect of which is to treat the insurance division as a
separate corporate entity. For example, the separation has been carried to
such an extent that the routine authority of the state bank regulator over the
insurance division is restricted, and the insurance division is regulated under
the insurance laws as a separate corporate entity from the bank. Thus, in the
Board's view, the Delaware statute does not authorize banks to engage in the
insurance business directly, as is required by the operating subsidiary rule.4 1 1
The Board then ordered Citicorp to immediately prohibit Family
Guardian from providing any further insurance services (except as al-
lowed under § 4(c)(8)(A)412 of the BHCA).
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. In General
The principal objectives of bank regulation that have developed
409. Citicorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 977 (1990).
410. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 293, 294.
411. Citicorp, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 977, 978 (1990).
412. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)(1988).
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through the years are safety and soundness 413 of the individual banks
and stability of the financial system.4 14 Safety and soundness were
accomplished by intense risk control regulation 415 and stability
through the deposit insurance protection 416 of the FDIC and FSLIC.
At the time these regulatory laws were passed and for decades there-
after, they were acceptable to the banking industry because banks' in-
termediation function was all pervading and their lending rates
assured them of a good return with relatively little risk. There was no
need for banks to diversify417 into other activities. But since the late
1960s, the financial markets have undergone a major revolution. The
cash flow from savers' checking accounts, savings accounts and bank
CDs began to bypass the banking system en route to borrowers. There
was a vast disintermediation from banks to other institutions,41 8 such
as money market mutual funds, cash management accounts, pension
plan funds, nonbank CDs, and other nonbank investments.4 19 Fur-
thermore, individual borrowers have substantially replaced the banks
as their main source of funds, obtaining loans from finance companies,
credit unions and thrifts. Worst of all, major corporations which were
the heaviest bank customers are now relying on the commercial paper
and securities markets as their sources of credit.420 To add salt to the
wounds, the very raison d'itre of banks, lending, has become less prof-
itable. Repeal of Regulation Q raised the cost of funds to banks,421
reducing the profit on the lending of these funds.
Thus it became obvious that the legal and financial environment
under which banks are now42 2 operating has changed drastically since
passage of Glass-Steagall and the BHCA.423 The question continues to
be raised whether these statutory barriers are adequately performing
their intended functions or whether they have become counterproduc-
tive and imperil the safety, soundness and stability of the banking sys-
tem.42 4 The insurance industry, and to a much lesser degree the
securities industry425 maintain that regardless of the changes in the
413. See supra text following note 73.
414. See supra text accompanying note 62.
415. See supra note 65, 101, and text accompanying note 234.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
417. From 1933 to 1970 there was only one case interpreting Glass-Steagall, Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
418. See supra text accompanying notes 204-220.
419. Id.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 213-216.
421. See supra note 207.
422. Or more precisely, during the past 30 years.
423. 1933 and 1956 respectively.
424. Unfortunately, Congress has not yet answered this question. See part VI. C.
425. The securities industry has lost case after case, both before the Board and the
courts. Bowing to the inevitable, the SIA (Securities Industry Association) sub-
mitted a compromise bill.
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financial industry environment, the barriers must remain, lest a der-
egulated banking industry result in calamity.4 2 6
426. Bank failures during the six year period 1985-1990 almost equal the number of
failures in the fifty year period 1934-1984!
Failures
1934-1984 1165
1985 116
1986 138
1987 184
1988 200
1989 206
1990 169
1013
Source: Various FDIC annual reports. Reports on file with author. In addi-
tion, during 1985-1990, 53 banks received financial assistance from the FDIC.
Those who oppose deregulation point to (among other things) the Continental
Illinois debacle in 1983. There were lengthy Congressional hearings in this mat-
ter, which revealed many disturbing aspects of the banking industry, Inquiry into
Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervisio7, Regulation and In-
surance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Continental Illinois National Bank (CINB) has been in business more than
125 years. It began as a conservative institution, focusing on time deposits and
lending to good credit risks. Continental Illinois Corporation, incorporated in
1968, began operating in 1969 after acquiring almost all of the outstanding stock
of CINB. The Corporation engaged in lease and debt financing, mortgage lending
and banking, asset-based financing, merchant banking overseas, reinsurance of
certain credit life and credit health insurance, fiduciary and investment services,
and most importantly, financing of energy development and exploration. In 1976
bank management announced their decision to become one of the top three
American corporate lenders. The adverse effects of the bank's pro-growth policy
were not obvious for many years. In 1978, Dun's Review, a widely respected fi-
nancial magazine, described Continental as one of the five best managed compa-
nies in America. At the end of 1983, it was the largest bank in Chicago and the
seventh largest in assets and deposits among some 15,000 national and state banks
in the United States.
The hearings offer an insight to the reasons of the failure of this mammoth
bank as well as an insight into the current relationship between banks and their
regulatory agencies, the inadequacies of our regulatory system, and the amount of
risk that bank management will take given a federally insured guarantee of suc-
cess. The recent destruction of the wall between the banking and securities in-
dustries and the possibility of an upcoming merger between the banking and
insurance industries make the insights offered by the Continental fiasco even
more important. During the hearings on the problems of Continental, Congress-
man Stewart McKenney (Conn.) asked the question: "Why should we trust a
banker who can't manage a loan portfolio to be able to successfully engage in
insurance, securities, or real estate?" Id at 89.
Continental tried to put the blame on the downturn in the economy, espe-
cially the downward spiral of oil and gas prices which caused huge loans to go
bad. But Subcommittee Chairman St Germain did not agree:
And if the problems of Continental were simply an unexpected
downturn in prices of an otherwise solid oil and gas portfolio, one must
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B. The Arguments for Deregulation
1. The Capital Mobility Problem
Members of the banking industry and others who favor deregula-
tion are surprisingly willing to use the horrendous increase in bank
again wonder the regulator. Regulators, like prudent bankers, presuma-
bly do watch the concentration of assets in a single industry and are in a
position to demand the type of diversification that would enable the
bank to ride out unforseen storms. Id at 2.
With this statement, the problems at Continental stood exposed. The banks
weren't prudent, and the regulators must have been daydreaming. Although
nothing illegal became evident in the hearings, one must wonder whether there
was dishonest activity, or whether the bankers and regulators were really so in-
ept that it just seems that way. Somehow, the bankers and regulators had al-
lowed heavy concentration in oil and gas loans, averaging twenty percent of the
total loan portfolio, leaving the bank extremely vulnerable to the decline of this
highly volatile industry. Between July 1982 and September 1984, oil and gas
loans accounted for approximately two-thirds of the bank's losses.
The oil and gas loan problems were only a manifestation of the larger
problems at the bank. CINB management failed to set corporate loan quality
standards. The aggressive lending policy of CINB was extremely decentralized,
allowing loan account officers to respond directly to customers, rather than re-
quiring loan approval by committee, like most banks. According to the OCC,
"[tiop management had created an environment where aggressive lending was
not only condoned but encouraged. In this atmosphere, a high quality system of
controls was secondary." Id at 205. In fact, the policies and controls governing
loan approval, review, and classification could hardly have been worse. It is inter-
esting that the deficiencies in the internal controls seem to have been noted by
bank examiners, but without any sense of urgency. During the summer of 1981,
Kathleen Kenefick, a loan officer in the oil and gas division, wrote a five page
memo describing the deficiencies in the internal control system and recom-
mending ways to fix it. Although her memo stressed the urgency of the bank's
problems and the need for immediate action, and although the memo was in pos-
session of both her supervisor and the bank examiner, it went largely ignored
both by her superiors and the bank examiner. However, the bank examiner's
1981 report described the oil and gas division as follows:
CINB is adequately staffed with both sound lending officers and scien-
tific (engineers and geologists) personnel to handle current relationships
and meet continued strong growth anticipations.. . . No significant
problems are evident.
Id. at 62.
Also during this examination the examiner noted a near doubling in the loans
going unreviewed by the bank, which failed to review $1.6 billion one year and
$2.4 billion the second year. As noted by the writers of the 1984 staff report to the
subcommittee, these statistics would seem to indicate a severely deficient and
worsening credit review and quality control system in the bank, and they de-
served some attention. However, in his letter to the Board of Directors the exam-
iner wrote a shamefully weak statement:
... the issue of timeliness or frequency of review is noted since bank
records indicate a general increase in the number ... of loans not being
reviewed.... Although this list is up from last examination, it has not
adversely impacted the reported results from Loan Administration.
In June 1982 the examiner was offered employment with Continental, which he
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failures427 to bolster their contention that these failures are due to the
regulatory limitations on bank activities. These limitations inhibit the
mobility of capital both out of and into the banking industry. These
restraints protect other industries from a fully competitive banking
industry. For example, the securities industry is protected from incur-
sions by the banking industry, thus enabling brokerage firms to esca-
late their fees with impunity.
The banking industry also argues that regulation prevents the nor-
mal outflow of capital from a declining industry (i.e., profits are fall-
ing).4 28 This causes the retention of an excess number of entities,
while the weaker ones go bankrupt.429 In fact the number of bank-
ruptcies may actually be increased (beyond what would take place
normally) by intense rivalry among banks seeking a share of the de-
clining business. Such rivalry motivates the making of riskier loans
(real estate development, oil, third world countries, etc.) and other
risky transactions.
Conversely, preventing entry into the banking industry by other
financial or non-financial entities permits banks to conduct their af-
fairs less responsibly430 and efficiently431 since they fear no competi-
tion. Furthermore, this restraint prevents the use of outside capital
from shoring up weak banks. Thus, a strong investment bank or
strong brokerage house (or for that matter a strong auto manufac-
accepted after removing himself from the examination to avoid a conflict of inter-
est.
These are only a few examples of the serious oversights and understatements
made by the regulators and the risky and poorly managed lending practices that
created the need for a very expensive bailout funded without consent by the tax-
payers of our nation. Thus it would be highly dangerous to expand the industries
into which banks may enter when experience has shown that bankers can be
irresponsible, regulators can be blind, and Uncle Sam will reward this dangerous
combination with a 100 percent insurance guarantee at the taxpayers' expense.
So say those who fear and oppose deregulation. They also point out that at pres-
ent the banking industry is functioning at an extremely high operating leverage,
that its credit quality has deteriorated to unacceptable levels (write-offs are the
worst in its history) and because of a public perception of high risk, there is a
withdrawal of investment and credit (deposit) support. To allow banks to now
assume additional (and different) risks would be suicide, according to this view.
427. See id.
428. When profits fall within an industry the affected members (here the banks)
would normally shift their capital into more profitable industries by making ac-
quisitions therein. The result would be a revival in the industry which is being
reduced (here the banking industry-the same total profit divided among fewer
entities).
429. With the FDIC paying off the depositors or even a bailout of the bank at taxpay-
ers' cost.
430. Since FDIC insurance will take care of losses.
431. Entry of new competitors into an industry is the motivating force of competition.
Even the mere perception of entry by "outsiders" greases the wheels of the com-
petition machine (so as to discourage entry).
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turer) could not acquire a weak commercial bank and infuse it with
new additional capital.
It appears that in this age of revolution in the financial services
industry43 2 and disintermediation of the banking function433 the
Glass-Steagall restrictions actually have an adverse effect on the sta-
bility and soundness of commercial banking, the very things that the
act is supposed to protect. Therefore it is the author's opinion that
most of the limitations of Glass-Steagall and the BHCA need to be
removed-what was good in 1932 is not necessarily good in 1992. At
the same time, the safety and stability of the banking system and
soundness of the FDIC must be retained even at a more exacting level
of control than under the present system. Consequently any of the
additional activities to be permitted to banks must be performed in a
holding company structure with the permissive activities to be effectu-
ated in subsidiaries of the holding company while the bank is com-
pletely insulated from all other affiliates of the holding company.
Under the BHCA a BHC can only own banks or other entities per-
mitted under § 4(c)(8).434 Under the proposed system a financial serv-
ices holding company structure would be formed under enabling
legislation. Such a holding company (FSHC) could own commercial
banks, investment banks, brokerage firms or any kind of financial
services company.435 The FSHC itself need not be a bank or financial
institution but can be any type of commercial entity.436 Indeed, the
FSHC itself could be the subsidiary of a nonfinancial entity. The per-
ceived additional risk to the banks and the FDIC under such a struc-
ture can be minimized by proper insulation of the banks. The FSHC is
to be so structured that its management can allocate financial re-
sources among the subsidiaries at its discretion based presumably on a
desire to maximize its return provided that the bank subsidiaries will
always be allocated the minimum statutory capital requirements and
such minimums will always be maintained. This sort of scheme would
in large measure solve the mobility of capital problem described
above.
2. Retention of the Wall-The Insulation Device
As indicated above,437 under the author's proposal the affiliates of
a bank could be other financial institutions or commercial entities ex-
432. See supra part V. A.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 213-219.
434. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1988).
435. The term "financial service company" does not include an insurance company.
436. There are at present many commercial companies that own financial services
companies. See supra note 204.
437. See supra text accompanying notes 435, 436.
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cept insurance companies. 438 It shall be imperative that no lending
take place between any bank and any of its affiliates, and "lending"
shall include purchase of any kind of assets by the bank from an affili-
ate, or the sale of any kind of an asset by the bank to an affiliate. Thus
the prohibitions of §§ 23A and 23B43 9 would be expanded to an abso-
438. The legislative means of generally achieving this result is to repeal portions of 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 377 and 378 (Glass-Steagall §§ 16, 20 and 32 respectively) and 12
U.S.C. § 1843 (Federal Reserve Act § 4).
439. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-371c-1 (1988). Portions of each follows:
§ 371c. Banking affiliates
(a) Restrictions on transactions with affiliates
(1) A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in a covered
transaction with an affiliate only if-
(A) in the case of any affiliate, the aggregate amount of covered
transactions of the member bank and its subsidiaries will not exceed
10 per centum of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank;
and
(B) in the case of all affiliates, the aggregate amount of covered
transactions of the member bank and its subsidiaries will not exceed
20 per centum of the capital stock and surplus of the member bank.
(2) For the purpose of this section, any transactions by a member bank
with any person shall be deemed to be a transaction with an affiliate to
the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit
of, or transferred to, that affiliate. (3) A member bank and its subsidi-
aries may not purchase a low-quality asset from an affiliate unless the
bank or such subsidiary, pursuant to an independent credit evaluation,
committed itself to purchase such asset prior to the time such asset was
acquired by the affiliate.
§ 371c-1. Restrictions on transactions with affiliates
(a) In general
(1) Terms
A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in any of the
transactions described in paragraph (2) only-
(A) on terms and under circumstances, including credit stan-
dards, that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such
bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable
transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated companies, or
(B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and
under circumstances, including credit standards, that in good faith
would be offered to, or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies.
(2) Transactions covered
Paragraph (1) applies to the following.
(A) Any covered transaction with an affiliate.
(B) The sale of securities or other assets to an affiliate, including
assets subject to an agreement to repurchase.
(C) The payment of money or the furnishing of services to an af-
filiate under contract, lease, or otherwise.
(D) Any transaction in which an affiliate acts as an agent or bro-
ker or receives a fee for its services to the bank or to any other per-
son.
(E) Any transaction or series of transactions with a third party-
(i) if an affiliate has a financial interest in the third party, or
(ii) if an affiliate is a participant in such transaction or series of
transactions.
(3) Transactions that benefit an affiliate
For the purpose of this subsection, any transaction by a member
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lute restraint. In fact, one of the provisions of the enabling legislation
ought to provide that in case of failure of any bank affiliate, the FSHC
will have to reimburse the FDIC for the monies disbursed by the lat-
ter. The reason for such an exacting provision is to prevent the FSHC
from siphoning off44o resources of a bank to assist an affiliate that is
faltering, causing the bank to fail. Managers of entities not subject to
control and supervision as are banks,441 need be made to understand
that banks under their control are not merely another subsidiary. The
temptation for the above described bail out is especially great because
a bank's assets can cover another affiliate's losses many times larger
than the bank's own capital. If the bank fails as a result of this drain,
the parent FSHC stands to lose only the equity invested in the bank;
the rest of the affiliate's loss (equal to the deficit in the bank) would
be, in effect, redeemed by the FDIC.442
Strict insulation would also ensure that legal separateness not ever
be questioned. Thus if an affiliate were to cause a loss to a third party,
such person should not be able to make a claim against the bank. This
matter is only one of the many problems with the Delaware deregula-
tion statute.4 43
C. Other Matters
1. Subtle Anti-competitive Issues
An additional argument against affiliate connections is the belief
that the bank would use subtle means of "steering" its customers to-
ward the services offered by these affiliates, thereby creating unfair
bank or its subsidiary with any person shall be deemed to be a trans-
action with an affiliate of such bank if any of the proceeds of the
transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred to, such
affiliate.
440. To see how this was done in the insurance industry see supra notes 174-182, 198
and accompanying text.
441. The FSHC would not be a regulated entity per se as the BHCs are at present,
except for supervision limited to determination that minimum capital require-
ments of banks within the FSHC are maintained, as well as sufficient minimum
capital within the FSHC to be able to provide the minimum bank capital needs at
any and all times is available. Neither the acquisition of banks nor divestitures
thereof require prior approval of a regulatory agency such as the FRB. Mere
notification is sufficient. On the other hand, regulation and supervision of the
banks themselves will continue under the same agencies. If the bank is a national
bank it will be supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC; if it
is a BHC (as a subsidiary of an FSHC), by the Fed; and if it is a state member
bank then by the state agency and FDIC.
442. In fact, one of the arguments against permitting banks to affiliate with others is
the belief that such affiliates will then indirectly enjoy the benefits of the insured
bank (i.e. FDIC insurance). Not only is it imperative that such a situation not
exist, but it is absolutely essential that any perception of such an advantage to an
affiliate must be eliminated. Absolute insulation is, of course, the answer.
443. See supra text following note 408.
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
competition. For example, assume a bank is affiliated with a stock
brokerage firm, a mutual fund, a title insurance company, a casualty
insurance company, a life insurance company, an automobile dealer-
ship, and an investment bank, all under the umbrella of an FSHC. A
customer of the bank requests a loan and is willing to pledge securities
he owns. The loan officer indicates that it would be more convenient
for the bank if the customer deposited the securities with the affiliate
broker and then assign the account to the bank (thus the bank would
not have to "handle" the securities). The customer complies believing
it necessary to get the loan. Or a customer of the bank requests an
auto loan. A bank officer explains that loans on autos purchased from
its affiliate auto dealer are much easier to process. Since the auto
dealer has the same car at same price that customer wants to buy,
customer complies. Or a customer of the bank requests a mortgage on
a home he is in the process of buying. The bank officer tells him that
the bank relies on affiliate title insurance company more than on
other title companies, and that an affiliate casualty insurer is very
knowledgeable in writing insurance on homes. The customer obtains
both title and casualty insurance from the bank's affiliated companies.
That such abuses might develop cannot be denied. However, if a
bank officer is prone towards such behavior, he could do so whether or
not there is affiliation. The solution of such problems lies in proper
enforcement of existing laws. Proper execution of present oversight
powers by the regulatory agencies should reduce such abuses to a min-
imum whether or not deregulation takes place.
2. The Case Against Insurance Integration
The additional activities to be permitted commercial banks as sug-
gested heretofore,44 4 would be congruent with activities presently per-
mitted them4 45 and there would therefore be a "natural" extension of
functions with which bankers are familiar and experienced. These ad-
ditional activities would be very much related to and similar to bank-
ing activities, thus enabling the bankers to assess the risk level they
would be assuming when entering the "new" fields. Insurance under-
writing is a totally different matter. It is not similar to usual banking
transactions,44 6 bankers are not familiar with the nature of the indus-
444. To do as investment banks do (i.e. underwrite all kinds of securities), as broker-
age firms do, as mutual funds do, etc.
445. See supra notes 101, 219, 271 and text accompanying note 273 and text following
note 275.
446. There is a strong view that insurance and banking are very similar and compati-
ble: insurance policies and demand deposits are both ways of funding investment
assets. Insurance, at least from the underwriter's perspective, is like a demand
deposit. The depositor or insured exchanges money in the present for the bank's
or insurer's promise to pay in the future. The underwriter can use the premiums
to buy investments, just as a bank uses demand deposits or any other debt obliga-
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tion. A bank is willing to pay interest, giving its depositors more than the amount
deposited. Similarly, an insurance underwriter is willing to pay out more in
claims than it has taken in as premiums. This is because both the bank and the
insurer can more than offset the deficit with investment income generated before
paying back the obligation. From a bank's point of view, insurance could be an-
other source of funding for its asset portfolio.
Payment of insurance claims are not on a definite time schedule; they are tied
to the hands of fate. Nevertheless the unpredictable nature of the liability is not
a deterrent because this does not prevent the insurer from determining the prob-
able amounts of claims each year. An insurer has a large pool of similar obliga-
tions and can analyze historical data to find the probability of an average
customer claim. For example, an underwriter of automobile collision insurance
may conclude from available data that an average driver in his pool has a 5%
chance of having an accident in any given year, that an average customer sub-
scribes for 10 years and that an average accident costs the insurer $100. If there
are 1000 customers in this pool and it charged a premium of $4.7619 per year it
would be as if it had taken 1000 $4.7619 time deposits with an average maturity of
10 years at 5% interest in that given year. Whenever it receives a $4.7619 pre-
mium it may expect to pay $5 in claims to the insured, just like a bank that takes
deposits and repays the principal plus interest. Because the insurer has a large
pool of customers, it can use averages and historical data to predict the amount it
expects to pay each year. Any variance between the estimated liability and actual
claims paid is usually small and therefore not a significant concern. Such annual
volatility is adjusted in the following year's estimate. Bankers too are not stran-
gers to volatility of liabilities, but with bankers it is on the asset side of the bal-
ance sheet: It makes loans with the expectations that some of them will not be
repaid; a bank must determine an expected amount of default. The actual amount
will vary around this expected amount. The risk of default is implicit in the inter-
est rate.
There are similar economic components in insurance (as a liability) and loans
(as an asset). There is an extension of credit and an assumption of risk for each.
An insurer in effect borrows money from its customer, which it can use until it
must pay a claim. To some extent part of the premium rate reflects an expected
risk-free interest rate, determined by the demand for and supply of money from
premiums. In addition, insurance premiums also reflect the risk that the insurer
assumes in agreeing to pay when a claim is made. Similarly, the bank loan inter-
est rate partly reflects the price of risk-free credit, which is a function of the
supply and demand for money. In addition, it also reflects the risk of default. A
bank can enter into the insurance business without introducing any new ele-
ments onto its balance sheet.
A primary benefit from adding insurance underwriting to the business of
banks is a reduction in the risk of illiquidity due to interest rate movements by
reducing the interest rate gap between the interest rate banks must pay on de-
mand deposits and the interest rate they receive on their loans. The interest rate
gap creates a risk of illiquidity because bank assets (loans) are usually of longer
duration than bank liabilities (deposits), and it is possible for interest rates to
move up sharply and unexpectedly, leaving a bank stranded with relatively low
yielding assets which it must fund with more expensive higher interest rate lia-
bilities. (This is one of the causes of the savings and loan crisis.) Insurance liabil-
ities are usually of longer duration than demand deposits and other bank
liabilities, and to the extent that bank assets are usually of longer duration than
bank liabilities, adding insurance to banks' business would reduce the risk of li-
quidity problems created by suddenly increased interest rates.
Another benefit would be the decrease in the cost of gathering information
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try and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risks involved 447 in
entering the field. The insurance industry has been in a near crisis
state for the past few years.448 In fact, the insurance industry's
which would occur by each customer using only one financial institution for
many of his/her financial services. A customer with credit cards, mortgages, car
loans, checking accounts, etc. would be more efficiently evaluated by a single in-
stitution rather than several. A bank that has underwritten life insurance for an
individual who later asks for a car loan would have an easier time evaluating the
risk, since it has already done much of the preliminary information gathering.
A third benefit is that with increased knowledge of a loan candidate's insur-
ance coverage, a bank can more accurately assess the risk of lending and can price
its loans more competitively. For example, a personal loan candidate with in-
dependent personal liability insurance and property insurance poses little risk of
default due to some catastrophic accident. This implies that tie-in sales would be
a beneficial practice. The risk of default is implicit in the interest rate paid on a
loan. This risk premium is presently not situation specific; it represents an aver-
age bundle of what can go wrong. But what can go wrong varies greatly between
customers. Forcing all those who are on a particular risk to insure against it
would reduce the risk of lending to them, and it would make the process of charg-
ing for the risk of lending more explicit and subject to clear negotiation.
447. Notwithstanding the argument id., it is recognized that insurance underwriting
carries dissimilar risks. See supra note 8. Furthermore, a time of crisis in the
banking industry, see supra note 426, is not the time to experiment by permitting
unfamiliar risky undertakings by this weakened financial group.
448. One would have thought that after Baldwin-United (see supra note 198) and after
the post-Baldwin Model Insurance Laws (1985) (see supra note 199 and accompa-
nying text) the insurance industry would be safe. Not so. Since then many large
insurers failed, causing vast losses to the public. One such was Mission Insurance
Company:
The factual causes of Mission's demise are quite clear. As the re-
ceiver succinctly stated, the two direct causes were high losses from the
nature of the business Mission held, coupled with the failure of the com-
pany's reinsurers to pay their share of those losses. He described the
situation as two guns, one pointed at each temple. The cause of insol-
vency was a question of which bullet did the job, since each was a fatal
shot on its own.
The receiver estimated the ultimate cost to the public of Mission's
collapse will be $1.6 billion. The obvious question is, "How could a com-
pany with less than $240 million in capital surplus write enough bad
business to cause a $1.6 billion failure?" The answer lies in excessive use
of reinsurance.
Failed Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies, Report by the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1990)(emphasis added)[hereinafter Dingell].
Reinsurance is the process whereby insurance companies spread
their risk exposure by transferring portions of specific policy liability to
other insurance companies in return for their receiving part of the pre-
miums. The company that originates business is compensated for its ef-
forts, brokers earn commissions for arranging reinsurance of the
business, and intermediary agencies receive commissions for managing
pools where reinsurance companies share in specific risks as joint ven-
ture participants. These reinsurance pools are a key method for coordi-
nating the joint participation of many companies in sharing business that
is centrally managed.
Agencies that manage reinsurance pools are usually responsible for
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problems can be traced back to the late 1970s. The high interest rates
that developed during that period along with the money market funds
flooding the market449 and the interest rate deregulation 450 has had a
tremendous adverse impact on life insurance companies. Policyhold-
ers borrowed against their policies at ridiculously low rates451 and in-
vested the proceeds in higher yielding instruments (1MFs; CDs;
NOW accounts; municipals; government bonds, notes and bills; and
other similar instruments). The life insurance industry responded by
issuing new high yielding products, such as single premium annuities,
universal life policies, variable universal life policies, and guaranteed
investment contracts452 (GICs). In order to be able to pay these high
yields, life insurers had to invest into risky, high yielding instruments,
including "junk bonds." The collapse of the junk bond market in 1989
underwriting business accepted by the pools, handling claims, collecting
and distributing premiums to pool members, and establishing adequate
reserve guidelines. Within set limits per risk and general management
terms, such agencies can obligate pool members on any type of property/
casualty business, and accept as many separate risks as they consider de-
sirable during the one-year period common to most pool agreements.
Pool members are, therefore, dependent on the managing agency to de-
termine the quality and amounts of business accepted by a reinsurance
pool.
For reinsurers, the benefit of reinsurance participation is an opportu-
nity to share for a fee in the business generated by other companies,
without the responsibility for developing customers and handling claims.
For insurance companies whose business is reinsured, the benefit is to
reduce their risk exposure on specific policies, and increase the amount
of new policies they can write. Business that is properly reinsured and
secured by letter of credit or trust funds put in escrow by the reinsurer
can be removed from the originating company's balance sheet. Because
a company's ability to accept new business is controlled by the ratio of
business on its books to its capital surplus, transferring business to the
books of reinsurance companies creates room to write new business and
earn more fees [and this excess new business is what breaks the camel's
back].
Id. at 9.
Reinsurance abuse has been a key factor in every insolvency studied
by the Subcommittee. The level of reinsurance has been excessive, the
quality has been poor, and controls on reinsurers have been minimal or
nonexistent. Conflicts of interest in arranging reinsurance have been
fairly common, and reinsurance problems seem to grow geometrically
with the number of reinsurers involved. In addition, letters of credit
have not worked to guarantee the performance of these reinsurers, and
foreign reinsurers appear beyond the effective reach of state regulators,
especially when they are domiciled in countries where regulation is
weak.
Id. at 69.
449. See supra text accompanying note 218.
450. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1992); see also supra note 207.
451. Typically the rate is five percent. Low rates were written into the terms of mil-
lions of insurance policies issued prior to the 1980s.
452. Some of these were guaranteeing an 18% return for terms as long as ten years.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:726
has put enormous pressure on the stability and solvency453 of the life
insurance industry. In addition, even mortgage loans, the "safe" tradi-
tional investment vehicle of insurance companies, has recently turned
into an underperforming asset (i.e. the debtors can't make their pay-
ments).454 The alarming increase in death claims due to AIDS and
AIDS related causes of death has put, and will continue to put, a sharp
dent into the assets of life insurers.45 5
The investment scenario of the property and casualty insurance in-
dustry is much rosier since it apparently avoided involvement with
junk bonds. The industry's investment income has been high; how-
ever, the underwriting performance has been negative for a long time.
Earthquakes, floods, and now unforseen environmental cleanup liabil-
ities and asbestosis claims have resulted in deteriorating operating in-
come.45 6 Insolvencies in the insurance industry have been heavy,457 as
is the case in the banking industry.458 Now is not the time to permit
integration of two weak and poorly regulated industries.459
453. Two giant life insurers were taken over by the State of California in 1991 due to
their insolvency directly attributable to their holdings of large amounts of junk
bonds.
454. As an example, Travelers Insurance, a giant in the industry, has set up reserves
of over $1 billion against its holdings of about $4 billion of underperforming mort-
gage loans. In other words Travelers has practically written off $1 billion of as-
sets! See INVESTMENT VISION, Nov.-Dec. 1990, p.2 7 .
455. The industry anticipates $50 billion in claims for premature deaths due to AIDS
in the next ten years alone. Id.
456. Operating income is the net result of investment income and underwriting in-
come (loss).
457.
Insurance Industry Insolvencies
LIFE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
1985 9 25
1986 12 16
1987 19 14
1988 13 12
1989 43 23
1990 30 10 (1/2 year)
Sources of figures on file with the author.
458. See supra note 426.
459. But if the same insulation devices as described in supra part VI. B. 2. were er-
ected around a bank affiliated with an insurance company, would that not be
enough protection? Probably not. It appears that regulation of insurers is in dis-
array. Here is what the California Insurance Commissioner had to say about this
matter:
Legislative and regulatory oversight to the insurance industry now is
"very weak" and will likely "get worse before it gets better," according
to California Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie.
"The trend in government in the last 10 years has been paralysis," she
said.
Despite "a lot of fire and brimstone" from regulators and elected offi-
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3. The 1991 Treasury Department Deregulation Proposal
On March 20,1991 a Treasury Department banking reform bill was
introduced in the House and Senate: The Financial Institutions Safety
and Consumer Choice Act of 1991.460 The intent of this massive piece
of legislation is summarized as follows:
Section 2 provides that the purposes of the Financial Institutions Safety and
Consumer Choice Act of 1991 (FISCCA) are to return deposit insurance cover-
age to its original purposes of protecting small depositors and promoting fi-
nancial stability; to strengthen the role of capital, enhance the supervision,
and restrict risky activities of insured depository institutions; to permit na-
tionwide banking and branching; to authorize the establishment of financial
services holding companies to permit companies owning depository institu-
tions to engage in other financial services with appropriate safeguards; to pro-
mote consumer convenience by permitting banking organizations a broader
range of financial products; to simplify the regulatory structure for depository
institutions by establishing a consolidated regulatory agency, the Office of De-
pository Institutions Supervision; and to recapitalize the Bank Insurance
Fund.4 6 1
A large portion of the bill is devoted to reforming the Federal Deposit
Insurance system by placing new limits on deposit insurance coverage,
by requiring the FDIC to use the least costly method to resolve in-
sured depository institutions, by requiring the setting of insurance
premiums for depository institutions on a risk-based assessment sys-
tem, by cracking down sooner on troubled banks, by expanding the
bank examinations, by raising capital requirements and by several
other changes from the present law. Another portion of the bill tight-
ens regulations in relation to foreign banks operating in the United
States. The bill also proposes a restructuring of the regulatory entities
cials, there has been very little real action in terms of insurance regula-
tion, charged Ms. Gillespie.
"The expectations of the public and the ability of government to de-
liver are poles apart," Ms. Gillespie noted.
Stacy Adler, Oversight of Insurers Weak'. Gillespie, BuSINESS INsURANcE, Aug.
20, 1990, at 14.
The Dingell report observed:
Under the present regulatory framework, state insurance depart-
ments are responsible for regulating insurance company solvency, and
administering the liquidation of insolvent companies. The Sub-commit-
tee found numerous weaknesses and breakdowns in this system, includ-
ing lack of coordination and cooperation, infrequent examinations based
on outdated information, insufficient capital requirements and licensing
procedures, failure to require use of actuaries and independent audits,
and improper influence on regulators. Inadequate staffing and regula-
tory resources is also a serious problem, yet state governments collect
twenty times more from premium taxes than they spend on insurance
regulation. Realistically, can the present system correct these problems
when 50 state legislatures and insurance commissions are involved?
Dingell, supra note 444 at 72.
460. S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
461. Id. § 2, as summarized by the Treasury Department's section-by-section analysis.
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by abolishing the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Office of Thrift Supervision and creating the Office of Depository In-
stitutions Supervision with broad administrative and supervisory pow-
ers over particular institutions.
There are several other areas of regulatory matter, but the one
most germane to this paper is Title II of the bill, entitled "Financial
Services Modernization." It creates (as of January 1, 1993) the Finan-
cial Services Holding Company (FSHC) and the Diversified Holding
Company (DHC). The FSHC will be able to own banks directly and
engage in activities currently permissible for BHCs (except that a
bank will not be able to be a FSHC) as well as participate in a broad
range of financial services through subsidiary institutions. Thus,
banks owned by a FSHC will be affiliated with a variety of financial
entities. A DHC may own or control a company engaged in activities
not permitted for FSHC subsidiaries. A DHC may not own a bank
directly, but it may own or control a FSHC and thus control a bank
indirectly. A bank may not be a DHC, but any commercial entity may
be a DHC. A sketch of these holding companies follows:
Financial Service Holding Company
A FSHC itself will be permitted to engage directly only in what
was permitted BHCs under the "closely related" standard462 of§ 4(c)(8),463 but not in any new activities that may be approved under
the "financial nature" standard,464 nor in the securities or insurance
activities authorized under §§ 4(c)(15) and 4(c)(16).465 All of these
new activities will have to be undertaken through subsidiaries. Thus,
a FSHC can continue to pursue those activities permitted under the
regulations and orders of the Board466 in which it was engaged as a
BHC on December 31, 1992. However, specific provisions address the
question of underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities. 467 The
FSHC will be permitted to continue these activities 468 for a period of
only three years (subject to the limitations imposed by the Board
when it authorized such activity469 ) and then convert the § 20 subsidi-
ary470 into a § 4(c)(15) subsidiary.471 A FSHC will be permitted to es-
tablish (or acquire) securities affiliates, referred to as § 4(c)(15)
462. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1976). The closely related standard has been replaced
in the FISCCA by the "financial nature" standard. The Board will determine (by
regulations, rules and orders) what activities are permissible under this new
standard.
463. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1982).
464. See supra note 445.
465. S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 203(a)(2)(C)(1991).
466. See supra text accompanying notes 241-242, 275.
467. See supra note 257.
468. Referred to as section 20 subsidiaries. See supra note 273.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 257-264, 272 and 273.
470. See supra note 273.
471. See supra note 465.
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subsidiaries. Such a subsidiary may engage in underwriting, distribut-
ing and dealing in any type of security; organize, sponsor, control and
distribute mutual fund shares; do private placements, investment ad-
visory services, full service brokerage activities and so on. A FSHC
will also be permitted to establish or acquire insurance affiliates, re-
ferred to as § 4(c)(16) subsidiaries. Such a subsidiary will be able to
provide insurance as a principal (i.e. underwrite), broker or agent
without geographic or product limitations.
The FISCCA classifies banks into 5 zones. Zone 1 banks are the
highest level, as expressed in terms of capital. Thus a zone 1 bank is
defined as a bank that maintains a risk-based capital ratio that is sig-
nificantly in excess of the minimum ratio required by the appropriate
federal banking agency under its risk-based capital standard and tier 1
capital that is significantly in excess of the required minimum for tier
1 capital.472 Zone 5 banks are banks that are at the level of need for
immediate salvaging action by the appropriate federal banking
agency.473 A FSHC that owns a zone 1 bank has certain privileges and
rights in procedures relative to expansion and acquisition of subsidiar-
ies. Similarly, the bounds of permissible activities of FSHCs that con-
trol banks other than zone 1 banks are determined by the zone
classifications of the banks they hold.
Diversified Holding Company
Section 204 of the bil1474 establishes the DHCs, a means whereby
there can be affiliation between commercial firms and banks. DHCs
may own only well capitalized banks, and own them only indirectly.
In practical terms it means that DHCs may acquire FSHCs, but only
those that meet the requirements of zone 1. Furthermore, all lending
between a FSHC or any of its subsidiaries, and an affiliated DHC or
any of its affiliates is strictly forbidden. Additionally, a number of
other transactions between the aforementioned entities is prohibited.
Other Matters
Amendments to the Glass-Steagall Act are included in order to
conform the permissible activities of national banks to the expanded
powers of FSHCs. Similarly, amendments have been made to the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as
the Investment Company Act of 1940. Provision for nationwide bank-
ing by FSHCs and branch banking by national and state banks has
been included in the bill.
For a decade Congress has been presented with bills to modernize
472. "'Tier 1 capital' shall have the meaning given [that] term by the appropriate Fed-
eral banking agencies in the risk-based capital standards adopted by such agen-
cies." S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 251(a)(1991).
473. Zones 2, 3 and 4 are, of course, between these extremes. Each zone is described at
length in § 251 of the bill.
474. S.713, H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 204 (1991).
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the American financial services system,475 without a successful resolu-
tion. Will it work this time?
The banking overhaul, championed by Treasury Secretary Nicholas F.
Brady, faces a myriad of legislative obstacles, as well as a mine field of special
interests. And lawmakers fear that they may be wading into another savings
and loan quagmire, which is blamed in part on deregulation legislation of the
early 1980s.
"It will require Herculean effort and Job-like patience to get the whole
thing through," said Bryce L. Harlow, until recently the Treasury's liaison
with Congress and now a lobbyist. "There is a fantasmagoria of special inter-
ests cutting this way or that. It's going to be a tough job to get those groups
together."
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu told a group of California bank-
ers last week, "It is doubtful you'll see this legislation [get] through the Con-
gress this year," and Rep. Chalmers Wylie (R-Ohio), the ranking minority
member of the House Banking Committee, has given the measure only a 50-50
chance of passing.
"I don't see the perception out there of the seriousness, the depth, the com-
plexity of the crisis facing the banking system," said Gonzalez. 4 7 6 "If we had
the perception of what the real serious nature of the crisis is, the people would
demand that we concentrate on the fundamentals." 4 7 7
A miracle is apparently needed. Miracles do happen. Let's hope.
VIII. ADDENDUM
On June 10, 1991 the Second Circuit overruled 478 the Board's rul-
ing in Citicorp4 79 and put to rest, at least for the time being, uncertain-
ties over the Board's state bank "operating subsidiary" rules.48 0 The
court appears to have determined that once the Board conceded that it
had no jurisdiction over state bank subsidiaries of BHCs481 it had cut
off its jurisdiction over the subsidiaries of those banks.
Later in the year, on November 27th, Congress passed the Federal
475. See part VI. C.
476. Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex.), chairman of the House Banking Committee.
477. The Washington Post, March 21, 1991, p. Bl, col. 5. Jerry Knight & Steve Muf-
son, Hill Obstacle Course Awaits Banking Bil4" Administration Expects Congres-
sional Fight, WASH. PosT, March 21, 1991, at B1l.
478. In Citicorp v. Board of Governors, 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1991).
479. 876 Fed. Res. Bull. 977, 978 (1990); see also supra 411 and accompanying text.
480. 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii). See also supra notes 293, 304 and accompanying text.
481. The Board ruled that whether bank subsidiaries may engage in non-
banking activities is a matter for the chartering authorities of those
banks, and not for the Board. Once that decision was made, we cannot
agree that the Act can sensibly be construed to permit the Board to dis-
place bank-chartering authorities in determining what activities are per-
mitted for the subsidiaries of bank subsidiaries.
Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys., 936 F.2d 66, 75 (2d
Cir. 1991).
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Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,482 which
was signed by the President on December 19, 1991. The scope of this
banking omnibus act is extremely broad, and only the one aspect ger-
mane to this paper will be mentioned here. Section 303 of the FDIC
Improvement Act effectively overturns the decision in Citicorp48 3 as
well as Merchants NationaJ484 and thus (again, for the time being)
forecloses the underwriting of insurance by banks.
The last relevant event to be mentioned is Independent Insurance
Agents of America v. C(arke,485 in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared section 92486 void, thereby eliminating the loophole cre-
ated by the Comptroller of the Currency in permitting national banks
located in towns of less than 5,000 population to sell insurance to any
customer.48 7
482. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
483. See supra note 481.
484. See supra text accompanying notes 330 through 357.
485. 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
486. 12 U.S.C.A. § 92 (West 1945).
487. See supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
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